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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation is a historical evaluation of the movement of the English courts from the 
doctrine of pith and marrow to the Catnic test in the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents. It considers how and why the doctrine was replaced with the Catnic 
test. It concludes that this movement occurred as a result of the adoption by a group of judges 
of literalism in the construction of patents while another group dissented and maintained the 
correct application of the doctrine. Although the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
initially approved the literalist approach, they, after realising its untennability, adopted the 
dissenters’ approach, but, ultimately, adopted the Catnic test in which features of the 
dissenters’ approach were included. The dissertation concludes that the doctrine of pith and 
marrow, correctly applied, should have been retained as the Catnic test creates uncertainty 
and confusion. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
[1] The determination of liability for the textual infringement
1
 of a patent has never been 
difficult.
2
 However, when it comes to the determination of liability for non-textual 
infringement
3
 of a patent, the situation is different. The difficulties associated with the 
determination of liability for non-textual infringement of patents arise from the fact 
that the alleged infringer so often varies, adds or omits from the patentee‟s invention 
to try and benefit from such invention as if it were his own without suffering the 
                                                 
1
 Textual infringement of a patent in the terms found in the relevant claim in the specification. It means that the 
device, product or process that is accused of infringing a patent fits exactly the description of the claim in a 
specification. For a further explanation of textual infringement as well as of non-textual infringement, see 
footnote 3 below. 
2
 The reason for this may be that, as Wills J put it way back in 1896 in The Incandescent Gas Light System Ltd 
and Others v The De Mare Incandescent Gas Light System Ltd and Others (1896) 13 RPC 301 (Queens Bench) 
at 330: 
“It is seldom that the infringer does the thing, the whole thing and nothing but the thing claimed by the Specification. 
He always varies, adds, omits…”. 
In 1950 the Supreme Court of the USA said through Mr Justice Jackson in the landmark case of Graver Tank 
and Manufacturing Co Inc et al v Linde Co 339 US 605 (1950) at page 2: 
“Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement”.  
Mr Justice Jackson continued thus in the same case at p.2: 
“One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play may be expected to 
introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy.” 
3
 The best way to explain textual and non-textual infringement of a patent claim is to invoke the words of two 
Cairns who provided the explanations about 100 years or so apart. First, Lord Cairns LC had the following to 
say in Clark v Adie (1877) 2 App Cas 315 (HL) at 320 about what in effect was an explanation of textual and 
non-textual infringement:  
“One mode of infringement would be a very simple and clear one; the infringer would take the whole infringement 
from beginning to end, and would produce a clipper made in every respect like the clipper described in the 
specification. About an infringement of that kind no question arises. The second mode would be one which might 
occasion difficulty. The infringer might not take the whole of the instrument here described but he might take a 
certain number of parts of the instrument described; he might make an instrument which in many respects would 
resemble the patent instrument, but would not resemble it in all its parts.” 
The type of infringement to which Lord Cairns LC referred first in the quoted passage is what is called textual 
infringement, whereas the second type of infringement to which he referred is non-textual infringement. It was 
by Lord Cairns LC in the Adie case that the phrase “pith and marrow” was used for the first time in English law 
to refer to the infringement of a patent specification by the taking of the substance of a patent or to refer to non-
textual infringement. About 100 years later, another Cairns, Sir David Cairns had the following to say in this 
regard in Catnic Components Ltd and Another v Hill and Smith Ltd (1982) RPC 183 (HL) at 234-235. 
“1 There are two types of infringement, textual infringement and infringement of the pith and marrow (Van der 
Lely, p 75 lines 35-9, per Lord Reid; p 77 line 45, per Lord Radcliffe; p 79 lines 48-9, per Lord Jenkins; p 80 
lines 15-21, per Lord Hodson. Rodi, p 380 lines 21-36, per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest; p 384 line 6, per Lord 
Upjohn; p 385 line 1, per Lord Hodson). 
2 Textual infringement occurs when the defendant‟s product contains all the features of the plaintiff‟s claim, 
interpreted literally ( Van der Lely, p 75 line 35 per Lord Reid; p 80 per Lord Hodson. Rodi, p 380 lines 21-5 per 
Lord Morris; p 385 line 1, per Lord Hodson). 
3 Infringement of the pith and marrow occurs when the defendant‟s product contains all the essential features of 
the plaintiff‟s claim despite some variation in unessential features (Van der Lely p 75 lines 45-50, per Lord Reid; 
p 79 lines 43-47, per Lord Jenkins; p 80 lines 15-19, per Lord Hodson. Rodi, p 380 lines 38 to p 381 line 3, per 




consequences of infringement. In English patent law two of the cases that are critical 
in any discussion of how the problem of the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents has been dealt with from the late 19
th
 century to about the end 
of the 20
th
 century are Clark v Adie
4
 and Catnic Components Limited and Another v 
Hill and Smith Limited
5
 (“Catnic” or “the Catnic decision”). The purpose of this 
dissertation is a critical evaluation of the movement of the English courts from the use 
of the doctrine of pith and marrow in the determination of non-textual infringement of 
patents to the adoption of the Catnic test. It examines a number of important decisions 
handed down from about 1875 to 1980 by the English courts which influenced not 
only the direction of that movement, but also the twists and turns which occurred 
along the way between 1960 and 1980 when the Catnic test was adopted. 
 
[2] Part of the significance of the two cases is that the former gave the doctrine of 
infringement by taking the substance of a patented invention the name of the “pith and 
marrow” doctrine whereas the latter case brought the use of the doctrine of “pith and 
marrow” in the determination of liability for non-textual infringement of patents in 
English patent law to an end and introduced the “Catnic test” in its stead.6 The gap 
between the two cases is just over 100 years. During that period the doctrine of pith 
and marrow was used to determine non-textual infringement of patents but, after the 
Catnic decision, the doctrine of pith and marrow ceased to be used and the Catnic test 
was used. Prior to Catnic the English law influence regarding the use of the doctrine 
of pith and marrow to determine liability for the non-textual infringement of patents 
had spread to many countries. Such countries included South Africa and Canada.
7
 The 
influence of the Catnic decision of the House of Lords also spread to other countries 
including South Africa, Canada, Korea, Australia and New Zealand whose courts also 
adopted or, at least, purported to adopt, the Catnic test in the determination of the 
infringement of patents.
8
 The question which arises, following upon the Catnic 
                                                 
4
 (1877) 2 App Cas 315 (HL). In the Court of first instance this case was reported as Clark v Adie (1875) LR Ch 
667. The judge in this case was James LJ. 
5
 [1982] RPC 183 (HL). 
6
 The phrase “Catnic Test” is obviously taken from Catnic Components Limited, one of the parties to the Catnic 
case. 
7
 According to Cameron and Renault, in Canada textual infringement and substantive infringement or the taking 
of the pith and substance was recognised by the Canadian Supreme Court in Smith Incubator Co v Seiling 
(1936) SCR 259 (SCC) (see Donald M Cameron and Ogilury Renault at 7). 
8
 See Binnie J‟s judgment in Free World Trust v Electro Lante [2000] 2 SCR 1024 par 39. See also Whirlpool v 
Camco [2000] 2 SCR 1067. While the Supreme Court of Canada has said that the Federal Court of Australia 
3 
 
decision of the House of Lords, is how and why English patent law abandoned the 
doctrine of pith and marrow and replaced it with the Catnic test. 
 
[3] The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a historical evaluation of the 
replacement of the doctrine of pith and marrow by the Catnic test in English patent 
law. In the process of such evaluation an explanation of how and why English patent 
law abandoned the doctrine of pith and marrow and adopted in its stead the Catnic 
test will be provided. A proper explanation of how and why this happened can only be 
given after an analysis of English patent law jurisprudence relating to the 
determination of non-textual infringement of patents and the doctrine of pith and 
marrow over a period of about 100 years before Catnic and the Catnic decision itself. 
Such an analysis is provided in this dissertation and the conclusion that is reached is 
that what led to the abandonment of the doctrine of pith and marrow and its 
replacement by the Catnic test in English patent law was a repeated disregard by the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords of an important rule of patent law applicable 
to the determination of non-textual infringement of patents which caused a judicial 
crisis about the determination of similar cases in future and the House of Lords‟ desire 
to save its face in resolving this judicial quagmire. 
 
[4] The proposition that the Catnic test replaced the doctrine of pith and marrow and that 
the doctrine of pith and marrow did not apply after the Catnic test is not universally 
accepted as correct.
9
 L Bently and B Sherman refer to the replacement of the literal 
mode of interpretation by purposive style of interpretation.
10
 It is suggested that what 
these authors refer to as the literal mode of interpretation is that approach to the 
construction of patents and the doctrine of pith and marrow that is referred to in this 
dissertation as the Upjohn LJ approach as reflected in the majority decisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
approved purposive construction in Populin v HB Nominees (Populin) (1982) 4 ALR 471, Pendleton has made 
contradictory statements on whether or not the Federal Court of Australia approved purposive construction in 
that case (see Pendleton Michael “The Purposive Approach to Patent Construction” (2000-2001) Intellectual 
Property Journal (2000-2001) 75 at 76, 81 and 88). 
9
 However, Cameron probably shares the view that Catnic replaced the doctrine of pith and marrow because he 
says that in Catnic Lord Diplock attempted to put an end to the pith and substance infringement test and replace 
it with a supposedly more simpler test of claim construction and purposive construction (Cameron at 13). Fox 
says that the English Courts have accepted that the strict literalism of the past and the limited application of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow have been superseded by the “purposive” approach to claim construction, where the 
scope of protection extends beyond its literal meaning to encompass variants of a claimed invention Fox 
Nicholas “Divided by a Common Language: A Comparison of Patent Claim Interpretation in the English and 
American Courts” (2004) EIPR 528 (at 530). 
10
 Bentley L and Sherman B Intellectual Property Law (2011) (2
nd
 ed) at 535. 
4 
 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in both Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd
11
 
and Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Ltd
12
 cases. If this is correct, the 
statement by Bently and Sherman would mean that these authors also take the view 
that the Catnic test or purposive construction replaced the literalist approach which 
was used before Catnic. Annand supports the proposition that Catnic did not change 
the prior law. She says that this is borne out by the subsequent case of Cordes 
Corporation v Racal-Mulgo Ltd.
13
 She quotes a passage in that case but does not 
include any analysis of the law before and the law after.
14
 Some have expressed the 
view that Catnic did not bring about any change in the law and that Catnic did not 
abolish the doctrine of pith and marrow. Prominent among those who seem to take 
this latter view are the Supreme Court of Canada
15
 and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
of South Africa.
16
 In fact the Supreme Court of Canada, through Mr Justice Binnie, 
went to the extent of saying that in Catnic Lord Diplock could be said to have “poured 
some whiskies into a new bottle, skilfully refined the blend, brought fresh clarity to 
the result, added a directive label, and voila „purposive construction”.17 A proper 
answer to these questions can only be found if one understands the developments 
which occurred over a long period prior to Catnic and led to the introduction of the 
Catnic test. 
 
[5] The discussion spans the period from 1875, which is the year of the reported 
judgment of James LJ in Clark v Adie to 1980 which is the year of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Catnic which was reported in 1982 and thereafter. The period is 
divided into three periods marked by important developments. The first period runs 
                                                 
11
 It is convenient to give the citations of the Van der Lely decisions at all three levels, namely, the Chancery 
Division, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. They are: Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd [1960] RPC 
169 (Ch); Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd [1961] RPC 296 (CA); Van der Lely (C) NV v Bamfords Ltd [1963] 
RPC (HL). 
12
 It is convenient to give the citations for all the decisions in the Rodi case at all three levels, namely, the 
Chancery Division, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. They are Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry 
Showell Ltd [1966] RPC 441 (Ch); Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Ltd [1966] RPC 460 (CA); 
Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Ltd [1969] RPC 367 (HL). 
13
 (1983) RPC 369. 
14
 Annand Ruth E “Infringement of Patents ” is „Catnic‟ the Correct Approach for Determining the Scope of a 
Patent Monopoly under the Patents Act 1977” (1992) Anglo American Law Review 39 at 46. 
15
 See Camco Inc and General Electric Company v Whirlpool Corporation and Inglis Ltd 2000 SCC or [200] 2 
SCR 1067 par 48. 
16
 See Vari-Deals 101 (Pty) Ltd t/a Vari-Deals v Sunsmart Products (Pty) Ltd 2008 (3) SA 447 (SCA) at par 11 
where Hurt AJA, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, inter alia said that “…  
Catnic did not change the law relating to construction …”. 
17
 See the Whirlpool case at par 48. 
5 
 
from 1875 to 1960. The second period runs from 1960 to 1978. The third runs from 
1978 to 1980 and thereafter. 
 
1.1 The First Period: 1875 – 1960 
 
[6] During the first period, ie 1875 to 1960, whenever the English courts considered 
whether to invoke the doctrine of pith and marrow in the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents, they took into account: 
 
(a) what the purpose or reason for the alleged infringer‟s introduction of a 
difference to the patented invention was; 
(b) the value, if any, which such difference added to the patented invention or 
the practical significance of the difference introduced by the alleged 
infringer, and 
(c) the rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented 
invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making 
immaterial variations to the patented invention (the “rule on immaterial 
variations”).  
 
A consideration of these factors plus the language of the relevant claim characterised 
the use of the doctrine of pith and marrow in the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents during this period. 
 
1.2 The Second Period: 1960 – 1978 
 
[7] The year 1960 marked the beginning of a change in English patent law relating to the 
determination of non-textual infringement. This was reflected in the judgment of 
Lloyd-Jacob J in the Chancery Division in the case of Van der Lely NV v Bamfords 
Ltd
18
 (“Van der Lely” or “the Van der Lely case”). In his judgment Lloyd-Jacob J 
placed form above substance and decided the case purely on the basis of the language 
used by the patentee in formulating his claims. He had no regard to the rule on 
                                                 
18
 Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd [1960] RPC 169 (Ch). 
6 
 
immaterial variations nor did he ask the question whether the alleged infringer had a 
reason for introducing the difference that he had introduced into his device or whether 
he had simply done so for no plausible reason. He found that there was no 
infringement. Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment and approach were subsequently approved by 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, albeit with dissents in both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.  
 
[8] In the Court of Appeal there were two judgments. The one, which was the judgment 
of the Court, was the judgment of Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ. The other one, which 
was a dissent, was the judgment of Lord Evershed MR. Lord Evershed MR rejected 
the Upjohn LJ approach. The approach to the determination of non-textual 
infringement and to the doctrine of pith and marrow which was adopted, first by 
Lloyd-Jacob J and later by Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ, was later approved by the 
House of Lords in the Van der Lely case. Although between Lloyd-Jacob J and 
Upjohn LJ, Lloyd-Jacob J was the first to adopt this approach to the determination of 
non-textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow and Upjohn LJ used it 
after Lloyd-Jacob J, it will, for convenience, be referred to in this dissertation as the 
“Upjohn LJ approach” because Upjohn LJ ultimately played a much more prominent 
role in the promotion of the approach than Lloyd-Jacob J. More will be said later 
about this approach.  
 
[9] In the House of Lords in Van der Lely, the various Law Lords wrote separate 
judgments. Four of them approved the approach adopted by Lloyd-Jacob J in the 
Chancery Division and by Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the Court of Appeal. In other 
words they approved, adopted and applied the Upjohn LJ approach to the 
determination of non-textual infringement of patents and to the doctrine of pith and 
marrow. Lord Reid rejected the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal and the 
majority in the House of Lords. He in effect followed the approach adopted by Lord 
Evershed MR in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely. For convenience the approach 
that was adopted by Lord Evershed MR in the Court of Appeal and Lord Reid in Van 
der Lely in the House of Lords will hereinafter be referred to as “the Lord Reid 
approach”. Although Lord Evershed MR used the approach earlier than Lord Reid, 
the approach is referred to in this dissertation as the “Lord Reid approach” because 
ultimately Lord Reid played a much more prominent role in the promotion of that 
7 
 
approach than Lord Evershed MR. The Lord Reid approach had regard not only to the 
language of the claims but also to the reason for the difference introduced by the 
alleged infringer and to the question of what value the difference added to the device 
or what practical significance the difference made to the product or device. 
 
[10] In the subsequent case of Rodi
19
 in the Chancery Division Lloyd-Jacob J turned his 
back on the Upjohn LJ approach that he had initiated in Van der Lely in the Chancery 
Division which had also received the approval of both the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in that case. Lloyd-Jacob J then embraced the Lord Reid approach in 
the Rodi case in the Chancery Division. He found that EXCALIBUR 59 infringed the 
patent. In a subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal that Court stuck to the Upjohn 
LJ approach in deciding the Rodi appeal. In a further appeal to the House of Lords, 
the House of Lords once again applied the Upjohn LJ approach when they had to 
decide the Rodi appeal. Although there was no dissent in the Court of Appeal in Rodi, 
the House of Lords was divided 3:2. Lord Reid and Lord Pearce applied the Lord 
Reid approach. The rest of the Law Lords applied the Upjohn LJ approach. 
 
[11] On the whole the Upjohn LJ approach to the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents and the doctrine of pith and marrow as reflected in the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in both Van der Lely and 
Rodi focused almost exclusively on the language employed by the patentee in his 
claims to describe his invention and disregarded other relevant considerations. In 
terms of this approach no regard was had to the question of what value the difference 
introduced by the alleged infringer added to the patented invention or to the accused 
device nor was the purpose or reason for the introduction of the difference considered. 
Indeed, in terms of this approach the rule on immaterial variations was almost 
completely disregarded. The approach was a literalist approach.  
 
[12] The Upjohn LJ approach made it very difficult to find a case in which it could be said 
that the doctrine of pith and marrow applied. It was bound to lead to serious 
difficulties in determining liability for non-textual infringement in the future. It will 
be suggested that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van 
                                                 
19
 Rodi and Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell Limited [1966] RPC 441 (Ch). 
8 
 
der Lely and Rodi constituted aberrations in the application of the doctrine of pith and 
marrow by the English courts. They had serious adverse consequences for the future. 
It will further be suggested that after Rodi the House of Lords realised the 
untennability of the Upjohn LJ approach and turned its back on it and embraced the 
Lord Reid approach. In this way the House of Lords averted the disastrous 
consequences that were likely to have followed if it had continued to apply the 
Upjohn LJ approach. 
 
[13] During this period there were those who dissented from the Upjohn LJ approach. The 
first dissenter was Lord Evershed MR in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely – but 
the dissenter who played the most prominent role in the rejection of the Upjohn LJ 
approach was Lord Reid who was the sole dissenter in a panel of five in the Van der 
Lely case in the House of Lords and one of two dissenters with Lord Pearce in the 
Rodi matter. The dissenters applied the correct approach to the determination of non-
textual infringement and to the doctrine of pith and marrow. Central to the dissenters‟ 
approach to the determination of non-textual infringement of patents was a 
consideration of:  
 
(a) what value, if any, the difference introduced by the alleged infringer added 
to the patented invention or the device or whether the difference was of any 
practical significance; 
(b) the reason, if any, advanced by the alleged infringer for introducing the 
difference he introduced to the device, product or process; 
(c) the rule on immaterial variations that related to the question whether the 
difference did not add any value or was of no practical significance or of 
whether the alleged infringer failed to show any reason for introducing the 
difference; if the difference was found to be immaterial, then almost 
inevitably infringement would be found. This did not necessarily entail an 
express mention of the rule on immaterial variations in each and every case; 
(d) the view that, unlike in the case of the Upjohn LJ approach, the mere fact 
that an integer was mentioned in a claim did not on its own mean that the 
patentee necessarily intended such integer to be an essential integer. 
9 
 
1.3 Third Period: 1978 – 1980 
 
[14] Although in Rodi, Lloyd-Jacob J turned his back on the Upjohn LJ approach and 
embraced the Lord Reid approach, neither the Court of Appeal nor the House of 
Lords followed his lead. However, in the House of Lords the number of the Law 
Lords embracing the Lord Reid approach increased from 1 to 2. The year 1978 is the 
year when the House of Lords did an about turn on the determination of non-textual 
infringement and its approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow. This was in the 
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories and Others (“Beecham” or “the Beecham 
case”)20 which came after the Rodi decision of the House of Lords. In Beecham 
Falconer QC, who was the Deputy Judge who heard the matter in the Chancery 
Division, though referring to the rule on immaterial variations, continued to apply the 
Upjohn LJ approach. In fairness to him, he was bound to use that approach in the light 
of the decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely and 
Rodi. He found that there was no infringement in Beecham. When the Beecham 
matter went on appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal gained the courage 
to follow Lloyd-Jacob J‟s lead, disregarded its previous decisions in Van der Lely and 
Rodi and embraced the Lord Reid approach. When the Beecham matter went to the 
House of Lords, the House of Lords, through Lord Diplock‟s judgment, abandoned 
the Upjohn LJ approach and embraced the Lord Reid approach. The House of Lords 
found that there was infringement in Beecham. 
 
[15] In due course the Catnic case came before the Chancery Division. Whitford J applied 
the Lord Reid approach. Of course, he had no choice in the light of the decision of the 
House of Lords in Beecham. He found that there was infringement of the patent. In an 
appeal to the Court of Appeal, the majority found that there was no infringement. That 
was the judgment of Buckley LJ in which Waller LJ concurred. In his dissent Sir 
David Cairns found that there was infringement. 
 
[16] In November 1980 came the Catnic decision of the House of Lords in which the 
House of Lords adopted the Catnic test. Although Lord Diplock, who wrote for a 
unanimous House of Lords, called his approach to the construction of patent claims 
                                                 
20
 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories and Others (1978) RPC 192 (HL). 
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the “purposive construction”, there can also be no doubt that the approach to the 
determination of non-textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow which 
had been adopted by the dissenters in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases was very much 
purpose-driven. That is why it entailed an enquiry into what value, if any, the 
difference introduced by an alleged infringer into the patented invention added or an 
inquiry into the practical significance of the difference introduced by the alleged 
infringer or an inquiry into the reason advanced by the alleged infringer for 
introducing the difference he did to the patented invention. It would not be a 
misnomer to refer to the Lord Reid approach as the purposive approach to the 
determination of non-textual infringement and to the doctrine of pith and marrow. In 
both Beecham and Catnic Lord Diplock adopted a significant amount of the Lord 
Reid approach, though he neither said so nor credited Lord Reid or Lord Pearce for 
any influence on his approach in Catnic. 
 
[17] Through its Catnic decision the House of Lords changed the test for the determination 
of infringement of patents. Although the House of Lords incorporated some of the 
features of the doctrine of pith and marrow as articulated by Lord Reid and Lord 
Pearce into the Catnic test, it effectively abolished the doctrine of pith and marrow in 
English patent law and replaced it with the Catnic test.  
 
[18] It must have been difficult for the House of Lords to live with the fact that its decision 
in Beecham represented their about turn from Van der Lely and Rodi and was an 
unarticulated admission by itself that it had been wrong in approving the Upjohn LJ 
approach and rejecting the Lord Reid approach. It cannot be said that the learned Law 
Lords did not appreciate these implications of their decision in Beecham. 
 
[19] In Catnic the House of Lords took advantage of the movement away from literalism 
in the interpretation of patents and other legal documents and of the calls for the 
adoption of purposive interpretation in its stead in English law at the time the House 
of Lords saved its face by adopting the Catnic test in Catnic. In this way its decision 
in Beecham would be forgotten in due course and the Catnic decision would be the 
focal point for the future. To show that this is how English patent law got the Catnic 
test will require, as already pointed out, a discussion and analysis of a number of 
decisions of the English courts on the determination of liability for non-textual 
11 
 
infringement of patents and on the doctrine of pith and marrow prior to Catnic and the 
Catnic decision itself. However, before that discussion, it is necessary to explain 
briefly the doctrine of pith and marrow and the Catnic test. 
 
1.4 Explanation of the Doctrine of Pith and Marrow 
 
[20] The doctrine of pith and marrow is the same as the doctrine of infringement by taking 
the substance of a patented invention. Indeed, prior to Lord Cairns LC‟s speech in the 
House of Lords in the case of Adie the doctrine was not known as the doctrine of pith 
and marrow. It was known as the doctrine of infringement by taking the substance of 
a patented invention. The doctrine of pith and marrow is the doctrine that was applied 
in English patent law for over a century before the Catnic decision of the House of 
Lords in November 1980 to determine whether there had been infringement of a 
patent where the product or process or device or apparatus alleged to constitute an 
infringement did not precisely or exactly fall within the text of the relevant claim in 
the specification of a patented invention. Obviously, where the accused product or 
device or process exactly fell within the literal meaning of the relevant claim in a 
specification, there could be no doubt that there was infringement. Where, however, it 
did not exactly fall within the literal meaning of the relevant claim, the determination 
whether or not there was infringement had to be made with the use of the doctrine of 
pith and marrow. 
 
[21] Under the doctrine of pith and marrow the question that had to be asked to determine 
whether there was non-textual infringement was formulated by Parker J in Marconi
21
 
as the following: 
 
“From this point of view, the question is whether the infringing apparatus is 
substantially the same as the apparatus said to have been infringed”.22 
                                                 
21
 Marconi v British Radios Telegraph and Telephone Company 1911 (28) 181 (Ch). Annand states that in the 
UK the doctrine of pith and marrow owes its origin to Parker J‟s judgment in Marconi v British Radio 
Telegraph and Telephone Company Ltd (1911) 28 RPC 181 (Annand Ruth E “Infringement of Patents” is 
„Catnic‟ the Correct Approach for Determining the Scope of a Patent Monopoly under the Patents Act 1977”  
(1992) Anglo-American Law Review 39 at 42) This is not true. The doctrine of pith and marrow existed long 
before the Marconi case. Initially it was referred to as the infringement by taking the substance of a patented 
invention. In Clark v Adie, Lord Cains used the term “pith and marrow” for the first time to refer to the doctrine 
of taking the substance of the invention and this is how the doctrine got the name “pith and marrow”. 
22






 Lord Evershed MR had this to say with regard to the 
question for the determination of non-textual infringement: 
 
“For the purposes of the present case we are content to treat the question as being in 
the words of Parker J as he then was, in Marconi v British Radio etc (1911) 28 RPC 
181 at 217: 
 
 „Whether the infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus 
said to have been infringed‟. 
 
  In the question thus formulated we take the apparatus „said to have been infringed‟ as 
being the apparatus claimed as the invention in the claiming clause of the 
specification; and „substantially the same‟ as meaning „in all essential respects the 
same‟.”24 
 
It is suggested that this question is the same in substance and effect as the question 
articulated by both James LJ in Adie and the question articulated by Lord Cairn LC in 
the House of Lords in Adie. In Adie James LJ formulated the question as being: 
 
“Whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect or is a substantially 
new or different combination”.25 
 
 Lord Cairns LC formulated the question in Adie as being: 
 
“…whether that which was done by the alleged infringer amounted to a colourable 
departure from the instrument patented, and whether in what he had done he had not 
really taken and adopted the substance of the instrument patented”.26  
 
[22] The doctrine of pith and marrow could only be invoked when the accused product or 
process took all the essential integers of the patented invention irrespective of whether 
or not it omitted, varied or added, some inessential feature. If the accused product or 
process left out an essential feature, the doctrine of pith and marrow had no 
application. For this reason it was always of paramount importance to determine 
whether the integer that was omitted or added or the variant had any practical value or 
significance to the successful operation of the patented invention. If it did not have 
                                                 
23
 Birmingham Sound Reproducers Ld v Collaro (1956) RPC 232 (CA). 
24
 Lord Evershed MR in Birmingham at 244 line 51 to 245 line 3. 
25
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 675. 
26
 Lord Cairns in Clark v Adie in the House of Lords at 320. 
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any practical value or significance, the proper approach was then to invoke a well-
known rule of patent law on immaterial variations. If it was found in a case that the 
variation introduced by the alleged infringer was material, it would follow that there 
was no infringement. However, if it was found that the variation or omission or 
addition was immaterial, then almost inevitably a finding of infringement would be 
made. 
 
1.5 Explanation of the Catnic Test 
 
[23] The Catnic test is the test used for the determination of infringement of patents 
introduced into English patent law by the House of Lords in 1980 through its decision 
in Catnic.
27
 Lord Diplock wrote the speech in which the rest of the Law Lords 
concurred. In terms of that decision the question to be asked to determine the 
infringement of a patent is: 
 
“… whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in 
which the invention was intended to be used would understand that strict compliance 
with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the 
patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall 
outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon the 
way the invention worked”.28 
 
 There are situations in which it is said that this question does not arise but those will 
be discussed later in the course of an analysis of the Catnic decision of the House of 
Lords.  
 
[24] Under the Catnic test the determination of infringement is taken as a question of 
construction and not as a question of fact which was the case with the doctrine of pith 
and marrow in English patent law prior to Catnic. Against this understanding of the 
essence of the doctrine of pith and marrow and of the Catnic test, it is appropriate to 
begin a consideration of the cases. 
 
[25] In all the cases that will be the subject of the analysis herein there was a discussion of 
whether or not the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable. In some of them it was 
                                                 
27
 Catnic Components Ltd and Another v Hill & Smith Ltd [1982] RPC 183 (HL) 
28
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 5-11. 
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decided that it applied. In others it was held that it did not apply. It is necessary to 
examine the cases and analyse the reasons why it was decided that the doctrine was 
applicable or was not applicable. Thereafter the decision which introduced the Catnic 
test will be examined with a view to showing that it and one or two others that were 
decided on the basis of the Catnic test soon after Catnic could easily and satisfactorily 
have been decided using the doctrine of pith and marrow and that the introduction of 
the Catnic test as a replacement of the doctrine of pith and marrow in the 
determination of non-textual infringement of patents was unnecessary. It is 
convenient to deal with the cases in the sequence in which the judgments were handed 
down so that the developments leading to the adoption of the Catnic test can be seen 
in their proper perspective. 
 
Against the above background it is now necessary to turn to a discussion of the first 
period to be considered, namely, the period from 1875-1960. The first case to discuss 






2 THE PERIOD OF THE CORRECT APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF 
LIABILITY FOR NON-TEXTUAL INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF PITH AND MARROW 1875-1960 
 




[1] In this case Clark instituted an action to restrain Adie from manufacturing and using 
or dealing in certain machines that were exact and avowed imitations of Clark‟s 
machine. Clark had, however, not made his new machine the subject of a patent. The 
two machines were for clipping or shearing horses and other animals. There had 
previously been other machines for doing the same thing as Clark‟s machine. 
Different people had taken patents for various such machines but Clark‟s machine 
was without any doubt better than any previous machine known up to that time 
including some which Adie had manufactured before. Clark was going to take out a 
patent for his advanced machine but abandoned that idea when he discovered that his 
ideas had been anticipated by one Grayson, who had taken out a patent. He then took 
an assignment of Grayson‟s patent from his trustee in bankruptcy. Clark sued as an 
assignee of Grayson‟s patent. His action was based on an alleged violation of 
Grayson‟s patent. The Court found in effect that Adie‟s machine did not take the 
substance of Grayson‟s machine because Adie‟s machine was in effect a much better 
machine than the machine described in Grayson‟s specification. 
 
[2] Based on the above facts there could be no infringement of Grayson‟s patent. The 
doctrine of pith and marrow could not apply because that doctrine applied only where 
the allegedly infringing product or process or apparatus could be said to have taken 
the substance of the patented invention. In his judgment James LJ made no reference 
to how persons to whom the specification was addressed would have understood the 
patentee‟s intention to have been in regard to which integers were essential and which 
ones were not. James LJ made certain statements in his judgment which reflected 
                                                 
1
 (1875) LR Ch 667. Hitchman and MacOdrum point out that while Clark v Adie is generally cited for the 
principle of infringement in substance, there is little discussion of the principle and no application of it in that 
case Hitchman Carol VE  and MacOdrum D H  “Don‟t Fence Me In: Infringement in substance” (1990) 
Intellectual Property Review 167 at 169.) 
16 
 
some of the principles applicable to the determination of non-textual infringement of 
patent specifications. James LJ inter alia said:  
 
 “A patent for a new combination or arrangement is to be entitled to the same 
protection, and on the same principles, as every other patent. In fact every, or almost 
every, patent is a patent for a new combination. The patent is for the entire 
combination, but there is, or may be, an essence or substance of the invention 
underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, like every other invention, 
may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case 
a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is 
a substantially new or different combination.”2 
 
James LJ referred to another case, namely Murray v Clayton
3
 – no citation appears in 
the judgment – where he said that they – by which he must have meant himself and 
Vice-Chancellor Baron with whom he sat in the Adie case – had held in that case that, 
although the patent was for a combination, infringement had been made out by 
showing that the alteration was colourable only, and that the defendant‟s machine was 
in substance and truth the same thing as the invention of the plaintiff.
4
 He also 
referred to another case where, as he put it, the defendant‟s machine left out a material 
part of the invention, and they therefore held that a machine which left out that part 
was not an infringement.
5
 It is significant that James LJ referred in this regard to a 
material part which must mean that it was a part that the Court regarded as material as 
opposed to a part that may have been intended by the patentee to be material but may 
not necessarily have been objectively material nor a part that would have been 
understood by the notional addressee to have been intended by the patentee to be 
material.
6
 Accordingly, James LJ seems to have meant that the objective materiality 
of an integer was important. James LJ stated the principle in these terms: 
 
“The principle is really very plain as it seems to us. A combination or accumulation of 
three improvements is a totally distinct thing from a combination or accumulation of 
two of them – as distinct as a partnership of A, B and C is from a partnership of A and 
B. And if a man really wants to patent not only the whole of what he calls a new 
arrangement, construction and combination of parts, he must clearly show that he 
                                                 
2
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 675. 
3
 Murray v Clayton Law Rap 7 Ch 570 
4
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 675. 
5
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 676. 
6
 These observations seek to contrast that part of James LJ‟s judgment that dealt with the materiality of an 
omission or variant under the doctrine of pith and marrow and the approach that the Catnic test advocates in 
regard to the materiality of an omission from or variation of or addition to, a patented invention. 
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claims that something less – of course periling his patent if that something less is not 
a novelty.”7 
 




[3] Clark v Adie went on appeal to the House of Lords. After explaining the different 
modes of infringement of a patent, Lord Cairns LC articulated the question to be 
asked in order to determine non-textual infringement of a patent. Lord Cairns LC, 
inter alia, said in relation to non-textual infringement:  
 
“… the question would be, either for a jury or for any tribunal which was judging of 
the facts of the case, whether that which was done by the alleged infringer amounted 
to a colourable departure from the instrument patented, and whether in what he had 
done he had not really taken and adopted the substance of the instrument patented. 
And it might well be, that if the instrument patented consisted of twelve different 
steps, producing in the result the improved clipper, an infringer who took eight or 
nine of those steps might be held by the tribunal judging of the patent to have taken in 
substance the pith and marrow of the invention, although there were one, two, three, 
four or five steps which he might not actually have taken and represented upon his 
machine.”9  
 
It was in this passage that Lord Cairns LC coined the phrase “pith and marrow” to 
refer to the infringement by the taking of the substance of a patent claim. Thereafter 
the doctrine of infringement by the taking of the substance of a patented invention 
became known as the doctrine of pith and marrow. 
 
[4] The important features of the above passage in Lord Cairns LC‟s speech in the House 
of Lords in Adie‟s case are the following: 
(a) that the question to be asked to determine liability for non-textual 
infringement was whether that which was done by the alleged infringer 
amounted to a colourable departure from the instrument patented and 
whether in what he had done he had not really taken and adopted the 
substance of the instrument patented. 
                                                 
7
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 676-677. 
8
 (1877) 2 App Cas 315(HL). 
9
 Lord Cairns LC in Clark v Adie in the House of Lords at 320. 
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(b) that it was the tribunal judging of the facts which had to decide whether or 
not the alleged infringer had taken the substance of the patented invention; 
this is important in the sense that the House of Lords did not say that the 
notional addressee of the specification had a role to play in this regard – 
something that resides at the centre of the Catnic test as decided by the 
same House over 100 years later in the Catnic case 
(c) that the question whether or not the alleged infringer in what he had done 
had not taken and adopted the substance of the instrument patented was a 
question of fact to be decided by the tribunal judging of the facts. 
 
2.3 The Incandescent Gas Light Company Ltd v the De Mare Incandescent Gas Light 




[5] In The Incandescent Gas Lamp case patents had been granted to one Carl Auer von 
Welsbach and were for the manufacture of an illuminant appliance for gas and other 
burners. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants were planning to infringe those 
patents. The defendants denied that what they were planning to do would infringe the 
patents. Welsbach had discovered a practical and simple method of arranging oxides 
to be rendered incandescent in a shape which made it possible to use them in burners 
and also discovered that a class of substances referred to as “rare earths” would, when 
blended with Zirconia, afford at once the necessary illumination and the necessary 
coherence. 
 
[6] The defendants intended to construct or sell in England plumes for incandescent 
lamps in a manner described by one De Mare with reference to two patents which De 
Mare had taken out and in an application for a patent on the 11
th
 April 1895. It would 
seem that the difference between what the specification described and what the 
defendants were likely to do was the defendants‟ omission of ammoniation, omission 




[7] Wills J, who was the trial Judge, articulated the test as being that, if the process which 
the defendants had held out that they were going to use was substantially identical to 
                                                 
10
 (1896) 13 RPC 301 (QBD). 
11
 The Incandescent Gas Lamp case at 329 lines 25-26. 
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the process of the plaintiffs‟ or of Welsbachs‟, they were liable in that action but that, 
if it was not so, they were entitled to his judgment.
12
 No reason was given for the 
omission of lanthanum. The trial Judge said that this omission undoubtedly involved 
some loss of the light-giving power of the plume; and generally no advantage had 
been suggested was obtained by any variation there may have been between 
Welsbach‟s or De Mare‟s proportions of the oxides or salts. With regard to the non-
ammoniation, evidence given by an expert called by the defendants was to the effect 
that ammoniation was, in his opinion, not necessary to arrive at the result proposed by 
the patentee. This meant that ammoniation was not an essential integer of the 
plaintiffs‟ patented invention. It seemed that dropping ammoniation only had the 
effect that the defendants got the same result by one step as could be achieved by two 
steps if there was ammoniation of the fabric. The trial Judge said that that was strictly 
the use of a chemical equivalent perfectly well known at the date of the patent, and 




[8] Wills J then embarked upon an extensive discussion of the principles relating to 
infringement. In dealing with the question of construction, he said he had carefully 
avoided any reference to the relative importance of different parts of the invention but 





This was a reference to the objective importance of the various parts of the invention 
irrespective of the patentee‟s own view of such importance. Wills J continued after 
the last sentence of the passage quoted above and said: 
 
“Infringement is a question of fact for the jury if there be one; and the question is not 
whether the substantial part of the process said to be an infringement has been taken 
from the specification, but the very different one, whether what is done or proposed to 
be done takes from the patentee the substance of his invention. A process might be 
wholly gathered from a specification and nowhere else, and yet be no infringement, if 
it did not take substantially the thing invented. What the thing invented is must be 
gathered from the specification alone, and the Patentee cannot escape from the thing 
he has claimed as the standard, and the only standard with which to compare the 
                                                 
12
 Wills J in The Incandescent Gas Lamp case at 321 line 55 to 322 line 2. 
13
 The Incandescent Gas Lamp case at 330 lines 3-4. 
14
 The Incandescent Gas Lamp case at 330 lines 16-19. 
20 
 
alleged infringement so as to see if it constitutes substantially the appropriation of the 
thing claimed.”15 
 
 Four of the points made by Wills J in the passage quoted above are that: 
 
(a) the relative importance of the various parts of the invention must be 
considered in determining whether there has been an infringement; 
(b) what the thing invented is must be gathered from the specification alone 
and from nowhere else; 
(c) the patentee must be judged by the specification. 
(d) the question for determining whether or not there had been infringement 
was whether what is done or proposed to be done takes from the patentee 
the substance of his invention. 
 
The point made in (a) relates to the materiality or essentiality of the various parts of 
the inventions including the variants. 
 
[9] An oft-quoted statement by Wills J in his judgment appears in a paragraph that 
follows the paragraph just quoted above. As will be recalled, in the last sentence of 
the paragraph last quoted above, Wills J referred to a comparison of the alleged 
infringement to the specification to see if the alleged infringement constitutes 
substantially the appropriation of the thing claimed. In the next paragraph Wills J then 
said: 
 
“When, however, you come to make that comparison, how can you escape from 
considering the relative magnitude and value of the things taken and of those left or 
varied? It is seldom that the infringer does the thing, the whole thing, and nothing but 
the thing claimed by the Specification. He always varies, adds, omits, and the only 
protection the Patentee has in such a case lies, as has been often pointed out by every 
Court, from the House of Lords downwards, in the good sense of the tribunal which 
has to decide whether the substance of the invention has been pirated.”16 
 
                                                 
15
 Wills J in Incandescent Gas Lamp case at 330 lines 19-29. 
16
 Wills J in The Incandescent Gas Lamp at 330 lines 30-37. 
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Part of what Wills J said in this passage relates to the materiality of the variant or the 
integer that is varied or omitted or added. In this passage Wills J repeated the 
statement about the importance of the magnitude and value of the things taken and of 
those left or varied. He then said that it was the tribunal which had to decide whether 
the substance of the invention had been taken and that the tribunal had to use its good 
sense to make this decision. In this regard what Wills J said in The Incandescent case 
about what the question was for determining whether there had been infringement and 
about who had to decide whether the substance of the patentee‟s invention had been 
taken was in line with the judgments of both James LJ and Lord Cairns in Adie. 
 
[10] In The Incandescent Gas case an argument was advanced that which parts of the 
invention were important and which ones were of subsidiary consequence could only 
be gathered from the specification itself. Wills J rejected this contention saying he 
was satisfied that that neither was nor could be the law.
17
 Wills J then said: 
 
“There are no means of ascertaining whether, notwithstanding additions or 
subtractions, the invention has been taken, except by seeing what they are worth as 
compared with the things which have been taken bodily from the invention. In the 
case of a patent for a combination, or for a series of operations, the Specification very 
often contains no clue to the inventor‟s own view of the relative importance of the 
different elements in the combination. If he says nothing on the subject you must 
conclude that, as far as the Specification goes, they are all presented as of equal 
importance, and all as essential parts of the combined whole, and yet there may be no 
infringement notwithstanding slight variations‟ (Cotton LJ in Proctor v Bennis 36 Ch 
D 740-754). So, again says Cotton LJ at page 756, „omissions and additions may be 
very material in considering whether, in fact, the „machine of the Defendant is an 
infringement of the combination which the Plaintiff claims. Omissions and additions 
may even be improvements but that fact „does not enable you‟ says Bowen LJ, „to 
take the substance of the Plaintiff‟s patent‟.”18 
 
 
Wills J found that what the defendants planned to do would take the substance of the 
plaintiff‟s invention and that there would be infringement. In this passage Wills J 
unequivocally said that you could not ascertain whether an invention had been taken 
when there were additions or subtractions except by seeing what they are worth as 
compared with the things which have been taken bodily from the invention.
19
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 Wills J at 330 lines 38-40. 
18
 Wills J in The Incandescent Gas Light at 330-331. 
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[11] It is clear that Wills J did not decide the essentiality or otherwise of the relevant parts 
of the patented invention omitted or varied only according to what the patentee said in 
the specification but also considered the objective importance and value thereof. That 
is the materiality of the parts. He certainly did not over-emphasise what the patentee 
had intended more than the objective importance and value of the relevant parts of the 
invention. 
 
[12] Adie‟s case and The Incandescent Gas case were decided towards the end of the 19th 
century. The first case of significance in the 20
th
 century that needs to be discussed is 
Marconi’s case.  
 




[13] The Marconi matter came before Parker J in the Chancery Division. It concerned an 
alleged infringement of a patent relating to an invention of improvements in an 
apparatus for wireless telegraphy. The defendant‟s apparatus contained all the 
essential features of the plaintiff‟s apparatus. That would suggest that the defendant‟s 
apparatus obviously infringed the plaintiff‟s patent. However, in this case the 
defendant, nevertheless, maintained that it did not infringe the plaintiff‟s patent. The 
basis of the defendant‟s defence was, in the main, that, whereas in the plaintiff‟s 
apparatus the plaintiff used a transformer that was a transformer in the ordinary sense 
which had two coils and that was the type of transformer that the specification 
referred to, the defendant had used an instrument which was a single-coil instrument. 
The defendant‟s case was that the instrument used in the place of the plaintiff‟s 
transformer was not, in ordinary parlance, a transformer at all but was what was 
known as an auto-transformer. The defendants said that their instrument did not act as 
a transformer acts, entirely by mutual induction, but partly by mutual induction and 
partly by what was called inductive shunt and they could perfectly easily eliminate the 
mutual induction altogether and make their instrument act entirely by inductive shunt. 
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 Marconi v British Radios Telegraph and Telephone Company Ld 1911(28) RPC 181 (Ch). 
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[14] The effect of the defendant‟s defence was that there was a sufficient difference 
between its apparatus and that of the plaintiff to justify a conclusion that there was no 
infringement. After analysing the technical evidence at some length Parker J 
expressed satisfaction that, if at the date of Marconi’s 1900 Patent, a competent 
electrical engineer, conversant with wireless telegraphy, had had Marconi‟s invention 
explained to him, and had been asked whether you could substitute for Marconi‟s 
two-coil transformers auto-transformers, whether arranged “1 to1”, or otherwise, he 
would unhesitatingly have answered in the affirmative. Parker J then said that, if this 
was so, the use of the aircore autotransformer, even if arranged “1 to 1” in Marconi‟s 
system could never have afforded subject matter for a new patent or be called a new 
discovery.
21
 Parker J concluded that the reference to a transformer in Marconi‟s 
specification was a reference to an ordinary transformer, and that was, he continued, a 
two-coil transformer. He said that if, therefore, a two-coil transformer was an 
essential feature of Marconi‟s system, the action would have to fail. However, he 
went on to say that he did not think that a two-coil transformer was an essential 
feature of Marconi‟s system. He said that Marconi had taken, and he thought most 
engineers would have taken, the most obvious means of securing this linkage, namely, 
a two-coil transformer. He said it was, however, a matter of indifference, so far as the 





[15] When Parker J looked at Marconi‟s first, second, third and fourth claims, he said that 
there could be no doubt that anyone reading the body of Marconi‟s specification, and 
then his claims, would conclude that the instrument, to which he referred in the claims 
as a transformer, was an instrument with two coils, though the words of the claims, 
taken alone, might include auto-transformers. He pointed out that, if, therefore the use 
of an instrument with two coils were an essential feature, the action would fail. In his 
opinion, however, the use of a two coil instrument was not an essential feature of 
Marconi‟s invention at all.23  
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[16] Later on Parker J expressed the view that Marconi had taken the most obvious means 
of securing some form of inductive linkage, namely a two-coil transformer. Parker J 
said he thought that most engineers would have done the same. He then said: 
 
“It is, however, a matter of indifference, so far as the essence of this invention is 
concerned, whether a transformer or an auto-transformer be used. Looking at the first 
Claim of the Specification, it is a claim for a transmitter involving a combination of 
parts, and, among others, two tuned circuits and a transformer the latter supplying the 
necessary linkage. In the second and third claims the transformer has the same 
function. The fourth Claim is for apparatus substantially as described in the 
Specification and illustrated in the Drawings.”24 
 
 Parker J went on to say in the Marconi case that he could not doubt that a jury would 
say that the defendant‟s apparatus was substantially the same as that covered by 
Marconi‟s 1900 patent. Then he pointed out that, where the patent is for a 
combination of parts or a process, and the combination or process, besides itself being 
new, produces new and useful results, everyone who produces the same results by 
using the essential parts of the combination or process is an infringer, even though he 
has, in fact, altered the combination or process by omitting some unessential part or 
step and substituting another part or step, which is, in fact, equivalent to the part or 
step he has omitted. Parker J took the view that the question here, again, was a 
question of the essential features of the invention said to have been infringed. Parker J 
said that, if that part of the combination, or that step in the process for which an 
equivalent has been substituted, be the essential feature, or one of the essential 
features, then there is no room for the doctrine of equivalents, and to ascertain the 
essential features of an invention, the Specification must be read and interpreted by 




[17] Fox draws attention to a statement by Romer LJ in Marconi‟s case to the effect that 
the essence of an invention is a matter to be determined on an examination of the 
language used by the patentee in formulating his claims and points out that there is 
considerable doubt as to the correctness of this statement.
26
 In this regard Fox refers 
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to the judgment of Thorson P in McPhar Engineering
27
 but fails to provide a citation 
for that case, Fox states that in that case Thorson P rejected this statement by Romer 
LJ and pointed out that the proper approach to the ascertainment of the essential 
features of an invention was stated by Parker J in Marconi‟s case 1911 28 RPC 181 at 
218 as being that the specification must be read and interpreted by the light of what 
was generally known at the date of the patent.
28
 Of course, the approach contemplated 
in Romer LJ‟s statement is the same approach that was applied by Lloyd-Jacob J, 
Upjohn LJ, and Pearson LJ as well as the majority in the House of Lords in Van der 
Lely and by the Court of Appeal and the majority in the House of Lords in Rodi which 
resulted in a crisis in English patent law early in the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
Fox goes on to say that Thorson P pointed out that, once the claim defining the 
invention has been construed, the ascertainment of whether the invention has been 
infringed is a different matter than the construction of the claims. He said that the 
distinction is of the utmost importance because infringement is a question of fact. As 
pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation it is suggested that infringement may not be 
a question of fact in all cases but the distinction is important. Fox says
29
 that, since 
there is infringement if the substance of the invention is taken, it becomes necessary 
to ascertain what the substance of the invention is and said that that question is a 
question of fact. 
 
[18] Parker J also referred to Benno’s case30 and said that that case was a good instance of 
the application of the doctrine of equivalents. In that case a centrifugal machine was 
both specified and claimed and the process was new and led to a new and useful 
result. The defendant used the whole process but omitted the centrifugal machine 
which he replaced with a settling tank to do what the centrifugal machine had been 
intended to do. It was held that the centrifugal machine had not been an essential 
feature of the process and that the defendant was an infringer. In the Marconi case the 
Court rejected an argument to the effect that no room existed for the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents where the equivalent used was unknown at the date of the 
patent. Parker J concluded in Marconi’s case that the defendants had taken all the 
essential parts of Marconi‟s invention and were, therefore, infringers notwithstanding 
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that they had substituted an auto-transformer for a transformer in the combination 
claimed and notwithstanding that the use of an auto-transformer with an air-core for 
any such purpose as that for which Marconi has used the transformer may have been 
new.
31
 Accordingly, the plaintiff‟s claim succeeded. 
 
[19] It is interesting to note that in the Marconi case reference was made to what a 
competent electrical engineer conversant with wireless telegraphy would have said 
about the substitutability of auto-transformers for Marconi‟s two-coil transformers if 
he had been asked after getting an explanation of Maroni‟s transformers. Parker J said 
that such engineer would no doubt have answered in favour of their substitutability. In 
the Clark v Adie and in The Incandescent Gas cases no reference seems to have ever 
been made to the role of the views of persons to whom a patent is addressed. In 
Marconi‟s case the doctrine of pith and marrow was applied. What is most significant 
about Marconi‟s case is not only that Parker J took into account the question whether 
or not the variant affected the result of the invention but also that, when he concluded 
that it did not, he immediately referred to the rule of patent law that no one who 
borrows the substance of a patented invention may escape the consequences of 
infringement by making immaterial variations. Accordingly, in Marconi‟s case it was 
after Parker J had both considered the value of the variant as well as this rule of patent 
law that he concluded that the substance of the patentee‟s invention had been taken 
and that, therefore, infringement had been established. 
 





[20]  Another case that needs to be referred to is that of Electric and Musical Industries Ld 
and Boonton Research Corporation Lissen Ld (“the EMI case”). It is not considered 
necessary to set out or discuss the facts of this case. It suffices to only refer to some 
statements that were made in the speeches of some of their Lordships in the House of 
Lords relating to the subject of the construction of specifications or of patent claims. 
This case concerned among other things a claim by Electric and Musical Industries 
Ltd and Boonton Research Corporation that Lissen Ld and Another had infringed 
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claims 1 and 2 of a patent that had been granted to them in respect of Improvements 
in Electric Wave Amplifying Apparatus. There were two consolidated actions. They 
came before Luxmoore J who held the patent to be valid and found that claims 1 and 
2 had been infringed. There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the 
judgment of Luxmoore J. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal. The plaintiffs then 
appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
[21] Before the House of Lords the appeal was heard by Lords Atkin, Russel, MacMillan, 
Wright and Porter. The House of Lords was divided. Lords Atkin and Porter would 
allow the appeal but Lords Russel, MacMillan and Wright dismissed the appeal. 
Accordingly, the decision of the House of Lords was to dismiss the appeal. However, 
Lord MacMillan‟s reasons for the decision to dismiss the appeal did not entail his 
agreement with Lord Russell on the issue of infringement. He was of the view that the 
patent failed for want of subject-matter. In the light of his conclusion on the defence 
of disconformity, it was not necessary for Lord Wright to deal with the issue of the 
construction of patent claims. Nevertheless, he did go on to express his view briefly 
on that question. On the applicable principles of construction, Lord Wright stated that 
he agreed with the enunciation of the true principles of construction made by Lord 
Romer in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the statement to the 




[22] In the judgments of Lord Atkin and Lord Porter one cannot find much by way of a 
discussion of the principles of construction other than that, in the case of Lord Porter, 
he affirmed in his judgment the principle that “if the claims have a plain meaning in 
themselves, then advantage cannot be taken of the language used in the body of the 
specification to make them mean something different”.34 Lord Parker went on to say 
in that case that he was unable “to construe the claims with certainty without the 
explanatory matter contained in the body of the specification…”.35 He read certain 
words into claim 1.  
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[23] It is now opportune to refer to the judgment of Lord Russell of Killowen. However, in 
discussing those aspects of that judgment that relate to the construction of patent 
claims and infringement, it must be borne in mind that only one other Judge in the 
matter expressed agreement with his enunciation of the principles of construction. 
That is Lord Wright. Lord Russell of Killowen made a number of important 
statements in this regard some of which were subsequently quoted with approval in 





[24] The first statement Lord Russell made in this regard on the construction of patents 
was that he agreed with the Court of Appeal‟s statement in the same case that: 
 
(a) no special rules were applicable to the construction of a specification; 
(b) a specification must be read as a whole and in the light of surrounding 
circumstances;  
(c) it may be gathered from the specification that particular words bear an 
unusual meaning, and,  
(d) if possible, a specification should be construed so as not to lead to a foolish 
result or one which could not have contemplated. 
 
 Leger views Lord Russell‟s statement that, if possible, a specification should be 
construed so as not to lead to a foolish result or one which the patentee could not have 
complemented as being in conformity with the concept of purposive construction.
37
 It 
is suggested that, although Leger is right in this regard, this may equally also fall 
within the qualification of the golden rule of interpretation, which is part of literalism, 
which is that words must be given their ordinary meaning unless that would lead to an 
absurdity. 
 
[25] Having expressed his agreement with every word that the Court of Appeal had said on 
the construction of a specification, and on the function of claims, Lord Russell 
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expressed a desire to add something further in regard to the claim in a specification.
38
 
What Lord Russell then said in the following paragraph has been repeated umpteen 
times in subsequent cases. He said: 
 
 “The function of the claims is to define clearly and with precision the monopoly 
claimed, so that others may know the exact boundaries of the area within which they 
will be trespassers. Their primary object is to limit and not to extend the monopoly. 
What is not claimed is disclaimed. The claims must undoubtedly be read as part of 
the entire document and not as a separate document; but the forbidden field must be 
found in the language of the claims and not elsewhere. It is not permissible, in my 
opinion, by reference to some language used in the earlier part of the specification to 
change a claim which by its own language is a claim for one subject-matter into a 
claim for another and a different subject-matter, which is what you do when you alter 
the boundaries of the forbidden territory. A patentee who describes an invention in 
the body of a specification obtains no monopoly unless it is claimed in the claims. As 
Lord Cairns said, there is no such thing as infringement of the equity of a patent 
(Dudgeon v Thompson LR 3 App Cas 34).”39 
 
 To a very large extent this passage has been used in support of the literalist approach 
to the construction of patent claims. This does not, however, mean that it has not been 




[26] Lord Russell also made further statements.
41
 He started off with an implied suggestion 
that words in a claim may bear a special or unusual meaning by reason either of a 
dictionary found elsewhere in the specification or of technical knowledge possessed 
by persons skilled in the art. He went further and said that the prima facie meaning of 
words used in a claim may not be their true meaning when read in the light of such a 
dictionary or of such a technical knowledge and that in those circumstances a claim, 
when so construed, may bear a meaning different from that which it would have borne 
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had no such assisting light been available.
42
 Lord Russell pointed out that that was 




[27] What Lord Russell said as reflected in the preceding paragraph suggests that as at that 
time the construction of specifications and claims was governed by the same canons 
of construction that were applicable to the construction of documents. A little later 
Lord Russell made two points. The first one was that he knew of “no canon or 
principle which will justify one in departing from the unambiguous and grammatical 
meaning of a claim and narrowing or extending its scope by reading into it words 
which are not in it”.44 The second point was that he knew of no canon or principle of 
construction “which will justify one in using stray phrases in the body of a 
Specification for the purpose of narrowing or widening the boundaries of the 
monopoly fixed by the plain words of a claim”.45  
 
[28] Lord Russell concluded by saying: 
 
 “A claim is a portion of a specification which fulfils a separate and distinct function. 
It and it alone defines the monopoly; and the patentee is under a statutory obligation 
to state in the claims clearly and distinctly what is the invention which he desires to 
protect. As Lord Chelmsford said in this House many years ago: „The office of a 
claim is to define and limit with precision „what it is which is claimed to have been 
invented and therefore patented‟ (Harrison v Anderson Foundry Co LR 1 App 574). 
If the patentee has done this in a claim the language of which is plain and 
unambiguous, it is not open to your Lordships to restrict or expand or qualify its 
scope by reference to the body of the specification. Lord Loreburn emphasised this 
when he said: „The idea of allowing a patentee to use perfectly general language in 
the claim and subsequently to restrict or expand or qualify what is therein expressed 
by borrowing this or that gloss from other parts of the specification is wholly 
inadmissible‟ (Ingersoll Sergeant Drill Co v Consolidated Pneumatic Tool Co 25 
Report of Patent cases, page 61 at page 83).”46 
 
 
Two observations emerge from this passage. Firstly, as a general rule, a patentee‟s 
monopoly must be found within the four corners of the claims. Secondly, an 
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exception to that general rule is where the language of the claims is unclear and 
ambiguous. In such a case recourse can be had to the body of the specification. Lord 
Russell then quoted Sir Mark Romer who, he said, had expressed a similar view in 
British Hatford.
47
 Lord Russell quoted Sir Mark Romer as having expressed himself 
thus in that case: 
 
 “One may and one ought to refer to the body of the specification for the purpose of 
ascertaining the meaning of words and phrases in the claims, or for the purpose of 
resolving difficulties of construction occasioned by the claims when read by 
themselves. But where the construction of a claim when read by itself is plain, it is 
not, in my opinion, legitimate to diminish the ambit of the monopoly claimed merely 
because in the body of the specification the patentee has described his invention in 
more restricted terms than in the claim itself.”48 
 
[29] Fox says there appears to be a conflict between a statement in the judgment of Lord 
Russell of Killowen in EMI and another statement made by Parker J in Marconi‟s 
case. In this regard Fox quoted the statement where Lord Russell said that “a claim is 
a portion of the specification which fulfils a separate and distinct function. It and it 
alone defines the monopoly and the patentee is under a statutory obligation to state 
clearly and distinctly what is the invention which he desires to protect.”49 Fox then 
quotes the statement made by Parker J, in Marconi where Parker said that it was a 
well known rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented 





 to Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Parks-Cramer Co v 
Thornton and Sons Ltd
52
 for an explanation of these two statements. It is suggested 
that one explanation for the two statements would be found in another statement 
which Lord Russell made in EMI. That is a statement which, it is suggested, qualified 
the one which Fox says is in conflict with the statement of Parker J. That statement by 
Lord Russell was that “if possible, a specification should be construed so as not to 
lead to a foolish result or one which the patentee could not have contemplated”.53 This 
statement would, it is suggested, accommodate the rule referred to by Parker J to 
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which Fox also refers. It would be an exception to Lord Russell‟s statement said to be 
in conflict with Parker J‟s statement. 
 
[30]  Lord Russell also referred in EMI to the fact that much stress was laid upon the fact 
that the body of the specification contained references to strong and weak signals, to 
modulation – distortion, and to the experiments made and the results obtained and 
illustrated in figures 1, 2, 3 and 4.
54
 He said that it was those references, experiments 
and information which were relied upon as a justification for departing from the plain 
language of Claim 1. Lord Russell then said that in his opinion those references, 
experiments and information thus imparted furnished no such justification. He said 
that they were included in the body of the specification because they indicated the 
advantages (ascertained by experimenting with valves which had the special design of 
tube electrodes) which would accrue from using the claimed method of adjusting the 
transmission. Lord Russell said that that was the proper place for them to occupy. He 
said that they should not be read into Claim 1 and had no place there, because they 
formed no part of the invention. He emphasised that their advantages accrued from 
using it.
55
 Lord Russell concluded that he would dismiss the appeal with costs.  
 





[31] In this case the patent related to an apparatus for the automatic changing by a 
gramophone or other sound reproducer of a number of disc records placed upon it for 
successive playing, notwithstanding that such records could have been of different 
diameters. Prior to the patented invention gramophone disc records had at all material 
times been, and at the time of the judgment in this case, were still, made and marketed 
in three sizes. The smallest, which previously had been 9 inch diameter, was then 7 
inch diameter, the next bigger size 10 inch diameter and the largest size 12 inch 
diameter. 
 
[32] Automatic devices for changing records required a mechanism which would cause the 
tone arm or pick-up at the end of the playing of a record to be raised from the record 
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and carried outward or laterally beyond the rim of the turntable and of the played 
record, the dropping of the next record to be played from the stack on to the turntable 
and then the movement of the tone-arm or pick-up back as far as the outermost groove 
of the new record to be played and its depression so that the needle would make 
contact with that record upon its outside grove and play the record in the ordinary 
way. It would seem that this mechanism worked when the records being dropped on 
to the turn-table from the stack were of the same size but not when they were of 
different sizes. To achieve the object of adapting the mechanism to be able to drop 
records of different sizes from the stack on to the turntable, the mechanism had to be 
such that the swinging inwards of the tone-arm or pick-up to the outermost groove of 
the new record to be played had to be adjusted to the size of the record. 
 
[33] The essential features of the earlier types of mechanism were that the falling record, 
other than a record of the smallest diameter, by depressing the blade, caused a 
corresponding lift of a rod; that the lifting of the rod in turn through a “bell-crank” 
lever caused a lateral movement of a horizontal member under the turntable to which 
was attached a projecting piece having in it an angled slot; that another member, 
called a stop member, being free to rotate about a fixed pivot, and having a peg 
engaged in the slot in the abovementioned slotted member, was caused by the lateral 
movement of the latter to rotate to a distance determined by the extent of the 
movements previously described; that the stop member was held in the position to 
which it had been moved by the action of another spring and rotating member called 
“detent” which operated in the manner of a ratchet upon an appropriate notch or tooth 
on the stop member, and that, finally, another member co-operating with the tone-arm 
was by a knob or peg brought to rest or halted against a part of another surface of the 
stop member corresponding to the notch or tooth held by the detent. 
 
[34] Lord Evershed MR, who delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court, made the 
following observations: 
 
“From the description which we have attempted, it will be appreciated that the extent 
of the depression of the blade was, indirectly or by a series of mechanical parts, 
communicated to a moving stop member which was held in the achieved position by a 
detent and that such position controlled, through the stop member itself, the extent of 
the in-swing of the torn-arms. It will further be appreciated that the work of moving 
34 
 
all the mechanism was done directly by the record itself, that is, by its own weight 
and movement. The outward movement of the tone arm at the end of the playing of a 
record operated to restore the whole mechanism to its original position.”57 
 
[35] According to Lord Evershed MR, in the essential features of the appellants‟ device as 
described and illustrated in their Letters Patent were found the essential pieces of the 
mechanism, the stop member and the detent. However, Lord Evershed MR pointed 
out that there were two marked differences between the earlier type of mechanism and 
the mechanism described in the appellants‟ Letters Patent. The one was that in the 
appellant‟s mechanism the blade was attached to the “detent”. The other was that the 
stop member was attached to the vertical part of the apparatus to which were 
“pivoted” also the blade and the detent. The stop member was free to move to a 
certain extent upwards or downwards but by reason of the use of a spring its tendency 
or “bias” was to move upwards. In the position of the mechanism produced by the 
outward swing of the tone-arm, the narrow “toe” of the detent rested upon the topmost 
of three steps at the top of the stop member. In this position the blade was horizontal. 
A record of the smallest size would not touch the blade. This part of the mechanism 
remained in this original position for the playing of such a record. 
 
[36] Lord Evershed MR pointed
58
 out that the use in the respondents‟ RC 54, which 
represented the respondents‟ apparatus, of the bell-crank lever plus the sliding metal 
strip in lieu of the single stop member in the appellants‟ device, gave rise to certain 
distinctions in design between the two devices, namely: 
 
(1) instead of the three steps or notches at the top of the appellants‟ stop 
member, one or other of which engaged with what he called the toe of the 
detent, there were found in RC 54(a) in the bell-crank a notch (liable to 
engage with a hook at the top of the detent) and peg (liable to engage with 
one or other of the two cam surfaces on the detent) and (b), the two last 
mentioned cam surfaces‟; 
(2) instead of the single stop member in the appellants device “biased” to move 
vertically upwards, there were found in RC 54 two belt-cranks, biased to 
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rotate clockwise, and the metal strip connected with the bell-crank and 
thereby “biased” to move vertically downwards; and  
 
(3) Instead of the three bottom steps or notches on the single stop member in 
the appellants‟ device, in RC 54 the corresponding three notches or steps 
were on the metal strip which itself had no other steps or notches. 
 
[37] The entire case of infringement related to claim 1 of the specification. The heading to 
the specification was: IMPROVEMENTS TO AND RELATING TO SOUND 
REPRODUCING APPARATUS. The specification referred to the kind of apparatus in 
which “the extent of the inward movement imparted to the reproducer by traversal of 
the plane of the turn-table, as a preliminary to the engagement of the stylus with the 
record to be played is made to correspond with the radius of that record by settable 
means adopted to function as a temporary stop for the inwardly moving reproducer, 
setting of said means being determined by the engagement of non-engagement 
therewith of the edge of the record as it moves from the lower end of the stack to the 
playing position on the turntable”.59 Thereafter followed a paragraph to the effect that 
the object of the invention was to provide an improved and simplified form of 
apparatus of this kind suitable for use with two but more particularly with a number in 
excess of two different sizes of disc records.
60
 Dealing with the invention with which 
the case was concerned, Lord Evershed MR. made the following points, namely: 
 
 that the invention consisted of the selection of particular known chemical 
members and their arrangement in a particular way so as to provide a 
simple, compact, cheap and positive method of carrying out a known 
mechanical operation. 
 that the individual parts of the apparatus were not claimed as inventions and 
could not be so claimed.  
 that the basic idea which the invention carried out, that is to say, the 
stopping of the tone-arm at a point appropriate to the commencement of the 
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playing of a given record, which point was determined or selected by the 
degree of defection of the blade brought about by that record as it dropped 
from stack to turntable, was not and could not be claimed as an invention as 
it was not new. 
 that the essence of the invention resided wholly in the selection and 
arrangement of the parts and the manner in which they interacted when 
arranged in accordance with the invention and that it was therefore essential 
to the invention that it should consist of the particular parts described in the 





[38] Lord Evershed discussed the principles applicable to non-textual infringement.
62
 He 
discussed all the prominent cases dealing with the principles applicable to the 
determination of non-textual infringement of patent claims between 1870 and 1956.
63
 
Quite importantly, Lord Evershed MR said:  
 
“For the purposes of the present case we are content to treat the question as being in 
the words of Parker J, as he then was, in Marconi v British Radio etc (1911) 28 RPC 
181 at 217: 
 
„Whether the infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus 
said to have been infringed‟. 
 
In the question thus formulated we take the apparatus „said to have been infringed‟ as 
being the apparatus claimed as the invention in the claiming clause of the 
specification; and „substantially the same‟ as meaning „in all essential respects the 
same‟.”64 
 
[39] In the next two paragraphs
65
 Lord Evershed MR dealt with the question of how a 
court would determine whether the infringing apparatus was substantially the same as 
the apparatus said to have been infringed. He inter alia said: 
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“In order to resolve this question it is necessary to determine what are the essentials of 
the particular invention claimed in any given case. We agree with Sir Lionel that 
generally speaking this must be ascertained by reference to the claim and to the claim 
alone. In RCA Photophone v Gaumont British etc (supra) at p 197 immediately after 
the passage already quoted, Romer LJ went on to say: „But it is not the province of 
the court to query what is or what is not the essence of the invention; that is a matter 
to be determined on an examination of the language used by the patentee in 
formulating his claims‟.”66 
 
This last sentence might have been in conflict with the approach of the House of 
Lords as found in the speech of Lord Cairnes LC in the Adie case. In the next 
paragraph Lord Evershed sought to dispel any notion that what he had just said meant 
that he did not think that that question was a question of fact. He said: 
 
“We do not however, exclude the possibility that, after the nature, scope and essential 
features of a given invention have been ascertained by construing the relevant claim, 
the question whether the alleged infringement is essentially or substantially the same 
as or different from the invention as claimed may become a question of fact and 
degree”.67 
 
[40] Lord Evershed also said that the question therefore was whether the allegedly 
infringing apparatus consisted of substantially the same parts acting upon each other 
in substantially the same way as the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention. 
He said it was not enough to find that the parts comprised in the Respondents‟ 
apparatus individually or collectively perform substantially similar functions to those 
performed individually or collectively by the parts comprised in the apparatus claimed 
as the appellants‟ invention that the respondents‟ apparatus produced the same result 
as the appellants‟ apparatus. It must be shown, continued Lord Evershed, that the 
respondents‟ selection and arrangement of parts is substantially the same as the 
appellants‟ selection and arrangement of parts because it would be in such selection 
and arrangement that the appellants‟ invention resided.68 The Court then went on to 
hold that the respondents‟ apparatus, namely, RC 54, was substantially different from 
the appellants‟ apparatus as claimed in the claiming clause. The Court said: 
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 Lord Evershed at 245 lines 4-10. 
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 Lord Evershed at 245 lines 11-14. 
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 Lord Evershed at 245 lines 29-38. 
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“As compared with the Plaintiffs‟ invention as claimed, the Defendants‟ construction 
introduced several new features. We note in particular the bell-crank lever biased for 
clockwise movement, the peg in its head, the two „cam surfaces‟ (or, as we think they 
may properly be called, spaced abutment surfaces) on the detent, and the co-operation 
of the peg in the head of the bell-crank with the spaced abutment surfaces on the 
detent when the blade is depressed so as to produce the required degree of downward 
movement on the part of the stop-member through its connection to the extremity of 
the horizontal arm of the bell-crank. We note also the method of holding the stop-
member in the starting position by means of the engagement of the hook at the top of 
the detent and the notch in the head of bell-crank.”69 
 
The Court found that there was no infringement. It is suggested that in the 
Birmingham case it was correctly found that the doctrine of pith and marrow was not 
applicable because the differences in the two devices were, at least in part, in respect 
of essential features. It is now necessary to turn to a discussion of the period: 1960 – 
1978. 
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3 THE ERA OF THE UPJOHN LJ APPROACH: 1960 ‒ 1978 
 




[1] In this case the appellants owned a patent for a hay rake, patent NO 680, 537. The 
respondent claimed to have invented a hay rake as well. For present purposes it can be 
accepted that the only difference between the two hay rakes was that, whereas the 
appellant‟s specification was to the effect that the hindmost wheels were 
dismountable, with the defendants‟ rake it was the foremost wheels that were 
dismountable. The appellants complained that the respondents‟ rake was an 
infringement of their patent relating to their rake. In the Chancery Division the trial 
Judge was Lloyd-Jacob J. Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment did not include any serious 
discussion of the principles relating to the determination of non-textual infringement 
of patents. 
 
[2] Lloyd-Jacob J found that the accused apparatus did not correspond to the textual 
requirements of the relevant claim. He then turned to the question whether the 
accused apparatus could be said to infringe the substance of the patented invention. In 
this regard he said that, although it was true that the accused apparatus secured the 
result which the claimed device was adapted to produce, if a finding of infringement 
was to be justified, it was not the identity of result only but substantial identity of 
means whereby that result was secured that had to be established. In other words 
Lloyd-Jacob J saw the test as being whether the same result was secured by means 
that were substantially identical to the means contemplated in the claims.
2
 Lloyd- 
Jacob J pointed out that, if the patentee had in fact appreciated that a vehicular frame 
could be devised which permitted conversion from side raking to swath turning by 
retention in position of the hindmost rake wheels of the original row, it would have 
been inconceivable that he would have framed the relevant claim in a language which 
expressly called for their removal.
3 
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[3] Lloyd-Jacob J thereafter referred to dicta in Sir Mark Romer‟s judgment in British-
Hartford
4 and in Lord Russell of Killowen‟s judgment in EMI. The one dictum was to 
the effect that, when the construction of a claim when read by itself was plain, it was 
not legitimate to diminish its ambit of the monopoly claimed merely because in the 
body of the specification the patentee had described his invention in more restricted 
terms than in the claims. The other dictum was to the effect that there was no rule or 
principle which would justify a departure from the unambiguous and grammatical 
meaning of a claim and narrowing or extending its scope by reading into it words 
which were not in it or which would justify one in using stray phrases in the body of 
the specification for the purpose of narrowing or widening the boundaries of the 
monopoly fixed by the plain words of the claim.
 
 
[4] In the Van der Lely case in the Court of first instance Lloyd-Jacob J found that the 
defendants‟ apparatus did not infringe the plaintiffs‟ patent. He set out the thrust of 
his reasons for his conclusion in these terms: 
 
“In the present case, no passage in the specification can be found to support the 
suggestion that removal of any but the hindmost wheels was ever within the 
contemplation of the inventor. Save for the ingenuity of the Defendants in producing 
their device, it is unlikely that any reader of the specification would have appreciated 
that the transposition in claim 11 of the words „hindmost‟ and „foremost‟ would be 
required to identify the useful conversion of a particular raking device, still less to 
suppose that the Patentee so intended. For the reasons stated, infringement of Claim 
11 has not been proved.”5 
 
[5] What is noteworthy in Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment is also the absence of any reference 
to the rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented 
invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making immaterial 
variations to the patented invention. Indeed, he also made no reference to the question 
whether the variant added any value to the invention. It was Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment 
in this case that marked the emergence of an approach to the determination of 
infringement of patents and the doctrine of pith and marrow which was later followed 
by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords which is referred to elsewhere herein 
                                                 
4
 British-Hartford Fairmont Syndicate Ld v Jackson Bros (Knottingly) Ld (1932) 49 RPC at 556. 
5
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Van der Lely in the Court of first instance at 197 lines 34-42. 
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as the “Upjohn LJ” approach. There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is next for discussion. Lloyd-Jacob J‟s approach was 
entirely based on the literal meaning of the claims. 
 
[6] Lloyd-Jacob J‟s approach was to ask whether or not there was any passage in the 
specification to support the suggestion that removal of any but the hindmost wheels 
was ever within the contemplation of the invention.
6
 He then said that save for the 
ingenuity of the defendants in producing their device, it was unlikely that any reader 
of the specification would have appreciated that the transposition in claim 11 of the 
words “hindmost” and “foremost” would be required to identify the useful conversion 
of a particular raking device, still less to suppose the patentee so intended.
7
 He then 
concluded that for these reasons the infringement of claim 11 had not been 
established. 
[7] From the above it is clear that Lloyd-Jacob J adopted a very literalist approach to the 
construction of claim 11 by asking the question whether or not the specification had a 
passage which suggested the removal of any wheels other than the hindmost wheels. 
This approach left no room for a consideration of whether or not the difference 
introduced by the alleged infringer was introduced for no reason other than to disguise 
the theft of the patentee's invention. Indeed, Lloyd-Jacob J paid no attention to the 
rule on immaterial variations at all nor did he have regard to the question whether the 
difference was in form only and not in substance. Lloyd-Jacob J had no regard to the 
question whether or not the dismounting of the foremost wheels instead of the 
hindmost wheels as contemplated in the claim added any value to the invention or 
whether the difference was of any practical significance. If, therefore, one applied  
Lloyd-Jacob J‟s approach to determine whether there was infringement in substance, 
one would simply have to ask the question whether or not there was a passage in the 
claims which covered the variant of the alleged infringer. This seems to require a 
literal “covering” of such variant. If the variant was not literally covered by the 
claims, then there was no infringement. That is in line with the approach that was later 
taken by the majority in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords in the same 
case. It is suggested that, if this approach were the correct approach, there would have 
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7
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Van der Lely at 197 lines 35-43. 
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been no room for the application of the doctrine of pith and marrow in patent 
infringement cases. Lloyd-Jacob J also made no reference to the role of the national 
addressee. 
[8] Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment on infringement in Van der Lely began what later became a 
very critical period of twenty years in English patent law. Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment 
was later followed and approved by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
Lloyd-Jacob J also failed to refer to any of the important decisions. Finally, Lloyd-
Jacob J did not even refer to the doctrine of pith and marrow or any of the well-known 
cases in which the doctrine had previously been dealt with authoritatively. Lloyd-
Jacob J‟s approach was completely literalist. There was an appeal to the Court of 
Appeal. It is the decision of the Court of Appeal that falls to be discussed next. 
 




[9] In the Court of Appeal the panel of Judges who heard the appeal comprised Lord 
Evershed MR, Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ. Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ gave a joint 
judgment in which they upheld the judgment of the trial Judge and found that the 
respondents‟ devices did not infringe the appellants‟ patent claims. For convenience 
Upjohn LJ‟s and Pearson. LJ‟s joint judgment is referred to herein as Upjohn LJ‟s 
judgment. Lord Evershed MR dissented and found that there was infringement. One 
important difference between the two judgments was that in considering the issue of 
infringement, Upjohn LJ did not consider, nor, did he refer to, the rule on immaterial 
variations whereas Lord Evershed MR not only referred to that rule but he also took it 
into account. He also considered the practical significance or materiality of the variant 
before deciding on infringement. Upjohn LJ also did not consider the practical 
significance or materiality of the variant before deciding on infringement. It is 
convenient to discuss the judgment of Upjohn LJ, which was the judgment of the 
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3.3 The Majority Judgment of Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in Van der Lely in the 
Court of Appeal 
 
[10] Although the majority judgment in the Court of Appeal in the matter of Van der Lely 
was a joint judgment of Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ, for convenience only Upjohn LJ 
may sometimes be referred to in the discussion of the judgment in this dissertation. In 
dealing with the appeal in the Court of Appeal Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ, inter alia, 
said:  
 
“Now it is obvious that in fact the respondents have avoided textual infringement by 
the simple device of so arranging the parallel beam to carry the wheels for swath 
turning that it is necessary to move the foremost wheels backwards rather than the 
hindmost wheels forward. Put in another way, if the respondents‟ machine was used 
by towing it in the opposite direction to its designed direction of travel (making 
suitable known mechanical adjustments) you would achieve a machine precisely 
within claims 11 and 12. To that extent the respondent may be said to have taken the 
substance of the appellants’ invention. But that, in our opinion, does not dispose of 
the point, for it is clearly settled law that to infringe the patent it must be shown that 
the invention, as claimed in the relevant claim, has been infringed in all essential 
respects, essential that is to say, upon the true construction of the claim.”9 
 
Upjohn and Pearson LLJ went on to say:  
 
“As a matter of construction of claim 11, it seems to us clear that the appellants have 
deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost 
wheels should be detachable and, as we have pointed out, the foremost wheels need 
not be. Why they so confined the claim it is not for us to speculate. The claim could 
presumably have safely been drawn to cover dismountability of either group (see for 
example claim 7 in the respondents‟ later patent 753,478); but as the learned judge 
pointed out, apparently the appellants did not appreciate this possibility. We have 
come to the conclusion that there is no escape from the learned judge‟s conclusion 
upon this point, and upon principle and authority we are bound to construe the words 
of the claim according to their clear and unambiguous meaning and to hold that 
claims 11 and 12 are not infringed.”10  
 
[11] The fundamental basis for Upjohn LJ‟s and Pearson LJ‟s conclusion of non-
infringement was the finding that “(a)s a matter of construction of claim 11, it seems 
to us that the appellants have deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the 
claim that the hindmost wheels should be detachable and, as we have already pointed 
                                                 
9
 Upjohn LJ in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely at 313 lines 4-15 (author‟s emphasis). 
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 Upjohn LJ in Van der Lely at 313 lines 16-26. Compare with Gordon  Harris: “Trends in UK patent litigation: 
The age of reason?” (1999) 21/5 EIPR 254-263 at 255. 
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out, the foremost wheels need not be. Why they so concluded to confine their claim is 
not for us to speculate”. Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ did not give any reasons for their 
finding that the patentees had “deliberately chosen” to make the dismountability of 
the hindmost wheels an essential feature. It was the same kind of approach as the one 
that had been adopted by Lloyd-Jacob J in the same case in the Chancery Division 
who had asked the question whether or not there was a passage in the relevant claims 
which suggested the dismountability of any wheels other than the hindmost wheels 
and decided the case on the basis simply of the answer to that question. 
 
[12] It is suggested that the conclusion reached by Upjohn and Pearson LLJ that there was 
no infringement was erroneous. It followed upon their conclusion that the appellants 
had deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost 
wheels should be detachable and the foremost wheels need not be.
11 
The fundamental 
error with this finding made by Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ is that they seem to have 
regarded the mere fact that the appellants had mentioned detachability in relation to 
the hindmost wheels as enough to make the detachability of the hindmost wheels an 
essential feature of the patented invention. The mere mention of a feature is not and 
cannot without more be sufficient to make a feature essential. A claim in a 
specification will mention both essential and unessential features. If it were not so 
(and if the mere mention of a feature in a claim was sufficient to make the feature 
essential), the question for the determination of the essentiality of a feature would be 
whether or not it is mentioned in the claim.  
 
[13] Another error made by Upjohn LJ in his judgment in coming to the conclusion that 
there was no infringement was that he had no regard to whether or not the 
detachability of the foremost wheels in the respondents‟ apparatus as opposed to the 
hindmost wheels in the patentee‟s invention added any value to the invention or 
whether there was any reason for the defendants‟ decision to make the foremost 
wheels detachable as opposed to the hindmost wheels. This, it is suggested, was an 
important factor because, where the feature, objectively speaking, does not add any 
value in that it is immaterial to the operation of the invention, it is not going to be 
easy to conclude that the patentee has chosen to make such feature an essential feature 
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of his invention. Another factor is that Upjohn LJ overlooked the well-known rule of 
patent law that no one who borrows a patented invention can escape the consequences 
of infringement by making immaterial variations to the patented invention. If Upjohn 
LJ had taken this rule into account, he would have reached the opposite conclusion to 
the one that he reached. 
 
[14] Finally, Upjohn LJ said that to some extent the respondent could be said to have taken 
the substance of the appellants‟ invention.12 When regard is had to what the law was 
at the stage of the Van der Lely case in the Court of Appeal in English patent law on 
the determination of the non-textual infringement of patent claims, this statement 
should inevitably have driven Upjohn LJ to the conclusion that there had been 
infringement. In this regard a reference to Adie, Birmingham and Marconi cases both 
of which were binding on Upjohn LJ would have reminded him that in terms of those 
decisions the question was whether or not the respondents had taken the substance of 
the appellants‟ invention. It is also to be noted that in his judgment Upjohn LJ made 
no reference whatsoever to any authorities, including Clark v Adie, Birmingham and 
Marconi which contained the relevant principles. If he had, he might have reached a 
different conclusion.  
 
[15] Upjohn LJ‟s approach to or understanding of, the doctrine of pith and marrow was the 
same as the one reflected in Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in the court of first instance. It 
was an approach that disregarded the rule of patent law on immaterial variations. It did 
not inquire into whether or not the difference introduced by the alleged infringer to the 
invention added any value or was of any practical significance to the operation of the 
invention. The approach which, for convenience, is referred to herein as the “Upjohn 
LJ” approach to the determination of infringement of patents and the doctrine of pith 
and marrow, uses almost exclusively the language employed by the patentee in framing 
his claim to determine whether an integer is essential or inessential and, therefore, 
whether the doctrine of pith and marrow applied or not and, therefore, whether there is 
infringement. The Upjohn LJ approach seems to in effect have taken the mere mention 
of an integer in a claim as evidence that the patentee intended it to be an essential 
feature of his invention in which case there would be no infringement. 
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3.4 Lord Evershed MR’s Dissent in Van der Lely in the Court of Appeal 
 
[16] Lord Evershed MR disagreed with Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ that there was no 
infringement. His view was that there was infringement. He wrote a dissenting 
judgment. Lord Evershed MR, inter alia, said: 
 
“If attention must exclusively be directed to the strict language of the claim then the 
charge of infringement may well be said to be repelled because, in the respondents‟ 
machine, the wheels which are dismountable are not the wheels „situated hindmost in 
the direction of motion of the vehicular frame‟ but the foremost. So it is said, and this 
answer has appealed to my brethren, that the appellants having, for reasons best 
known to themselves, confined by its language the scope of their 11
th
 claim to 
dismounting the hindmost (only) of the wheels, cannot complain of the device 
wherein not the hindmost but the foremost of the wheels are alone dismounted: and it 
is further said, and said truly, that it is the function of the claim to state precisely the 
scope of that for which the inventor desires protection. As Lord Russell of Killowen 
said in the EMI case (EMI Ltd v Lissen Ltd (1938) 56 RPC 23 at 41): It and it alone 
defines the monopoly; and the patentee is under a statutory obligation to state in the 
claim what is the invention which he desires to protect.”13 
 
[17] Lord Evershed MR pointed that it was not always a defence to a claim of infringement 
for the alleged infringer to say that his device or process or apparatus did not exactly 
and in every respect fall within the precise language of the patentee‟s claim.14 Lord 
Evershed MR thereafter said: 
 
“Authorities of long standing and binding upon this court establish that infringement 
may occur if that which is done or proposed to be done „takes from the patentee‟, in 
the language of Wills J, affirmed by this court in the case of The Incandescent Gas 
Light Co. Ltd v The de Mare Incandescent Gas Light System Ltd (1896) 13 RPC 301, 
„the substance of the invention‟: if, in Lord Cairns‟ classic phrase, the infringer has 
taken the „pith and marrow‟ of the patentee‟s claim.”15 
 
A little later Lord Evershed MR said: 
 
“True it is that the question of infringement „in substance‟ normally arises where the 
patented device consists – as is very commonly the case – of a number of combined 
integers and where the device alleged to constitute infringement embodies some but 
not all of them; so that the question is resolved to this: whether the integers omitted or 
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 At 318 lines 35-37. 
15
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varied are „unessential‟ characteristics of the claim properly construed as a whole. But 
in my judgment the principle involved is not, and cannot on principle be confined 
precisely to that class of case. The principle invoked remains where the device alleged 
to infringe only departs from the invention comprehended in the claim, properly 
construed, in respects which are, upon its true interpretation, not essential to the scope 
of the claim.”16 
 
[18] Against the background of the fact that claim 11 referred to the dismounting of wheels 
situated hindmost in the direction of motion of the vehicular frame, Lord Evershed 
MR pointed out that, as he read the claims, “it was no essential part of the invention 
that the machine should move in direction, that is upwards as you look at the Figure 
rather than in the opposite direction.
17
 The direction is indicated, but only indicated by 
the small arrow near to the Figure itself. For the purposes of construing and 
appreciating the claims such direction is assumed. Nor is more light thrown upon the 
matter in the body of the specification. True, the line of the wheels must be oblique to 
the direction of movement; but this essential feature would be achieved whether the 
vehicle moved upwards or downwards on the sheet of Figures. The only reference to 
the fact or assumption that the direction is upwards is by reference to the Figures 
themselves …”.18 Lord Evershed MR then turned to the question of how the 
defendants had sought to avoid the infringement of claim 11. He said that they had 
done this by merely reversing the direction of the machine. He continued: 
 
“If the appellants‟ machine and that of the respondents were placed side by side upon 
the ground without any indication of the direction of the traction, then those of the 
wheels to be displaced and remounted would be in both cases the same three. So in 
each case would the transition from side raking to swath turning be identically 
achieved. The result in each case would be that the six wheels would become 
disposed in the required position, „adjacent and parallel‟. For my own part I would 
therefore hold that the appellants‟ claimed device had in substance been infringed. 
Regarding the machines as pieces of mechanism the same three wheels of each are to 
be displaced and remounted; but because the directions in use are reversed, the three 
wheels are called hindmost in the one and foremost in the other.”19 
 
[19] Lord Evershed MR also referred to James LJ‟s well-known statement in the same 
court many years before where James LJ said in part: 
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“The patent is for the entire combination but there is or may be an essence or 
substance of the invention underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, 
like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form 
and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in 
substance and effect or is a substantially new or different combination.”20 
 
Lord Evershed MR endorsed Lord Cairns LC‟s judgment in Adie v Clark in the House 
of Lords to the effect that the question would be “whether that which was done by the 
alleged infringer amounted to a colourable departure from the instrument patented and 
whether in what he had done he had not really taken and adopted the substance of the 
instrument patented”.21 
 
[20] Lord Evershed MR then said: 
 
“I add one citation from the speech of Lord Duredin in the case of BTH v 
Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Co (1928) 45 RPC 1 at 25: „The question for the 
court is not that of detecting absolute similarity but is that of seeing whether the pith 
and marrow of the combination, to use Lord Cairns phrase, has been taken and if that 
has been done, there is an infringement in spite of any combination.”22  
 
He also said that the question was a question of fact.
23
 Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment 
was an affirmation of the correct approach to the determination of non-textual 
infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow, ie, the Lord Reid approach. Lord 
Evershed MR‟s judgment became the first judgment in the Court of Appeal not to 
follow the Upjohn LJ approach. Lord Reid was to later build upon this judgment in 
his dissent in Van der Lely in the House of Lords. There was an appeal from the 
decision of the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. 
 




[21] The panel of Judges who heard the appeal in the House of Lords comprised Lord 
Reid, Viscount Radcliffe, Lord Jenkins, Lord Hodson and Lord Devlin. On the issue 
of whether the relevant claim, namely, claim 11, had been infringed, there had been a 
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difference of judicial opinion in the Court of Appeal. There occurred a difference of 
judicial opinion in the House of Lords as well. In the House of Lords, Lord Reid 
found that there was infringement whereas the rest of the members of the panel found 
that there was no infringement. In deciding the issue of infringement in this case the 
majority was rigid and seemed to think that they were required to hold the patentee 
strictly to the terms of his claims irrespective of the results thereof whereas the 
minority was prepared to invoke the doctrine of pith and marrow to decide the matter. 
 
[22] Lord Reid thought that the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable and could be 
invoked in this case whereas the majority thought that this was not a case where that 
doctrine was applicable. In fact Viscount Radcliffe pointed out that a patentee had a 
basic duty to state clearly what his invention was for which he sought protection.
25
 He 
also pointed out that “one must be very careful when one speaks of theft or piracy of 
another‟s invention or when the principle of pith and marrow is invoked to support 
such accusation to see that the inventor has not by the actual form of his claim left 
open to the world the appropriation of just that property that he says has been filched 
from him by piracy or theft”.26 
 
[23] None of the Judges who found that there was no infringement inquired into whether 
or not the variant in the Van der Lely case added any practical value to the functioning 
of the invention. Viscount Radcliffe actually refrained from inquiring into the 
question whether or not the dismountability of the hindmost wheels was an 
essential.
27
 This was because he took the view that the patentee had himself “told us 
by the way that he has drawn up claim 11 that this dismountability of the hindmost 
wheels is the very element of his idea that makes it an invention”.28 None of the 
Judges who found that there was no infringement ever considered what the 
interpretation was that a person skilled in the art would have attached to claim 11. 
Nor, indeed, did they ask the question whether it would have been obvious to a person 
skilled in the art that dismounting the foremost wheels would have made any material 
difference. The majority gave their own interpretation to claim 11 and concluded that 
the patentee had effectively said in the claim that the dismountability of the hindmost 
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wheels was the very element of his invention. The majority, therefore, held that there 
was no infringement of the patent and upheld Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in the Court of 
Appeal.  
 
[24] One of the observations that can be made about the judgments of the judges who 
found no infringement is that those Judges all failed to deal with the reasons upon 
which Lord Reid relied to find that there was infringement. It is suggested that they 
were obliged to have considered Lord Reid‟s reasons for his dissent and to have dealt 
with them and, if they did not find them persuasive, to have given reasons why they 
found those reasons unpersuasive. It is now necessary to deal with the minority 
judgment of Lord Reid who found that there was infringement. 
 
3.6 Lord Reid’s Dissent in Van der Lely in the House of Lords 
 
[25] One of the appellants‟ complaints was that the respondents had infringed claim 15. 
Claim 15 was in the following terms: 
 
“A device as claimed in any one of the preceding claims wherein the rear ground 
wheel of the vehicular frame is adjustable in a horizontal direction and can be fixed 
in any desired position with respect to the longitudinal axis of the device”.29 
 
The respondents‟ defence to the claim of infringement of claim 15 was that “any 
desired position in claim 15 meant any position which may be desired by the farmer 
when he came to use the machine”. Lord Reid then said: “They had incorporated the 
device in a way that there were only four positions in which rear wheels can be fixed 
and they say that this is not within the claim because the farmer cannot put the wheel in 
some other position if he desired to do so. To my mind there is no substance in this 
point. The specification is addressed to the man who is making the machine and it says 
to him: you may arrange to fix the wheel in any positions you may desire and the 
machine will work in all of them. No doubt the manufacturer is concerned to choose 
positions which are likely to suit the needs of his customers, but that is not the concern 
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of the patentee. He is giving directions to the manufacturer. I am therefore of the 
opinion that this claim has been infringed, and that the cross-appeal fails.”30 
 
[26] Another important question for decision in the Van der Lely matter was whether the 
respondent had infringed claim 11. Lord Reid regarded this issue as the most difficult 
in the case.
31 
He described the scenario with regard to claim 11 thus: 
 
“On that question there was a difference of opinion in the Court of Appeal, Lord 
Evershed holding that there had been infringement. The respondents have copied the 
appellants‟ method of conversion of the machine to a swath turner with one 
difference. The appellants dismount the three hindmost wheels of the row of six and 
remount them separately in accordance with claim 11. The respondents do exactly the 
same except that they dismount and remount the three foremost wheels. They cannot 
point to any mechanical reason for doing this or to any advantage resulting from it. It 
is simply done to try to evade the claim, and the respondents‟ method is the exact 
mechanical equivalent of the appellants‟ method. But they do avoid textual 
infringement of claim 11 because claim 11 refers to dismounting „rake wheels 
situated hindmost in the direction of motion.”32 
 
It is important to point out that in this passage Lord Reid, inter alia, directed his 
attention to why the respondents had decided to dismount the foremost wheels and 
not the hindmost wheels as well as whether introducing such difference to the 
invention affected in anyway the functioning of the apparatus. These were important 
issues to consider in seeking to determine liability for non-textual infringement of a 
patent. 
 
[27] Lord Reid dealt
33
 with the question whether the respondents had infringed claim 11 of 
the appellants‟ patent by dismounting the three foremost wheels whereas claim 11 
referred to the dismounting of the three hindmost wheels. Lord Reid said: 
 
 “Copying an invention by taking its „pith and marrow‟ without textual infringement 
of the patent is an old and familiar abuse which the law has never been powerless to 
prevent. It may be that in doing so there is some illogicality, but our law has always 
preferred good sense to strict logic. The illogicality arises in this way. On the one 
hand the patentee is tied strictly to the invention which he claims and the mode of 
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effecting an improvement which he says is his invention. Logically it would seem to 
follow that if another person is ingenious enough to effect that improvement by a 
slightly different method he will not infringe. But it has long been recognised that 
there „may be an essence or substance of the invention underlying the mere accident 
of form; and that invention, like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a 
disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the 
alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a substantially new or 
different combination‟ (Per James LJ, in Clark v Adie (1873) LR 10 Ch 667). It was 
in Clark v Adie that Lord Cairns used the expression „pith and marrow‟ of the 
invention: (1877) 2 App Case 315 at 320.”93  
 
 Leger, after quoting this passage from Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely, says34 
Lord Reid‟s comments in that judgment have been applied to the evolution of the law 
of infringement in substance in Canada. This is interesting to note because Lord 
Reid‟s judgment was a minority judgment and dissent and not that of the majority. 
The approach adopted by Lord Reid in Van der Lely on patent copycats and patent 
pirates seems to have subsequently been echoed by Mr Justice Binnie of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Free World case where he said: 
 
 “It would be unfair to allow a patent monopoly to be breached with impunity by a 
copycat device that simply switched bells and whistles, to escape the literal claims of 
the patent”.35 
 
[28] A reading of the specification in general and claim 11 in particular in the Van der Lely 
case would reveal that there was no mention that the foremost wheels could not be 
dismounted in order to achieve the same result. That alone should not necessarily 
mean that a person who then produced the same apparatus or device but substituted 
the dismounting of the foremost wheels for the dismounting of the hindmost wheels 
necessarily did not infringe. It is suggested that the inquiry should not be such a 
shallow one. One further issue that should have been considered was whether or not 
there was a special reason underpinning the choice of dismounting the foremost 
wheels. Put differently, the further question should have been asked whether 
dismounting the foremost wheels instead of the hindmost wheels as was envisaged in 
the claim of the patented invention added any value to the invention or its functioning. 
If it did, that would have been a basis to conclude that the accused apparatus or device 
did not constitute an infringement. If, however, the answer was that the dismounting 
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of the foremost wheels was not based on any particular reason or did not really add 
any value to the apparatus or device, it is suggested that that should have led to the 
conclusion that an infringement of the patented invention had been established 
because it would constitute an immaterial variation. In this regard the rule on 
immaterial variations would have come into operation. The majority in both the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords in the Van der Lely case completely overlooked this 
principle.  
 
[29] One reason why the passage appearing at 75 lines 38 to 52 of Lord Reid‟s speech in 
Van der Lely is significant is the statement he quoted from the judgment of James LJ, 
in Adie. That is the statement that “… invention, like every other invention, may be 
pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case a 
question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a 
substantially new or different combination”.36 Lord Reid went on to say: “I cannot 
imagine any more obvious equivalent than substituting the foremost for the hindmost 
wheels in this machine. So the question is whether selecting the hindmost wheels in 
claim 11 makes them an essential or an unessential integer.”37 Lord Reid pointed out 
that he would agree that, if there were only one novel integer in a particular claim, the 
patentee could not be heard to say that it was unessential.
38
 He continued and said 
that, “(if) the specification of the hindmost wheels were the important part of claim 11 
or the only novel feature in it I cannot imagine how it could be held that claim 11 was 
valid or involved in any inventive step”.39 He then pointed out in the next sentence 
that “(n)othing could be less inventive than selecting the hindmost as against the 
foremost wheels when the selection makes no practical difference as regards 
efficiency”.40 
 
[30] It is clear from Lord Reid‟s speech that he sought to establish why the defendant had 
decided upon the variant. Lord Reid asked whether there was any mechanical reason 
for the variant or any advantage resulting from the variant.
41
 Lord Reid also stated 
that “nothing could be less inventive than selecting the hindmost as against the 
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foremost wheels when the selection makes no practical difference as regards 
efficiency”.42 
 
[31] It is convenient to pause here and make some important point that should be made 
now rather than later. A few paragraphs earlier there is a statement within a passage 
quoted from Lord Reid‟s speech to the effect that the respondents had copied the 
appellants‟ apparatus in every respect except that the wheels that were dismounted in 
the apparatus were the three foremost wheels instead of the three hindmost wheels in 
the case of the apparatus of the appellants and in accordance with the terms of claim 
11. Lord Reid also made the point – and the point was common cause – that the 
respondents could not point to any mechanical reason for dismounting the three 
foremost wheels instead of the three hindmost ones nor could they advance any 
advantage resulting from it.  
 
[32] It is suggested that Lord Reid could well have stopped the inquiry at that stage. It is 
suggested that the rule should be that, where the only difference between the 
patentee‟s invention and the alleged infringer‟s apparatus is one for which the alleged 
infringer can advance no mechanical reason nor advantage, that should be the end of 
the inquiry where the two devices or processes are otherwise the same. It is difficult to 
understand how the other Judges reached a different conclusion in a case where the 
respondents could not justify the only difference they had made to the invention. It 
ought to have been crystal clear to all concerned that the sole reason for the 
respondents‟ decision to dismount the foremost wheels in their apparatus instead of 
the hindmost wheels as specified in the patentee‟s claim was to disguise their “theft” 
of the appellant‟s invention. 
 
[33] In the Court of Appeal Lord Evershed MR dealt specifically in his dissent with how 
the respondents had sought to avoid infringement of the appellants‟ claim. He wrote 
that so far as relevant to the claim then under consideration, the respondents had done 
no more than reverse the direction of the machine. He said that, if the appellants‟ 
machine and that of the respondents were placed side by side upon the ground without 
any indication of traction, then those of the wheels to be displaced and remounted 
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would be in both cases the same three. So, said Lord Evershed MR, in each case 
would the transition from side raking to swath turning be identically achieved. He said 
that the result in each case would be that the six wheels would become disposed in the 
required position, adjacent and parallel.
43
 A line or two later Lord Evershed said: 
 
 “Regarding the machines as pieces of mechanism the same three of the wheels of 
each are to be displaced and remounted but, because the directions are reversed, the 
three wheels are called hindmost in the one and foremost in the other”.44 
  
[34] Lord Reid discussed how the Court determined what is and what is not an essential 
integer. He said that the authorities revealed a difference of opinion. He stated that 
sometimes it was said that it was a question of construction of the specification and 
sometimes it was said that you must have regard to all the facts.
45
 The impression that 
the two approaches created was that it was the Court that determined what was and 
what was not an essential integer. This is highlighted herein in contrast to an approach 




 that the question whether a particular feature for which a mechanical 
equivalent has been substituted is essential to the invention is one of fact and the 
answer to the question whether a particular feature is essential must depend on the 
facts of each case and by considering the magnitude and value of the things taken and 
of those left or varied. In support of this last part of the statement, Fox relies on Van 
der Lely NV v Bamfords Ltd (1963) RPC 61 at 76 and Rodi and Wienenberg AG v 
Henry Showell Ltd (1966) RPC 441 at 467. Fox‟s reliance on both the Van der Lely 
and Rodi cases for support for the last part of his statement is, with respect, not 
supported by what was said in the pages of the judgments which he has cited in 
respect of both cases. In fact support for the last part of his statement is to be found 
not in Van der Lely or Rodi but in Wills J‟s judgment in The Incandescent Gas Light 
case.
47
 Talking about making a comparison of the alleged infringement to the 
specification to see if the alleged infringement constitutes substantially the 
appropriation of the thing claimed, Wills J, inter alia, said: 
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“When however, you come to make that comparison, how can you escape from that 
considering the relative magnitude and value of the things taken and those left or 
varied?”48 
 
[36] Soon after stating the two approaches relating to how to determine what is and what is 
not an essential integer, Lord Reid stated that he doubted whether there was much 
difference between the two approaches. He continued: 
 
“If the specification makes it clear that the patentee regards a particular integer as 
essential, then it must be treated as essential, but otherwise even if the question is one 
of construction of the specification I cannot see why one should shut one‟s eyes to 
facts of which the patentee must have been aware when framing the specification”.49 
 
[37] The first part of the passage just quoted from Lord Reid‟s speech suggests that, as 
long as the specification makes it clear that the patentee intended a particular integer 
to be essential, then it is essential. However, the second part of the same passage 
seems to qualify that and seems to suggest that the Court may hold an integer to be 
essential even if there is nothing in the specification to suggest that the patentee had 
intended it to be treated as an essential integer. That is why Lord Reid said that he 
could not see why the Court would have to shut its eyes to facts of which the patentee 
must have been aware at the time of framing his specification. In the next paragraph 
of his speech Lord Reid seemed to make this clear. He had this to say: 
 
“I think that Lloyd-Jacob J and Upjohn LJ, delivering the judgment of himself and Pearson 
LJ, have taken too narrow a view of this matter. It must be true, as Lloyd-Jacob J, says, that in 
framing their specification the appellants did not appreciate that the same result could be 
achieved by moving the foremost wheels, for otherwise they would have made their claim 
wide enough to cover this. But surely the same must be true of most if not all cases where 
there is an attempt to avoid infringement by the substitution of a mechanical equivalent: if the 
patentee had foreseen that possibility he would have made his claim cover it. If that were a 
good reason for refusing protection to the patentee against a person who later thinks of and 
adopts the mechanical equivalent, it seems to me that there would be very little left of this 
principle. Upjohn LJ, said that the appellants „have deliberately chosen to make it an essential 
feature of the claim that the hindmost wheels should be detachable. If by that he meant that 
there is something in the specification to show that they deliberately refrained from including 
the foremost wheels or went out of their way to make the hindmost wheels an essential feature 
I cannot find anything on which to base such a conclusion. But I do not think that he meant 
that, because he went on to agree with Lloyd-Jacob J that apparently the appellants did not 
appreciate the possibility that the foremost wheels might be moved. So I think that he must 
have meant that the mere fact that they only mentioned the hindmost wheels was sufficient to 
                                                 
48
 Wills J in The Incandescent Gas Light at 330 lines 30-37. 
49
 Lord Reid at 76 lines 29-33. 
57 
 
make the limitation to the hindmost wheels an essential feature of the claim. But if that were 
right, then I cannot see how there could ever be an unessential feature or how this principle 
could ever operate. And I think that the principle is very necessary to prevent sharp 
practice.”50 
 
[38] Special attention should be drawn to Lord Reid‟s statement in the above passage that 
Lloyd-Jacob J, Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ took a narrow view of the matter. The 
narrow view to which he is referring is the view they took to the determination of 
non-textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow. He demonstrates that 
narrow view by referring to the fact the Lloyd-Jacobs J said (and this is what Upjohn 
and Pearson LLJ also approved on appeal in the Court of appeal) that in framing their 
specification in Van der Lely the appellants had not appreciated that the same result 
could be achieved by moving the foremost wheels instead of the hindmost wheels for 
otherwise they would have made their claim wide enough to cover it. Lord Reid says 
that, although this must have been true, it did not necessarily mean that the doctrine of 
pith and marrow did not apply because of this. He said the same was true of most if 
not all cases where an attempt has been made to avoid infringement by the 
substitution of a mechanical equivalent. Lord Reid was in effect saying that the 
approach adopted by the three Judges would make it impossible to find a case where 
the doctrine of pith and marrow would apply. 
 
[39] In making the statement that the mere mention of a feature in a patent claim is not 
itself sufficient to justify the conclusion that such a feature was intended by the 
patentee to be an essential integer, Lord Reid echoed a point which had previously 
been made by Thorson P in Canada in the case of McPhar v Sharpe.
51
 What emerges 
from the passage is that Lord Reid held that the mere fact that a patentee did not 
foresee that the same result could be achieved by a different combination did not 
necessarily mean that there was no infringement.  
 
[40] Lord Reid used his own judgment to determine whether an integer or a feature was 
essential. He said: 
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“in my judgment taking the way in which the specification is framed and the nature of 
the mechanism in respect of which this claim is made, the reference to the hindmost 
wheels is of minor importance and is an unessential integer. The respondent‟s 
substitution of the foremost wheels is merely a mechanical equivalent and therefore 
they must be held to have infringed this claim.”52 
 
[41] After referring to what he called the illogicality which he said arose from the fact that, 
on the one hand, the patentee “is tied strictly to the invention which he claims and the 
mode of effecting an improvement which he says is his invention and therefore, that it 
should follow that, if another person is ingenious enough to effect that improvement 
by a slightly different method, he will not infringe”, Lord Reid pointed out that it had 
“long been recognised that „there may be an essence or substance of the invention 
underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention like every other invention, 
may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case 
a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is 
a substantially new or different combination‟ (per James LJ in Clark v Adie (1873) LR 
10 Ch 667. It was in Clark v Adie that Lord Cairns used the expression „pith and 
marrow of the invention‟ (1877 2 App Cas 315 at 320).”53 
 
[42] A careful study of Lord Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely reveals that he did not refer to 
the rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention 
can escape the consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations. 
However, what is clear from that speech is that Lord Reid did place a lot of emphasis 
on whether the variant was material or immaterial which inquiry precedes the 
application of that rule. It is also clear from Lord Reid‟s speech that, once he found 
that the variant was immaterial, he proceeded to conclude that there was infringement. 
That approach is an application of that rule. Accordingly, although Lord Reid made 
no express reference to that rule, he did consider the materiality of the variant and 
effectively applied that rule without expressly referring to it.  
 
[43] Support for the last mentioned proposition is derived from the fact that Lord Reid 
asked himself the question of what practical difference the defendants‟ choice of the 
foremost instead of the hindmost wheels was. When he found that that selection made 
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no practical difference, he concluded that the defendants‟ selection of the foremost 
instead of the hindmost wheels was an obvious equivalent and that, therefore, the 
defendants‟ apparatus infringed the plaintiffs‟ patent. He said:  
 
“I cannot imagine any more obvious equivalent than substituting the foremost for the 
hindmost wheels in this machine”.54 
 
 Later Lord Reid said: 
 
“Nothing could be less inventive than selecting the hindmost as against the foremost 
wheels when the selection makes no practical difference as regards efficiency”.55 
 
Lord Reid went on to say: 
 
“How then are we to determine what is and what is not an essential integer? The 
authorities show an apparent difference of opinion. Sometimes it is said that it is a 
question of construction of the specification and sometimes it is said that you must 
have regard to all the facts. I doubt if there is much difference between these points of 
view. If the specification makes it clear that the patentee regards a particular integer 
as essential, then it must be treated as essential, but otherwise, even if the question is 
one of construction of the specification I cannot see why one should shut one‟s eyes 
to facts of which the patentee must have been aware when framing the 
specification.”56 
 
[44] Lord Reid later pointed out that the mere fact that an integer had been mentioned in a 
claim was not by itself enough to justify the conclusion that it was an essential integer 
or that it was intended by the patentee to be an essential integer. The Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa seems to have been in agreement with 
Lord Reid on this point. In Frank and Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v Rodi and Weinenberger 
Aktiengeselleschaft Schreiner JA said: 
 
“Whether a feature can actually be claimed, as opposed to being merely mentioned, 
without being an essential of the claim seems to be largely a matter of terminology. If 
a feature is claimed it may on one view be said to have been thereby made an 
essential, or one may say that, though claimed, it must still be examined in the light of 
its apparent importance, having regard to the language of the claim, to see whether it 
is essential or not. The latter usage seems preferable, as avoiding verbalistic inquiries 
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as to whether a feature mentioned in a claim is actually claimed. The question of 
substance is whether a feature is essential to the invention or not.”57 
 
[45] Lord Reid then concluded the discussion of the issue of infringement by pointing out 
that in his judgment, taking the way in which the specification was framed and the 
nature of the mechanism in respect of which the claim was made, the reference to the 
hindmost wheels was merely a mechanical equivalent and therefore the alleged 
infringers had to be held to have infringed the claim.
58
 From this passage it is clear 
that Lord Reid used his own judgment to determine whether or not the relevant 
integer was essential but also had regard not only to the specification but also to the 
nature of the mechanism in respect of which the claim had been made. Annand 
suggests that in Van der Lely Lord Reid was looking to the essence or equity of the 
plaintiff‟s invention and not to its formal expression in the claim.59 This accords with 
the suggestion made elsewhere in this dissertation that the approach of the majority in 
Van der Lely both in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords was one which 
elevated form above substance. It was too formalistic. 
 
[46] Finally, special attention needs to be drawn to a feature of Lord Reid‟s speech that, it 
seems, was to later influence Lord Diplock‟s approach to the construction of patent 
claims in his Catnic decision that will be dealt with in due course. That is whether or 
not it would have been obvious to the patentee at the time of the publication of the 
specification that the variant would affect the way that the invention works. Lord Reid 
said: “… You cannot avoid infringement by substituting an obvious equivalent for an 
unessential integer”.60 Lord Reid continued and said that “[n]othing could be less 
inventive than selecting the hindmost as against the foremost wheels when the 
selection makes no practical difference as regards efficiency”.61 Lord Reid said that 
he would dismiss the appeal except in regard to the infringement of claim 11 in 
respect of which he would allow the appeal. He said that he would dismiss the cross-
appeal. 
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[47] It is very surprising that in their discussion of the Van der Lely case Hitchman and 
McOdrum
62
 have said absolutely nothing about the important dissent of Lord Reid 
and the significance of his approach. However, they do say that the Van der Lely 
decision of the House of Lords held that, although the doctrine of infringement in 
substance was not dead, the form of claim might well prevent the patentee from 
relying upon that doctrine.
63
 It is also suggested that these authors‟ statement about 
the majority decision of the House of Lords lends credence to the suggestion made 




[48] Leger states that the Van der Lely case, which he says had been the source of 
inspiration for the doctrine of infringement in substance in Canada,
65
 was also the 
source of inspiration for the doctrine of purposive construction in the Catnic case.
66
 
Leger must be referring to Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely. If so, his view in 
regard to Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely being a source of inspiration for the 
doctrine of purposive construction in Catnic, would not be inconsistent with the view 
expressed in this dissertation that in Catnic, Lord Diplock borrowed some of the 
features of the Lord Reid approach to the construction of patents, the determination of 
patent infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow. 
 
3.7 Lord Jenkins’ Judgment 
 
[49] In the Van der Lely case Viscount Radcliff, Lord Jenkins, Lord Hodson and Lord 
Devlin concurred in all the views expressed by Lord Reid in his speech except on the 
issue of whether or not the respondents had infringed claim 11. On the latter point 
Lord Jenkins expressed a different view and the rest of the Court agreed with him. It 
is convenient to first discuss Lord Jenkins‟ speech before a discussion of Viscount 
Radcliff‟s speech. Lord Jenkins expressed agreement with the conclusion of the 
Judges of the Court of Appeal and Lloyd-Jacob J, who had dealt with the matter at 
first instance. He quoted a passage from the majority judgment of Upjohn LJ and 
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[50] What can be distilled from the passage from Upjohn LJ‟s judgment referred to above 
is that a patentee would be held to what was taken to be his choice of what he claimed 
to be essential integers and what he did not claim was disclaimed. Furthermore, the 
passage is to the effect that, if the meaning of the claim or the specification was clear 
and unambiguous, there was no need not to give effect thereto. Lord Jenkins approved 
the finding of the majority in the Court of Appeal that the appellants had deliberately 
chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost wheels should be 
detachable and the foremost wheels did not need to be.
68
 In that passage the Court of 
Appeal did not state the basis for its conclusion. 
 
[51] In the Van der Lely case Lord Jenkins also quoted, with approval, another passage 
from Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in the Court of Appeal. In that passage Upjohn LJ quoted 
a statement by Sir Mark Romer in British Hartford to the effect that, when the 
construction of a claim, read by itself, was plain, it was not legitimate to diminish the 
ambit of the monopoly claimed merely because in the body of the specification the 
patentee had described his invention in more restricted terms than in the claim itself.
69 
There, Sir Mark Romer had also quoted a statement from Lord Russell of Killowen in 
EMI. Lord Russell‟s statement was to the effect that he knew of no canon or principle 
which would justify one in using stray phrases in the body of the specification for the 
purposes of narrowing or widening the boundaries of the monopoly fixed by the plain 
words of the claim.
70 
 
[52] Lord Jenkins went on to describe what the difference was between the hay rake of the 
appellant and that of the respondents. He pointed out that the argument in support of 
the charge of infringement was based on the doctrine of pith and marrow and that 
Claim 11 required, in the course of the operation described, the dismounting and 
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remounting of the three hindmost wheels, and the appellants‟ machine as operated 
complied with that requirement. Lord Jenkins further observed that, on the other 
hand, the respondents dismounted and remounted the three foremost wheels of their 
apparatus, making, he understood, no other change. He pointed out that in these 
circumstances the doctrine of pith and marrow was called in aid and it was claimed 
that the respondents‟ use of the foremost wheels was a mere colourable device, 
designed to enable the respondents to take the substance of the appellants‟ invention, 
under cover of a wholly unessential and superfluous feature in the shape of the 
substitution of the foremost for the hindmost wheels.
71 
 
[83] Lord Jenkins stated that he could not agree that Van der Lely was a proper case for the 
application of the pith and marrow principle. He said that each case had to be decided 
on its own facts. Then he said that in that case, whatever the reason, the appellants had 
deliberately framed claim 11 so as to exclude the use of the foremost wheels. That, in 
his opinion, left it open to the respondents to arrange their wheels in any way they 
chose provided they did not interfere with the appellants‟ arrangement. Lord Jenkins 
did not think that the doctrine of pith and marrow applied in the case. He said that it 
should be noted that the appellants themselves wanted for some reason or other the 
arrangement of wheels which was said to have led to the infringement of claim 11. He 
thought it would be unfair and oppressive to hold the respondents guilty of 
infringement of claim 11 merely because they did what the language of claim 11 in 
effect allowed them to do.
72
 If this last sentence does not reflect a literalist approach in 
the extreme on the part of Lord Jenkins, then literalism does not exist. In that sentence 
Lord Jenkins revealed a misunderstanding of the doctrine of pith and marrow. He 
implied that the doctrine of pith and marrow did not apply where the alleged infringer 
did what the language of the patentee‟s claim allowed him to do or did not prevent 
him from doing. The fact of the matter is that all cases in which the doctrine of pith 
and marrow is invoked are cases where the device or apparatus of the alleged infringer 
falls outside the strict language of the patent claim. Where such apparatus or device 
falls within the textual language of the claim, textual infringement occurs and the 
doctrine of pith and marrow does not apply.
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[54] Lord Jenkins‟ judgment to the effect that there was no infringement of claim 11 is 
unpersuasive. It is simply an upholding of literalism in the construction of patent 
specifications and of documents generally which held sway in English law for a long 
time prior to the 1980‟s. Lord Jenkins‟ approach did not look beyond the literal 
meaning of words used in a patent claim or specification, no matter what the 
consequences were. He said that Van der Lely was not a case in which the pith and 
marrow principle applied but did not explain what it would take for a case to attract 
the application of that principle. He held the appellants to the literal meaning of the 
claim despite the fact that the respondents could not explain why they used the 
foremost wheels instead of the hindmost wheels, even when it was accepted that the 
use of the foremost wheels was a superfluity. It is suggested that Lord Reid‟s 
judgment to the effect that the respondents‟ device infringed claim 11 is a much 
sounder judgment, is persuasive, full of common sense and advanced the battle 
against patent piracy. Lord Jenkins‟ approach promoted the cause of patent pirates. 
Finally, it needs to be noted that Lord Jenkins did not have regard to whether or not 
the variant in this case had any practical significance to the functioning of the hay 
rake nor did he refer to or have regard to the rule on immaterial variations. This 
resulted in him wrongly concluding that the doctrine of pith and marrow did not 
apply. 
 
3.8 Viscount Radcliffe’s Judgment 
 
[55] Viscount Radcliffe, Lord Hodson and Lord Devline concurred in Lord Jenkins‟ 
judgment on the issue of the infringement of claim 11. Viscount Radcliff stated that 
the “pith and marrow” principle “is from first to last directed to the prevention of 
abuse of patent rights by colourable evasion; it is not a special or „benevolent‟ method 
of construing an uncertain claim: and I think that [Counsel for the respondents] is 
right to remind us that the basic duty of the patentee to state clearly what is the 
invention for which he seeks protection and the modern practice of building up patent 
claims by a meticulous accumulation of separate or combined elements has left a 
good deal less room for a patentee to complain of abuse, where there is no textual 
infringement, than may have been allowed to him at some periods in the past.”73 
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[56] Viscount Radcliffe went on to caution that when one speaks of theft or piracy of 
another‟s invention or says that it has been “taken” by an alleged infringer and the 
“pith and marrow” principle is invoked to support the accusation, one must be very 
careful to see that the inventor has not by the actual form of his claim left open to the 
world the appropriation of just that property that he says has been filched from him by 
piracy or theft. This statement by Viscount Radcliffe suggests that in his view the 
actual form of a patentee‟s claim could be such that it allowed someone else to in 
effect take the substance of the patentee‟s invention. He then said: “After all, it is he 
who has committed himself to the unequivocal description of what he claims to have 
invented, and he must submit in the first place to be judged by his own action and 
words”.74 The rest of what Viscount Radcliffe said in his judgment says nothing more 
than the following two points: 
 
(a) the patentees could not complain if the respondent dismounted the foremost 
wheels; 
(b) the appellants had, according to Viscount Radcliffe, in effect said in claim 




[57] In his separate judgment in Van der Lely, Viscount Radcliffe said that he could not 
“embark upon an enquiry whether the dismountability of the hindmost wheels is an 
essential or unessential element of the invention claimed, because it seems to me that 
the patentee himself has told us by the way that he has drawn up claim 11 that this 
dismountability of the hindmost wheels is the very element of his idea that makes it 
an invention”.76 He went on to say that “(w)hen one says, then, as has been said by the 
majority of the Court of Appeal, that the appellants have deliberately chosen to make 
it an essential feature of the claim that the hindmost wheels should be detachable‟, 
what one means is not merely that the wording of this claim has been carefully 
selected, as has all the rest of the patent document, to put the appellants in a strong 
position as their expert advisers thought attainable or desirable, but also that the 
appellants have stated clearly and without equivocation that the point of their 
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invention lies in its application to the hindmost wheels.”77 Viscount Radcliffe did not 
refer to any provision of the claim to support the conclusion that the appellants had 
made it clear that the point of their invention lay in its application to the hindmost 
wheels. In O’Hara78 the Federal Court of Appeal, through Pratte JA, inter alia, said: 
“When an inventor has clearly stated in the claims that he considered a requirement as 
essential to his invention, a court cannot decide otherwise for the sole reason that he 
was mistaken”.79 There was nothing in the specification of the appellants in Van der 
Lely to support the proposition that the inventor considered the selection of the 
hindmost wheels to be an essential integer and none was pointed out by any of the 
judges who reached that conclusion from the Court of first instance up to the House of 
Lords. 
 
[58] One of the factors which Lord Reid took into account in reaching the conclusion that 
he reached on claim 11 which is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Lord 
Jenkins, Viscount Radcliffe and Lord Hudson was that the respondents were not able 
to point to any mechanical reason for their choice to dismount the foremost wheels 
instead of the hindmost wheels nor were they able to point to any advantage which 
resulted there from. Lord Jenkins, Viscount Radcliffe and Lord Hodson did not take 
this factor into account before rejecting the opposite conclusion reached by Lord 
Reid. It is suggested that this is a very important factor pointing in the direction that 
the respondents made a minor and unessential variation to the appellants‟ invention. 
In Canadian patent law parlance what happened to the patentee in Van der Lely as 
seen through the eyes of the majority in both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords would have been regarded as a self-inflicted wound
80
 but it is suggested that in 
truth it is not. 
 
[59] The failure of the respondents to point to any mechanical advantage or reason for their 
choice of dismounting the foremost rather than the hindmost wheels should have led 
the majority to a finding of infringement based on the doctrine of „pith and marrow‟. 
In the Van der Lely case the majority in both the Court of Appeal and the majority in 
the House of Lords effectively approved the theft of an invention in a disguised form. 
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They also went against the well-known principle of patent law that, if you borrow the 
substance of patented invention, you cannot escape the consequences of infringement 
by making immaterial variations to the patented invention. It is suggested that the 
failure of the majority to take into account the fact that the defendants could not point 
to any advantage arising from their making the foremost instead of the hindmost 
wheels dismountable and their disregard of this well-known rule of patent law 
constituted a serious misdirection on their part which must have contributed 
considerably to their reaching the conclusion of non-infringement. The majority 
appears to have been excessively preoccupied with the language of the claims to the 
detriment of other relevant factors such as, it is suggested, whether the variation 
added any value to the apparatus or its efficiency or not. James LJ must have had 
cases such as Van der Lely in mind when he said in Clark v Adie that “there is or may 
be an essence or substance of the invention underlying the accident of form; and that 
invention like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or 
mutilated form”.81 In Van der Lely‟s case making the foremost wheels as opposed to 
the hindmost wheels dismountable added absolutely no value and, as Lord Reid said, 
was only done in order to disguise the piracy of the appellant‟s invention. Lord 
Jenkins simply recorded the argument that this was a wholly unessential and 
superfluous feature but went on to say that the appellants had deliberately framed 
claim 11 so as to exclude the use of the foremost wheels and that that left it open for 
the appellant to arrange their wheels in any way they chose provided that they did not 
interfere with the appellants‟ arrangement. 
 
[60] It seems that the majority‟s approach was to look at the terms of the claim concerned 
and, if the terms of the claim did not refer to the variation effected by the alleged 
infringer which made his apparatus slightly different from the patentee‟s invention or 
apparatus, the majority found that the patentee had deliberately chosen not to cover 
the variant and that, for that reason, there could be no infringement. It is suggested 
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that this approach adopted by the majority in Van der Lely was literalism of the 
extreme order. In fact one wonders what the majority would have wanted to see in a 
claim other than that the variant was textually covered by the claim before they could 
find infringement on the basis of the pith and marrow doctrine. The pith and marrow 
doctrine does not apply to a case where the apparatus of the alleged infringer falls 
within the textual terms of the claims of a specification. That being so, it would 
appear that the case in which the majority in the Van der Lely case could apply the 
pith and marrow principle would be as difficult to find as it is difficult to find water in 
a desert. It is suggested that the majority judgment of the House of Lords in Van der 
Lely‟s case on claim 11 was a travesty of justice and the main reason why this travesty 
of justice occurred was that both the majority in the Court of Appeal and the majority 
in the House of Lords failed to take into account the question of whether the 
dismounting of the foremost wheels added any practical value to the invention and 
disregarded the rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a 
patented invention escapes the consequences of infringement by making immaterial 
variations to the invention. 
 
3.9 Lord Hodson’s Judgment 
 
[61] In his judgment Lord Hodson revealed that he understood that the appellants‟ 
complaint was that the substance of their invention had been taken under cover of an 





[62] Lord Hodson said that he agreed with Lord Jenkins that “the pith and marrow” 
doctrine was not applicable to this case. He went on to say: “Where the appellants 
have drawn their claim so as to include specifically the hindmost wheels, thereby 
excluding the foremost, it would, I think, be oppressive to hold the respondents guilty 
of infringement of claim 11 because they have made those wheels detachable which 
were deliberately excluded from the language of the plaintiffs‟ claim”.83 Lord Hodson 
also pointed out that he agreed with Lloyd-Jacob J that no passage in the specification 
could be found to support the suggestion that the removal of any but the hindmost 
                                                 
82
 James LJ in Clark v Adie at 657. 
83
 Lord Hodson at 80 lines 17-19. 
69 
 
wheels was ever within the patentee‟s contemplation.84 Lord Hodson found that there 
was no infringement of the patentee‟s invention. 
     
[63] It has been pointed out above that the majority in the Van der Lely case did not take 
into account Lord Reid‟s reasons for his conclusion in his minority judgment on the 
infringement of claim 11 that the change introduced by the respondents to the 
appellants‟ invention added no value to the invention. Another reason which the 
majority also failed to take into account (and did not deal with) upon which Lord Reid 
relied was that the mere fact that a patentee mentioned a certain feature in a claim did 
not necessarily mean that he intended to make that feature an essential feature of his 
invention. He effectively said that the mere mention of a feature in the claims is no 
sufficient basis to conclude that it was intended by the patentee to be an essential 
feature. Lord Reid said that, if it was enough, there would be very little left of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow. In none of the judgments of members of the majority in 
the Van der Lely case can one find an answer to this argument. The majority was not 
entitled to go ahead and give a judgment going against Lord Reid‟s judgment without 
dealing with his reasons for his conclusion in this regard. 
 
[64] Earlier on when discussing Wills J‟s judgment in The Incandescent Gas case attention 
was drawn to a statement that Wills J made in his judgment to the effect that, when a 
patentee did not reveal any clue in his specification as to his own view of the relative 
importance of the different features of his invention, that meant that the patentee 
intended to treat all of the features of the invention as equally important and as 
essentials of the invention. It was pointed out that that approach made it easy for the 
conclusion of non-infringement to be reached in a case. It is suggested that the 
approach taken by the majority in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in 
the Van der Lely case was in effect an implementation of the wrong approach 
advocated by Wills J in The Incandescent Gas Lamp case in this regard. That 
approach of Wills J ensures that every feature is taken as essential and this means that, 
if an alleged infringer omits only one feature, he would not be said to have infringed 
the patent because omitting an essential feature results in there being no infringement. 
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[65] When the Van der Lely matter came before the House of Lords, Viscount Radcliffe, 
who gave the main judgment and, for all intents and purposes, the judgment of the 
House of Lords, took Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in the Court of Appeal which made no 
reference to the rule on immaterial variations as correctly setting out the principles on 
infringement. Accordingly, he, too, fell into the same error into which Upjohn and 
Pearson LJ had fallen in the Court of Appeal, namely, that of not considering the rule 
on immaterial variations. The other Law Lords who came to the same conclusion also 
did not refer to the rule. This means that the rule was in effect overlooked by both the 
Court of Appeal and by the House of Lords.  
 
[66] When one reads all the speeches of Viscount Radcliffe, Lords Jenkins, Hodson and 
Devlin, it is quite clear that they decided the matter purely on the basis of the fact that 
the appellants had mentioned dismountability only in respect of the hindmost wheels 
and in respect of no other wheels. They took this to be evidence that the appellants 
deliberately chose the dismountability of the hindmost wheels as an essential feature 
of their claim. They allowed form to prevail over substance. In fact Viscount 
Radcliffe even said in his speech that, when one seeks to invoke the pith and marrow 
principle to support an accusation that the substance of someone‟s invention has been 
taken, one should “be careful to see that the inventor has not by the actual form of his 
claim left open to the world the appropriation of just that property that he says has 
been filched from him by piracy or theft”.85 It is suggested that what Viscount 
Radcliffe was saying here was that, if in form the inventors‟ claim does not cover the 
alleged infringer‟s device or process, there is no infringement. It is suggested that 
there cannot be a worse way of elevating form above substance than this. This is 
conclusive proof that the Upjohn LJ approach elevated form above substance. 
 
 [67] Based on the judgments which found that there was no infringement of the 
appellants‟ claims 11 and 12, it can be said with confidence that the rule of patent 
law on immaterial variations and the doctrine of pith and marrow were effectively 
discarded by the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van 
der Lely. For all intents and purposes it would not have been easy for anyone in the 
future to successfully sue for the non-textual infringement of patents and invoke the 
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doctrine of pith and marrow. This was a disaster for the future. Very strangely, as 
already stated elsewhere in this dissertation, in Van der Lely the English courts from 
the Chancery Division to the House of Lords, all the judges who found that there 
was no infringement of claims 11 and 12 failed to take into account the rule of patent 
law on immaterial variations, failed to consider whether the alleged infringer had a 
reason for introducing the difference that it introduced nor did they consider whether 
or not such difference added any value. Indeed they failed to consider whether or not 
the difference introduced by the alleged infringer had any practical significance. 
They also did not refer to or consider some of the important decisions relevant to the 
doctrine of pith and marrow. 
 
[68] A reading of the decision of the House of Lords in Van der Lely reveals the following 
about that decision: 
 
(a) the House of Lords decided the question whether or not there was non-
textual infringement without dealing with the rule on immaterial variations; 
 
(b) the House of Lords regarded the fact that the patentee had made mention of 
the dismountability of one set of wheels without mentioning any other set 
as sufficient to justify the conclusion that the patentee had intended the 
dismountability of the mentioned set of wheels as essential; 
 
(c) the House of Lords did not inquire into the materiality, or otherwise, of the 
dismountability of one set of wheels as opposed to another set of wheels in 
the functioning of the device; 
 
(d) the House of Lords did not inquire into the alleged infringer‟s reasons for 
choosing to dismount the one set of wheels which he chose as opposed to 
the set of wheels to which the claims referred in regard to dismountability. 
(e) the House of Lords did not deal with Lord Evershed MR‟s reasons for his 
dissent and Lord Reid‟s reasons for his dissent to indicate whether it found 




(f) the House of Lords decided the issue of infringement purely on the basis of the 
language used by the patentee in formulating his claims; 
 
(g) the House of Lords‟ approach was too literalistic; 
 
(h) the House of Lords‟ approach placed form above substance; 
 
(i) the House of Lords‟ approach to the determination of liability for non-textual 
infringement and to the doctrine of pith and marrow made it impossible for 
any litigant to succeed in a non-textual infringement claim and, in effect, 








[69]  This case was probably one of the first reported cases, if not the first reported case, to 
come before the courts after the Van der Lely decision of the House of Lords in which 
the claim was based on non-textual infringement. In this case, the Rodi case, the 
plaintiffs invented a new method of making extensible wrist watch bracelets. The 
plaintiffs‟ bracelet was made up of only three components, namely, hollow sleeves, 
connecting links and spring plates with a novel method of articulation so that it could 
be assembled without any soldering or riveting. In the plaintiffs‟ bracelet there were 
two layers of sleeves which were arranged in such a way that each sleeve in the top 
layer overlapped two sleeves in the bottom layer.  
 
[70] At each end of each sleeve there were inserted two connecting links. Those on the one 
side also went into one of the sleeves which overlapped in the lower layer and those 
on the other side also went into the other sleeve in the lower layer which was 
overlapped. When the bracelet was not extended, the sleeves in each layer touched 
each other but adjoining sleeves in each layer were not connected and the links could 
pivot. When the ends of the bracelet were pulled, the pivoting of the links allowed the 
sleeves to slide and separate slightly thus making the bracelet extensible.  
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[71] There was a spring plate in each sleeve so arranged that, when the connecting links 
pivoted, they compressed the springs. When the pull extending the bracelet was 
released, the springs caused the bracelet to contract again to its original length. 
 
[72] The defendants made two models of bracelets known as EXCALIBUR 59 and 
EXCALIBUR 60. EXCALIBUR 59 was made in exactly the same way as the 
plaintiffs‟ bracelet with one alteration or variation. Whereas in the plaintiffs‟ bracelet 
as described in the specification the connecting links at one end of each sleeve were 
separate from those at the other end and each was roughly in the shape of a capital U, 
with the upright parts of the U going into different sleeves and the curved part 
forming a bridge or connection between them, in the defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59 
one limb of the U was extended and joined to the corresponding limb of the 
corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, thus making a double link in the shape 
of an elongated letter C. 
  
[73] Only claim 1 was in issue. It read as follows: 
 
“Claim 1: 
An extensible chain band, more particularly a wrist watch bracelet, made of hollow 
links, which connect the hollow links in an articulated manner and so that they can be 
pulled apart and which pivot against spring action, characterised by this that the 
hollow links are constituted by two layers of cylindrical sleeves (10, 11) of any 
desired section which are arranged transversely to and relatively staggered in, the 
longitudinal direction of the chain band, and the connecting links are constituted by 
U-shaped connecting bows (14) arranged in the longitudinal edges of the chain, which 
bows are inserted in pairs with one of the limbs (15) of each in the open end of a 
sleeve (10) of the one layer and with the other limb (16) in one of the adjacent sleeves 
(11) of the other layer which are in a staggered position, in that a leaf spring 
comprising a bent spring plate (12) is provided in each sleeve and acts by spring 
action against their pivoting when the chain is stretched or bent.” 
 
 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59 was an infringement of 
claim 1 of its patent. The defendants sought a declaratory order that their 







3.11 Lloyd-Jacob J in the Court of First Instance in Rodi 
 
[74] Lloyd-Jacob J was the trial judge in the Rodi matter in the Chancery Division. Lloyd-
Jacob J found that the defendants‟ device known as EXCALIBUR 59 infringed the 
patentees‟ invention. What is very remarkable in Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment is that one 
of the issues upon which he focused was whether such differences as there were 
between the patentees‟ claim and the defendants‟ device were differences which 
added value or which had any practical significance to the operation of the device. 
That is, as is suggested throughout herein, the correct approach in the determination 
of non-textual infringement of patents. Once it has been found that the differences do 
not add any value or are not of any practical significance in the operation of the 
device or apparatus, the patent rule on immaterial variations comes into operation and 
this will almost inevitably lead to the conclusion that there is infringement.  
 
[75] Although Lloyd-Jacob J did not refer to this rule of patent law in his judgment, he, 
nevertheless, came to the correct conclusion. It is interesting to note that in this case 
Lloyd-Jacob J did take into account the question of whether or not the differences 
added any value or had any practical significance because he was the judge who had 
also tried the Van der Lely case in the court of first instance and in that case he did not 
take this factor into account in determining whether non-textual infringement had 
been proved and in that case he came to the conclusion, quite incorrectly it is 
suggested, that there was no infringement. It is suggested that, had he taken this factor 
into account in Van der Lely and had he also applied the rule on immaterial variations, 
he would have come to the conclusion that there was infringement in the Van der Lely 
case which would have been the correct conclusion. 
 
[76] Lloyd-Jacob J pointed out that the resemblances between the two bracelets were so 
marked that it was not reasonable to infer that the design of EXCALIBUR 59 was 
arrived at in ignorance of the patented invention. He said: 
 
“Both are assemblages wherein two relatively staggered layers of hollow sleeves 
arranged transversely to the longitudinal direction of the band are united by 
connectors held firmly in place by bent spring plates, which connectors tilt when 
tensioned to permit articulation between adjacent sleeves. The first and main 
differentiation concerns these connectors, for, in lieu of each pair of U-shaped bows 
75 
 
disposed at opposite edges of a sleeve, the defendants employ one integral C-shaped 
member the two ends of which function as U-bows but which, because of the union 
between one limb of each U, requires to be introduced into the sleeve otherwise than 
from the edges. This necessitates the presence of a slot in the lower face of each of the 
upper sleeves of a width just exceeding the width of the two inserted C-members.”88 
 
[77] Lloyd-Jacob J pointed out that the defendants relied upon a number of differences 
between their bracelet and claim 1 (upon which the plaintiffs relied in regard to 
infringement) which they contended were adequate to disprove infringement. Five 
differences were relied upon by the defendants. These were that: 
 
(1) the sleeves are of rectangular section and thus not cylindrically shaped 
(2) the gap in every upper link member denies possession of the sleeve 
characteristic; 
(3) no U-shaped connecting bows are used; 
(4) the C-shaped connector is incapable of insertion within the sleeves it is 
required to conjoin; and 




Lloyd-Jacob J pointed out that the first two and the last two of the differences were of 
“no real substance”. This meant that the only difference that deserved to be 
considered was the one mentioned in (3) above. That is that in EXCALIBUR 59 there 
were no U-shaped connecting bows used whereas claim 1 contemplated a device in 
which U-shaped connecting bows were used. Lloyd-Jacob J pointed out that this left 
for estimation of the real significance the requirement that pairs of U-shaped 




[78] Lloyd-Jacob J thoroughly considered the advantages which the defendants argued 
their bracelet had over the plaintiffs‟ bracelet but came to the conclusion that the 
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differences were of no practical significance. This meant that the differences 
introduced by the defendants to the patented invention to produce their bracelet added 
no material value.
91
 That Lloyd-Jacob J considered the allegedly infringing device 
thoroughly can be seen from what follows below. 
 
[79] After dealing with the differences between the defendants‟ bracelet and the plaintiffs‟ 
claim, Lloyd-Jacob J pointed out that the question to be answered was whether the 
defendants‟ bracelet consisted of substantially the same parts acting in relation to each 
other in substantially the same way as the claim required.
92
 Lloyd-Jacob J then said 
that in many of the decided cases the omission of a non-essential feature of a patent 
claim or the substitution of a mechanical equivalent in the operation of a patented 
device had been held insufficient to avoid infringement. But, he continued and 
pointed out that, the principle of safeguarding a patentee against the evasion of his 
rights by colourable evasion was not restricted to such types of infringement.
93 
 
[80] In considering the question of infringement, Lloyd-Jacob J did consider the question 
whether or not the differences between the plaintiffs‟ bracelet and the defendants‟ 
bracelet were of any “real substance”.94 He also inquired into the “real significance” 
of the requirement “that pairs of U-shaped connecting bows as inserts in the 
longitudinal edges of the chain are to constitute the connecting links”.95 He also 
pointed out that, although some of the differences relied upon by the defendants could 
have importance from a commercial point of view, for the purpose of deciding on 
infringement, they required examination “to see to what extent, if any, their existence 
is inconsistent with any of the representations contained in the specification so as to 
constitute all or any of the genuine distinctions as opposed to merely colourable 
differences from the patentee‟s invention”.96  
 
[81] Lloyd-Jacob J referred to the fact that the interposition of an integral spacing member 
between oppositely disposed limbs of a pair of U-bows such as was involved in their 
conversion to a C-shaped member denied to the combined member the complete 
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freedom of action possessed by separate U-bows in relation to transverse 
extensibility.
97
 He pointed out that in practice the teaching of the specification in suit 
that the limbs of the bows should lie with play in the sleeves, when applied to a C-
member, enabled sufficient transverse flexibility to be available to meet all reasonable 
requirements in this respect.
98
 Lloyd-Jacob J then concluded in the next sentence: 
 
“This introduction of a slight degree of rigidity is not of any practical significance, as 
can be observed by manipulation of the exhibited EXCALIBUR 59”.99 
 
[82] Lloyd-Jacob also referred to some thickness upon which the defendants had also 
relied as one of the differences between the plaintiffs‟ bracelet and their bracelet. He 
found that this imported “no practical difference”.100 Lloyd-Jacob J concluded that it 
was possible that a finding of strict mechanical equivalence was not justified but said 
that this was not necessarily adverse to an affirmative conclusion on the issue of 
infringement “for the question to be answered is whether the defendants‟ bracelet 
consists of substantially the same parts acting in relation to each other in substantially 
the same way as the claim requires”.101 
 
[83] A little later Lloyd-Jacob J concluded in regard to the issue of infringement: 
 
“The difference between a pair of U-bows and a C-shaped member is for the 
connecting purpose devised by the patentee of no genuine significance, for the inter-
action between the associated parts is in all material respects identical. Each C-
member comprises in reality a pair of U-bows, and this, although obscured, is not 
removed by the integral arm interposed between them. This arm serves no purpose 
necessary for the successful operation, its presence does not deny the substantial 
attainment of the patentee‟s result, and no reason for its adoption other than as a 
disguise is established. In fairness it should be disregarded as a colourable distinction 
introducing an apparent but not an actual difference from the invention claimed, and, 
so considered, a finding of infringement must follow.”102 
 
[84] Thus, Lloyd-Jacob J concluded that the defendants‟ bracelet infringed the plaintiffs‟ 
patent. This last passage quoted from Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment was, it is suggested, 
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based upon the same kind of reasoning and factors that Lord Reid used to reach the 
conclusion of infringement in his dissent in Van der Lely. In this regard reference can 
be made to the fact that Lloyd-Jacob J asked himself the question: what purpose does 
the difference or variant serve? He also took into account the fact that the defendants 
had not advanced any reason for introducing the difference. It, therefore, seemed to 
him that the difference had been introduced as a disguise for the theft of the patentee‟s 
invention. Although Lloyd-Jacob J did not refer to the rule on immaterial variations 
referred to earlier herein, it is quite clear from some of the passages quoted above 
from his judgment that in effect he applied that rule without expressly mentioning it. 
As already stated above, Lloyd-Jacob J also considered the question of what practical 
significance the differences introduced by the defendant to the patented invention 
were. This drove him to the correct conclusion on infringement. In reaching this 
conclusion Lloyd Jacob J invoked the doctrine of pith and marrow. 
 
[85] Although Lloyd-Jacob J did not in his judgment refer to the rule on immaterial 
variations, there can be no doubt that he in effect applied that rule after establishing 
that the variations introduced by the defendants were not material or were not of any 
practical significance. Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi represents his abandonment 
of the Upjohn LJ approach and an adoption of the Lord Reid approach. It marked a 
turning point in the entire saga of the Upjohn LJ approach and the Lord Reid 
approach. Lloyd-Jacob J was the one who had initiated the Upjohn LJ approach 
through his judgment in Van der Lely in the Chancery Division and his approach in 
that case had been approved by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords and 
yet he now turned his back on that approach and joined the dissenters in using the 
Lord Reid approach. There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal against Lloyd-
Jacob‟s judgment. 
 
3.12 Comparison of Lloyd-Jacob J’s Judgment in Rodi with Lord Evershed MR’s 
Dissenting Judgment in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely 
 
[86] A reading of Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi and his judgment in Van der Lely in 
the Chancery Division reveals a striking contrast between the approaches employed in 
the two judgments to the determination of non-textual infringement of patent claims 
and the doctrine of pith and marrow. In Van der Lely Lloyd-Jacob J elevated from 
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above substance in determining whether there was an infringement of the patent in 
that case but in Rodi he focussed more on substance than on form in determining 
whether or not the patent had been infringed. After Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Van 
der Lely, Lord Evershed MR gave his dissenting judgment in the same case in the 
Court of Appeal. A reading of Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment also reveals that he had 
also focused on substance rather than on form in determining whether or not there was 
infringement in Van der Lely. Lord Evershed referred to the doctrine of pith and 
marrow and asked himself the question whether or not the substance or pith and 
marrow of the invention had been taken. That was the correct approach. Lloyd-Jacob 
J‟s judgment in Rodi reflected the same approach. It is suggested that this must have 
been because Lord Evershed MR‟s dissent probably influenced Lloyd-Jacob J in his 
judgment in Rodi. 
 
3.13 Comparison of Lloyd-Jacob J’s Judgment in Rodi with Lord Reid’s Dissenting 
Judgment in the House of Lords in Van der Lely 
 
[87] A reading of the judgment of Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi and Lord Reid‟s dissenting 
judgment in the House of Lords in Van der Lely reveals that there are interesting 
features common in both judgments. It is suggested that the reason for the presence of 
these features in the two judgments is that, when Lloyd-Jacob J wrote his judgment in 
Rodi, he had already read Lord Reid‟s judgment and had become convinced that the 
Upjohn LJ approach that he had applied in Van der Lely and which had been 
approved by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords was wrong and that the 
correct approach was the Lord Reid approach. The common features in the two 
judgments are the following: 
 
(a) In Van der Lely Lord Reid adopted an approach that focused on substance 
rather than form in determining whether there was an infringement of the 
patent; in support of this, reference can be made to the statement in Van der 
Lely where Lord Reid said: 
 
 “… it has long been recognized that there „may be an essence or substance 
of the invention underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention, 
like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or 
mutilated form, and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the 
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alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a substantially new 
or different combination‟”.103 
 
 In Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J also adopted an approach that focused on substance 
rather than form. In support of this proposition, reference can be made to 
the fact that, when he considered the differences between the allegedly 
infringing bracelets and the patentees‟ relevant claim 1, Lloyd-Jacob J said 
that the differences were of “no real substance”.104 
(b) In Van der Lely Lord Reid did not refer in terms to the rule on immaterial 
variations even though he, in effect, applied that rule in determining 
infringement of the patent. In Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J also did not refer in terms 
to that rule even though he applied it in determining infringement. 
 
(c) In Van der Lely Lord Reid asked himself the question whether the alleged 
infringer‟s choice to dismount and remount the foremost wheels instead of 
the hindmost wheels as provided for in the patentee‟s claim 11 made any 
practical difference.
105
 In Rodi Lloyd–Jacob J effectively said the same. He 
said: 
  
“This introduction of slight rigidity is not of any practical significance, as 
can readily be absorbed by manipulation of the exhibited EXCALIBUR 
59”.106 
 
 Lloyd-Jacob J also rejected a distinction in respect of the thickness of the 
bracelets as making “no practical difference”.107 
 
(d)  In Van der Lely Lord Reid also inquired into the reason for or the purpose 
served by, the difference introduced by the alleged infringer. In the Van der 
Lely case this refers to the fact that he inquired into the reason why the 
respondents had chosen to dismount the foremost wheels instead of the 
hindmost wheels as provided for in the patentees‟ claim 11. Lord Reid 
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found that the respondents had no reason for making that choice other than 
to try and disguise their infringement of the appellants‟ patent. He said: 
 
“The appellants dismount the three hindmost wheels of the row of six and 
remount them separately in accordance with claim 11. The respondents do 
exactly the same except that they dismount and remount the three foremost 
wheels. They cannot point to any mechanical reason for doing this or to any 
advantage resulting from it. It is simply done to try to evade the claim and 
the respondents‟ method is the exact mechanical equivalent of the 
appellant‟s method.”108 
 
 In Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J said: 
 
“The difference between a pair of U-bows and a C-shaped member is for the 
connecting purpose devised by the patentee of no genuine significance for 
the interaction between the associated parts is in all material respects 
identical. This arms serves no purpose necessary for successful operation, its 
presence does not deny the substantial attainment of the patentee‟s 
result.”109 
 
 There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the judgment of Lloyd-Jacob J. 
 




[88] In the Court of Appeal the appeal was heard by Harman LJ, Diplock LJ and Winn LJ. 
All three Lord Justices upheld the appeal against the finding of infringement and held 
that there had been no infringement in respect of both EXCALIBUR 59 and 
EXCALIBUR 60. Each of them gave a separate judgment giving reasons for his 
conclusion. Their respective judgments require some discussion. 
 
3.15 Harman LJ’s Judgment 
 
[89] The plaintiffs‟ invention was described in the specification in part in the following 
terms: 
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“This invention relates to an extensible chain band, more particularly a wrist watch 
bracelet, which consists of hollow links and links connecting the same together in an 
articulated manner and so that they can be stretched apart, which connecting links can 
pivot against spring action. Moreover, the chain band is composed of only three 
different parts, namely the sleeves, the connecting bows and the spring plates, 
whereby its construction and assembly is extremely simple and its manufacture very 
economical, especially as the parts can be inserted within one another without 
soldering or reverting.”111 
 
Harman LJ referred to certain passages in the judgment of the trial Judge. He said that 
the trial judge had described the plaintiffs‟ invention in this case in the following 
terms: 
 
“The invention the subject of the letters patent in suit is concerned with extensible 
chain bands, more particularly for wrist watch bracelets of the type wherein a 
succession of hollow links are united by interposed members which permit 
articulation and stretching of composite band to take place”.112 
 
[90] Harman LJ also quoted a passage from the trial judge‟s judgment dealing with two 
concepts on which the trial Judge thought the plaintiffs‟ invention stood. The passage 
reads as follows: 
 
“Stated as a matter of broad generality, the patentee‟s construction of bracelet 
incorporated two basic concepts, both of which were novel at the priority date. The 
first was that an arrangement of link members in two layers arranged transversely to 
and relatively staggered in the longitudinal direction of the chain would if they could 
be satisfactorily articulated present a closed appearance throughout all reasonably 
required extensions. The second concerned the articulation, and this was that 
connectors capable of pivotal action would, if located within opposed ends of each 
pair of upper and lower links, permit relative movement between them on extension, 
and if spring controlled allow recovery when tension is released. Figures 1 and 2 are 
illustrative of these two concepts. In embodying these two concepts in a bracelet the 
patentees chose to place a practical limitation upon each of them. For the first (and 
this was necessitated by the requirement of the second that the connectors should be 
located within the links) hollow links were specified and these are expressed to be 
cylindrical sleeves of any desired cross-section.”113 
 
Harman LJ then quoted another passage from the judgment of the trial Judge where 
the latter said: 
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“For the second, the connection between adjacent upper and lower sleeves was to be 
provided by what are termed U-shaped connecting bows and their spring control by a 
leaf spring of the bent spring plate type suitably located within each sleeve. This 
spring holds the connectors firmly in the sleeve and, whilst permitting pivoting of the 
connectors when tension is applied, operates to restore them to their original position 
when tension is released.”114 
  
[91] The first claim in the specification, which was the only claim said to have been 
infringed by the defendants, has been quoted earlier on. Accordingly, it is not 
necessary to quote it again. In two paragraphs Harman LJ described the similarities 
and differences between the plaintiffs‟ patented invention and the defendants‟ 
apparatus or device that was said to have infringed the plaintiffs‟ patent claim. He did 
so in these terms: 
 
“There seems to me no doubt that the defendants‟ bracelet here in suite, which they 
call EXCALIBUR 59, exhibits these two concepts referred to by the judge. The 
appearance of the defendant‟s bracelet is much the same as that of the plaintiffs‟. It 
consists of two rows of hollow sleeves, staggered one above the other, within which 
are located leave springs and a means of connecting the upper with the lower row by 
pairs of connectors of which one prong is placed in a lower sleeve, which the upper 
prong is placed in the adjacent sleeve in the upper row. The so-called pairs of U-bows 
in the patented invention consist of two parallel prongs joined at the base and of a 
length less than half of the length of the sleeves. In the defendants‟ bracelet each 
opposed pair of these is replaced by a single double-ended piece like a „C‟ on its side. 
These, of course, cannot be put into position by pushing them into the ends of the 
sleeves: they are inserted by means of a slot in each sleeve which can be subsequently 
closed. There is moreover another difference namely that in the patented device the 
U-bows are held in position and prevented from falling out by the two leaf springs, 
one in the upper and one in the lower sleeve; whereas in the EXCALIBUR 59, the „C‟ 
pieces would not fall out in the absence of the springs, though no doubt they might 
rattle about. In both instruments the leaf springs provide the retracting force which 
brings the sleeves together again when released from stretch.”115 
 
[82] Harman LJ began his consideration of the appeal by making an observation to the 
effect that the trial Judge had decided the case upon the footing that the so-called “C” 
pieces were in effect two U-pieces joined so as to give a pretended difference. He then 
said: 
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“As to this it is the law, and the judge expressly recognises it, that you cannot patent a 
concept. Your monopoly is to be found in your claim and in so far as the claim limits 
your means of performing or carrying out the concept to a certain method, your patent 
will not be infringed by someone who carries it out in another. This is analogous to 
the law of copyright. There is none in ideas: it is their embodiment in physical or 
tangible form that the law protects.”116 
 
Harman LJ then continued and pointed out that the starting point for the court was to 
construe the claim and decide what the essential features were. He said that, having 
done that, the Court should find whether the essential features had been taken by the 
infringer. “If there are unessential elements”, said Harman LJ, “and there is a 
departure from these there will nevertheless be infringement but if the so-called 
infringer, in bringing about the same result, has employed really different means, he 
will not infringe”.117 Harman LJ pointed out that “the so-called doctrine of 
mechanical equivalents only applies, I think, to unessential features. If there are 
genuine differences between the elements of one machine and the other, there will be 
no infringement.”118 It is to be noted that Harman LJ referred to “genuine differences” 
and not to material differences. 
 
[93] Harman LJ pointed out that there was no difference between the parties as to the 
principles involved in the determination of infringement. He said that those principles 
were well set out in Birmingham and he thought he did not need to “rehearse the 
authorities”.119 In the next sentence Harman LJ set out what the decisive question 
was. He said: 
 
“The question is whether the mechanism said to infringe consists of substantially 
(that is to say in essentials) the same parts operating in substantially the same way as 
in the patented invention”.120 
 
He then said that it was, as usual, in the application of the principle involved that the 
difficulty arose.
121
 Harman LJ examined the claim and set out what he believed were 
the features of the claim. With regard to the differences, he said: 
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“The difference comes where the plaintiffs speak of U-shaped connecting bows and 
describe them as „inserted in pairs‟ in the open end of the sleeves. The defendants‟ 
connectors are not in the shape of a „U‟ and cannot be inserted in the end of a sleeve. 
Moreover, in the plaintiffs‟ invention the spring in each sleeve is required to keep the 
U-bows in position, whereas in the defendants‟ invention it is not needed for this 
purpose.”122 
 
Harman LJ then pointed out that the plaintiffs‟ contention was that the differences 
pointed out above were only colourable differences and not differences in essentials. 
He said that the plaintiffs contended that the “C” pieces were only two U-bows joined 
together and that the join did not perform any function. He said that the plaintiffs 
argued that the “C” pieces were “inserted” in the sense of being found inside the 
sleeves and that it was unnecessary that they should be pushed in at the open ends. He 
said that, furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants‟ “C” pieces did keep 
the connectors firmly in the sleeve in the sense that they prevented them from lying 
loosely within it and that this was all that the claim, on its true construction, meant. 
 
[94] Harman LJ expressed sympathy with the plaintiffs. He said: 
 
“I feel some sympathy with the plaintiffs whose broad notion does seem to me to have 
been imitated by the defendants; and it may be that in other times they could have 
succeeded on what was called the „pith and marrow‟ doctrine as enunciated, for 
instance, by Lord Cairnes in Clark v Adie (1877) 2 App Cas 315 but as time has gone 
on inventors have gone into greater particulars about their claims and have not left the 
court to examine the substance and extract the essential details, and once you find that 
an essential element of the patented invention is not found in the rival machine, the 
latter does not infringe the former”.123 
 
Harman LJ then referred to the Van der Lely case and said that it was a “striking 
example of this”. He said: 
 
“The change from displacing the hindmost wheels of the hay rake to that of displacing 
the foremost wheels seems to be a merely mechanical alteration, nevertheless the 
claim for infringement failed”.124  
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These statements by Harman LJ reveal an approach on his part in terms of which he 
found against the patentee not because of what the law was but because of what he 




[95] It was in one paragraph that Harman LJ made the finding that there was no 
infringement in this case in respect of the defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59 and gave his 
reasons upon which that finding was based.
125
 His first reason was that it was 
impossible, in his opinion, to say that the so-called U-bows were not an essential part 
of the plaintiffs‟ invention. In support of this statement, Harman LJ said that the U-
bows were one of the three different parts expressly mentioned in the specification as 
constituting the only parts of the chain band, and as having the result of making the 
construction simple and easily taken apart. Moreover, he thought that it was an 
essential feature that they should be pushed in at the open end of each sleeve and kept 
in the sleeve by means of the leaf springs.
126 
The first reason cannot be sufficient for 
the conclusion that the U-bows were essential features of the patented invention. A 
mere mentioning of a feature in a claim is not per se sufficient for a finding that it is 
an essential feature. The second one is not another reason for the conclusion that the 
U-bows were essential features but another conclusion – a statement that it was an 
essential feature of the patented invention that the U-bows should be pushed in at the 
open end of each sleeve and kept in the sleeve by means of the leaf springs. Harman 
LJ then went on to say that such features were not present in the defendants‟ device 
and that the defendants‟ C-pieces were not the true equivalents of the U-bows in the 
patented invention and that they were not pushed in at the ends of the sleeves nor did 
they rely on the springs to prevent them from falling out. He then said that in the light 
of all this he could only conclude that there had been no infringement of the plaintiffs‟ 
invention by the defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59. 
 
[96] It is important to point out that in his reasons for the conclusion that the U-bows were 
essential features of the patented invention all that Harman LJ said, apart from the 
statement that they were mentioned in the specification, was that they were said to 
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have “the result of making the construction simple and easily taken apart”.127 No other 
substantiation was given for this conclusion. It was also not pointed out why the 
simplicity of the construction was essential. No reference was made to the patent law 
rule on immaterial variations. Harman LJ did not deal with the plaintiffs‟ contention 
that the join arising out of the “U” bows being joined together to make a “C” 
performed no function. There can be no doubt that Harman LJ applied the Upjohn LJ 
approach in determining whether there was infringement in the Rodi case. 
 
[97] Harman LJ correctly found that EXCALIBUR 60 had not been infringed. It is 
important to observe that Harman LJ did not refer to the notional addressee in any 
way to determine essentiality but only determined it himself. It is now necessary to 
turn to Diplock LJ‟s judgment. 
 
3.16 Diplock LJ’s Judgment 
 
[98] Diplock LJ also found that EXCALIBUR 59 and EXCALIBUR 60 did not infringe 
the patentees‟ patent. He allowed the appeal in respect of both devices. In dealing 
with the matter Lord Diplock first considered the role played by the specification in 
the determination of liability for the non-textual infringement of patent claims. In this 
regard he said: 
 
“By letters patent a patentee discloses to the world the new manner of manufacture 
which he claims to have invented. He thereby obtains if his patent is valid a monopoly 
for what in his specification he has claimed as being his invention. He obtains a 
monopoly for nothing else. When, as was formerly the practice, specifications were 
drafted in the form of a description of the invention, whether a process or an article, 
followed by a general claim to the process or article „substantial as described‟, the 
problem of construction involved the court‟s selecting from the descriptive matter 
what was intended by the patentee to be the substance as distinct from the unessential 
parts of his invention. Since specifications then as now were written for the 
information of persons interested in the process or article described who would know 
what was already known about the subject matter and could identify what was old and 
what was novel in the process or article described, the court in approaching the 
problem of construction had to try itself to understand the description as such persons 
would. Such persons would be able to say that the patentee could not have been 
intending to claim that the use of a particular component referred to in the description 
was essential to his invention if it were common knowledge to those versed in the 
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subject matter that some other component would perform the same function (the 
„doctrine of equivalents‟ cf Marconi v British Radio etc (1911) 28 RPC 181, and 
when the unessential had been thus identified, what remained, were the „essential 
features‟ of the invention an expression which I find preferable to „substance‟ or to 
the time-worn lisping metaphor „pith and marrow‟ (cf Clark v Adie (1877) 2 App Cas 
315 at 320).”128 
 
[99] In the above passage the important points that Diplock LJ made, apart from the 
historical background to specifications, are the following: 
 
(a) a patentee only obtains a monopoly for that which he has claimed in his 
specification as his invention and nothing else; 
(b) previously the problem of construction involved the court selecting from 
the descriptive matter in the specification what was intended by the patentee 
to be the substance of the invention as distinct from the unessential parts; 
(c) in approaching the problem of construction the Court had to try and 
understand the description of the invention as it would be understood by 
persons interested in the process or article; and 
(d) persons interested in the process or article would be able to say that the 
patentee could not have been intending to claim that the use of a particular 
component referred to in the description was essential to his invention if it 
were common knowledge to those versed in the subject matter that some or 
other component would perform the same function. 
 
[100] Diplock LJ went on to deal with the position as it was in terms of the then modern 
practice. He said: 
 
“Under the modern practice, however, the patentee does not leave the essential 
features of his invention to be identified by the reader from the general description of 
it in his specification. He himself specifies with particularity those elements or 
integers of his invention which he claims to be essential to it. In construing a modern 
specification, to speak of looking for the substance or the „pith and marrow‟ of the 
invention, may lead one erroneously to suppose that the patentee, whatever be the 
precise language in which he has framed his claim, is entitled to a monopoly of the 
mechanical or other principle of which his invention makes use or of the result which 
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his invention achieves. This is not so. If the language which the patentee has used in 
the claims which follow the description upon its true construction specifies a number 
of elements or integers acting in a particular relation to one another as constituting the 
essential features of his claim, the monopoly which he obtains is for that specified 
combination of elements or integers so acting in relation to one another – and for 
nothing else. There is no infringement of his monopoly unless each and every one of 
such elements is present in the process or article which is alleged to infringe his patent 
and such elements also act in relation to one another in the manner claimed. The law 
as to the principles of construction of claims in specifications in the modern form 
seems to me so laid down clearly and authoritatively in the judgment of Upjohn LJ in 
Van der Lely v Bamfords Ltd [1961] RPC 296 at 312 which was approved by the 
majority of the House of Lords on appeal; [1963] RPC 61.”129 
 
 The important points made by Diplock LJ in the above passage are the following: 
 
(a) under the then modern practice the patentee did not leave it to the reader to 
identify the essential features of his invention but “(h)e himself specified 
with particularity those elements or integers of his invention which he 
claims to be essential to it”; 
(b) if the language which the patentee has used in the claims, upon its true 
construction, specifies a number of elements or integers acting in a 
particular relation to one another as constituting the essential features of his 
invention, the monopoly which he obtains is for that specified combination 
of elements or integers so acting in relation to one another – and for nothing 
else. There is no infringement of his monopoly unless each and every one 
of such elements is present in the process or article which is alleged to 
infringe his patent and such elements also act in relation to one another in 
the manner claimed. 
(c) The law as to the principles of construction of claims in specifications in the 
then modern form was that laid down by Upjohn LJ in Van der Lely in the 
Court of Appeal which was approved by the majority of the House of Lords 
in a further appeal. 
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[101] Diplock LJ pointed out that, to resolve ambiguities, it was permissible to have resort 
to the remainder of the specification including the drawings.
130 
He expressed the view 
that it was not an essential feature of the invention that the sleeves should be of 
circular section or devoid of any gap in their periphery. In substantiation of this view 
Diplock LJ referred to the drawings in the specification and said that they showed 
sleeves that were not circular in section and which had a gap in the lower surface of 
the upper sleeve and the upper surface of the lower sleeve. In further substantiation of 
his view – and more importantly – Diplock LJ referred to what would have been 
obvious to any reader versed in mechanics. He said: 
 
“Secondly, to any reader versed in mechanics it is obvious that there is no need for the 
section of the hollow sleeve to be circular in order to enable it to perform its required 
function and that so long as the lower surface of the upper sleeve provides a firm 
bearing surface for the leaf spring, it makes no difference to the functioning of the 
bracelet that there is a gap between the parts of the lower surface on each side which 
bear the spring. Such a reader would realise that the patentee could not have been 
intending to claim as an essential feature of his invention that the sleeve must be of 
circular section or devoid of any gap in its periphery in the lower surface of the upper 
sleeve.”131 
 
[102] In discussing the principles applicable to the determination of liability for 
infringement of patents, Diplock LJ made two very important omissions. First, he 
made no reference to whether or not any of the variations or omissions made by the 
defendants to the patentee‟s inventions added any value to the invention nor does it 
appear that he paid any attention to the fact that the defendants did not give any 
reasons why they made such variations. That was a relevant factor to take into 
account because, once it was found that a particular variation added no material value 
to the invention, that should be a factor in favour of a finding of infringement. The 
second matter that Diplock LJ omitted to take into account was the rule on immaterial 
variations. It was imperative that Diplock LJ should have taken this rule into account 
and should have given effect to it. His failure to take these two matters into account 
led him to find that there was no infringement. Had he taken them into account, he 
would have concluded that there was infringement. 
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[103] Diplock LJ decided the matter broadly on the basis of the language used by the 
patentees in their claim. Lord Diplock said: 
 
“For the patentees it has been argued forcefully before us and successfully before the 
learned judge – that the description of the connecting links as „U-shaped bows‟ does 
not make it an essential feature of the invention that the parallel limbs of the link 
should be open at one end. The only portions of the connecting link which perform an 
essential mechanical function in the bracelet are the base, which lies outside the 
hollow sleeves and at right angles to their axis, and those parts of the two limbs which 
lie within the hollow sleeves near to their open ends. As long as these portions of the 
connecting links can be fairly described as U-shaped, it matters not, the patentees 
contend, that one of the limbs of a connecting link at one side of the bracelet between 
the open ends of two adjacent sleeves is joined to the corresponding limb of the 
connecting link at the other side of the bracelet between the open ends of the same 
sleeves, so that two U-shaped links become one composite link roughly in the shape 
of an elongated approximately rectilinear letter „C‟. If such a composite connecting 
link was intended to be covered by the claim it could hardly be described as having 
two „limbs‟, and even if it could, such „limbs‟ could not be „inserted‟ in the open ends 
of adjacent sleeves if „inserted‟ connotes the method of assembling the bracelet as 
distinct from the mere positional arrangement of its various component parts which is 
what the patentees are driven to contend it means.”132 
 
Diplock LJ‟s approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow in Rodi was the same as 
that of Upjohn LJ in Van der Lely in the Court of Appeal. 
 
3.17 Winn LJ’s Judgment 
 
[104] Winn LJ, who gave a separate judgment, said that it was not open to doubt in his view 
either that the patented invention represented a marked and meritorious development 
in the art of constructing wrist watch bracelets or that Henry Showell Ltd, 
appreciating the significance and merits of this advance, set out to produce a 
competing article which would incorporate the advantages of the patented invention 




[105] Winn LJ pointed out that to determine the essential question whether a patent 
monopoly had been infringed, the starting point of the inquiry was necessarily to 
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ascertain what was the monopoly granted.
134
 Two sentences thereafter he pointed out 
that in the modern form of specification the patentee “picked out by a series of claims 
in the characteristics of his invention” and thereby, in general, indicated the essential 
features which could be omitted or replaced without substantially altering the article 
for which he is claiming a patent. Winn LJ pointed out that, where a question of 
alleged infringement arose, it was clear from the judgment of Upjohn LJ in Van der 
Lely in the Court of Appeal
135
 that “to infringe the patent it had to be shown that the 
invention, as claimed in the relevant claim, had been infringed in all essential respects 
essential, that is to say, upon the true construction of the claim”. Winn LJ then noted 
that this judgment was upheld expressly by the majority of the House of Lords.
136 
Winn LJ expressed the view that Lord Evershed MR had defined the question in 
similar terms in Birmingham. In this regard Winn LJ quoted a passage from the 
judgment of Lord Evershed MR in Birmingham where Lord Evershed MR said: 
 
“For the purposes of the present case we are content to treat the question as being in 
the words of Parker J in Marconi v British Radio etc (1911) 28 RPC 181 at 217 
„whether the infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus said to 
have been infringed‟. In the question thus formulated we take „the apparatus said to 
have been infringed‟ as being the apparatus claimed as the invention in the claiming 
clause of the specification; and „substantially the same‟ as meaning „in all essential 
respects the same‟.”137 
 
Ultimately Winn LJ effectively decided the issue of infringement on the basis of the 
language used be the patentee in the claim. He said: 
 
“Taking as a whole those portions of the text set out above under (a), (b) and (c) I am 
of the firm opinion that the claim states as an essential of the invention that into either 
end of each of the sleeve referred to there should be put from outside, inwards and 
arranged contiguous to each of those ends, one limb of a connector shaped in a 
general sense like a capital letter „U‟ this postulate excludes the use of any connector 
with a continuous portion running throughout the length of the sleeve and within the 
sleeve, albeit possessing two ends shaped respectively like „U‟ pieces”.138 
 
                                                 
134
 Winn LJ in Rodi at 471 lines 38-41. 
135
 At 313. 
136
 Winn LJ at 471 line 44 to p.472 line 3. 
137
 Winn LJ quotes this passage at 472 lines 6-12 of the Rodi case from Birmingham‟s case at 471 line 472. 
138
 Winn LJ in Rodi at 473 lines 23-30. 
93 
 
Winn LJ also pointed out that there was an advantage in practice, favouring lateral 
flexibility of the band, in securing that there be two limbs lying within any particular 
sleeve able to move independently of one another, as they could not do if joined 
together by a connecting piece.
139 
 
[106] In considering the issue of infringement, Winn LJ neither considered what value the 
differences introduced by the defendants added to the invention or article nor did he at 
any stage refer to or consider the patent rule on immaterial variations. Winn LJ also 
concluded that the appeal should be allowed. He found that there was no infringement 
of the plaintiffs‟ patent by the defendants‟ device called EXCALIBUR 59 and the one 
called EXCALIBUR 60.  
 
[107] The fact that Winn LJ also followed the Upjohn LJ approach in deciding the Rodi 
appeal means that all the three Judges in the Court of Appeal in Rodi‟s case chose to 
stick to the Upjohn LJ approach. Unlike in Van der Lely in which the Court of Appeal 
followed the approach adopted by Lloyd-Jacob J in the Court of first instances, in this 
case it stuck to the approach that Lloyd-Jacob J had adopted in Van der Lely and not 
the one of Lord Reid that Lloyd-Jacob J chose to follow in Rodi. There is no 
indication in any of the three judgments produced in the Court of Appeal in Rodi‟s 
case that anyone of the three Judges of the Court of Appeal appreciated the legal 
quagmire that the approval of the Upjohn LJ approach by both the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords had created for English patent law. There was an appeal 
against the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords. 
 
3.18 Special Observations on the Judgments of the Three Judges in the Court of 
Appeal in Rodi 
 
[108] It is significant to note that that not a single one of the three Judges considered or 
even referred to the rule on immaterial variations. All three of them seemed to have 
focused on the language of the claim in the specification. They also did not have 
regard to, for example, whether the differences had any practical significance. In this 
regard it needs to be pointed out that Diplock LJ regarded Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in 
the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely as approved by the House of Lords in the same 
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case as having correctly stated the relevant principles.
140
 Of course this was erroneous 
because both in Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely and in 
Viscount Radcliff‟s speech in the same case in the House of Lords the rule on 
immaterial variations was not mentioned as part of the law on infringement and yet it 
was part of the law. Once Diplock LJ had taken this view on the law, it was inevitable 
that he would have no regard to the rule on immaterial variations in his consideration 
of the issue of infringement and would ultimately conclude that EXCALIBUR 59 did 
not infringe the patent. Winn LJ did the same. 
 





[109] In the House of Lords the matter came before Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-
Gest, Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce and Lord Upjohn. The majority of this panel had 
been involved in the Van der Lely case at one level or another. Lord Reid and Lord 
Hodson were members of the panel which had heard the Van der Lely matter in the 
House of Lords. Lord Reid had given a dissent and Lord Hodson had concurred in the 
majority judgment of Viscount Radcliffe. Lord Upjohn had given the majority 
judgment in the Van der Lely case in the Court of Appeal. Lord Pearce and Lord 
Morris were the only Law Lords who had not had anything to do with the Van der 
Lely matter. In the light of this composition of the panel, one is tempted to wonder to 
what extent the prior involvement of the three members of the panel in different 
judgments in the Van der Lely case would influence the ultimate outcome of Rodi in 
the House of Lords. Two of the members of the panel in the Rodi matter in the House 
of Lords had followed the Upjohn LJ approach in the Van der Lely case and found the 
doctrine of “pith and marrow” not to be applicable whereas one had applied the Lord 
Reid approach and had found the doctrine of pith and marrow to have been applicable 
in that case.  
 
[110] The House was divided 3:2 in favour of a finding that the EXCALIBUR 59 did not 
infringe the plaintiffs‟ patent. Lord Reid gave a minority judgment. He found that the 
defendants‟ bracelet known as EXALIBUR 59 infringed the plaintiff‟s patent but that 
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the defendants‟ bracelet known as EXCALIBUR 60 did not. Accordingly, he 
concluded that he would allow the appeal with regard to EXCALIBUR 59 but dismiss 
it with regard to EXCALIBUR 60. With regard to EXCALIBUR 60 Lord Reid was of 
the view that EXCALIBUR 60, in dispensing with separate spring plates found in the 
plaintiff‟s device by modifying the nature of the connecting links, was “essentially 
different from using substantially the same parts so that they act on each other in 
substantially the same way”.142 Lord Pearce wrote a separate judgment agreeing with 
Lord Reid that EXCALIBUR 59 infringed but that EXCALIBUR 60 did not infringe. 
Accordingly, he too, would allow the appeal relating to EXCALIBUR 59 but dismiss 
the appeal in respect of EXCALIBUR 60. The other Law Lords concluded in three 
separate speeches that the appeal be dismissed in respect of both EXCALIBUR 59 
and EXCALIBUR 60. It is necessary to discuss the different approaches adopted by 
the majority and the minority in their different speeches. It is convenient to start off 
with the majority. 
 
3.20 Lord Morris’ Judgment 
 
[111] Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest referred
143
 to a part in Van der Lely NV v Bamfords 
Ltd
144
 where it was said that the patentee is tied strictly to the invention which he 
claims and the mode of effecting an improvement which he says is his invention and 
also to a part in Van der Lely where it was said that “[i]t is he who has committed 
himself to the unequivocal description of what he claims to have invented, and he 
must submit in the first place to be judged by his own action and words”.145 Lord 
Morris pointed
146 
out that this did not mean that an allegation of infringement could 
be answered by pointing out that a method had been adopted which in some 
unimportant respect was different from that described in a claim. He then quoted a 
passage from Lord Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely at 75 which, in turn, had quoted a 
passage from James LJ‟s judgment in Clark v Adie which was to the effect that there 
could be an essence or substance of the invention underlying the mere accident of 
form and that an invention could be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form 
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and that in every case it would be a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the 
same in substance and effect or is a substantially new or different combination.
147 
 
[112] Lord Morris said that when there is an allegation of infringement it becomes, 
therefore, a question of considering substance rather than mere form.
148
 Lord Morris 
observed that it was pointed out in Marconi that no one who borrows the substance of 
a patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making 
immaterial variations.
149
 He quoted another passage from the same judgment that, 
inter alia, said that everyone who produces the same result by using the essential parts 
of the combination or process is an infringer, even though he has, in fact, altered the 
combination or process by omitting some unessential part or step and substituting 
another part or step, which is, in fact, equivalent to the part or step he has omitted. It 
was said in the same judgment that the question here, again, was a question of the 




[113] Lord Morris also referred to a passage in Birmingham
151
 where it was, inter alia, said 
that “[t]he question therefore appears to be whether the allegedly infringing apparatus 
consists of substantially the same parts acting upon each other in substantially the 
same way as the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention”.152 However, Lord 
Morris also referred to the speech of Viscount Radcliffe in the Van der Lely matter in 
the House of Lords where Viscount Radcliff took a very rigid approach on tying the 
patentee to the strict terms of his claim. In the passage which Lord Morris quoted 
from Viscount Radcliff‟s speech in Van der Lely, Viscount Radcliffe, inter alia, 
cautioned that when therefore one speaks of theft or piracy of another‟s invention or 
says that it has been “taken” by an alleged infringer and the “pith and marrow” 
principle is invoked to support the accusation, one must be very careful to see that the 
inventor has not by the actual form of his claim left open to the world the 
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[114] The approach taken by Lord Morris after referring to the above authorities was to the 
effect that the Court should study the relevant claim and, if necessary, construe it and 
thereafter consider what the defendants have done.
154
 Very importantly, Lord Morris 
asked the correct questions. He asked: 
 
“Have they or have they not taken all the essential features or integers of the invention 
claimed? If there are variations, are they immaterial? If there are differences, are they 
differences in essential respects or in inessential respects?”155 
 
One can see from this passage that Lord Morris did have as one of the factors to be 
considered the question whether, if there were differences, such differences were 
material or immaterial or to put it differently, whether the differences related to 
essential or inessential respects. This approach was correct. The next question would 
be how he would determine the materiality or immateriality of the differences and 
what the consequences of such conclusion would be to the question whether there was 
infringement or not. 
 
[115] Lord Morris said that, like Harman LJ in the Court of Appeal in the same matter he 
was approaching the matter, with some sympathy for the plaintiffs because not only 
did their invention have new and valuable features but its “broad notion” did seem to 
have been imitated by the defendants. However, he considered that claim 1 was clear. 
His view was that it was a claim requiring a combination of integers. He said that it 
was manifest that in what the defendants had produced there were differences and the 
question was whether or not the differences were in essential respects.
156 
 
[116] Lord Morris thereafter sought to apply to the case the principles he believed to be 
applicable. Lord Morris set out the three features of the plaintiffs‟ invention.157 Those 
were the same features as those found by the Court of Appeal. They were: 
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 (a) that the connecting links between the staggered layers of sleeves were 
constituted by U-shaped connecting bows arranged in the longitudinal 
edges of the claim; 
 (b) that those “bows” were inserted in pairs with one of the limbs of each in the 
open end of the sleeve of the one layer and with one of the limbs of each in 
the open end of the sleeve of the one layer and with the other limb in one of 
the adjacent sleeves of the other layer; and 
 (c) that in each sleeve there was a leaf spring comprising a bent spring plate 
which spring plate kept the connecting bows firmly in the sleeve and acted 





 In the next sentence Lord Morris said that it seemed to him that these elements of the 
plaintiffs‟ claim had to be regarded as essential ones159 but he did not substantiate this 
conclusion.  
 
[117] Lord Morris referred to certain differences between the plaintiffs‟ invention and the 
defendants‟ device and concluded that the defendants‟ departures from the plaintiffs‟ 
claim were in respect of essential elements and that, therefore, EXCALIBUR 59 was 
not an infringement. Lord Morris did not in reaching this conclusion refer to how a 
person skilled in the art would have understood the relevant claim nor did he refer to 
what such person would have understood to have been the patentee‟s intention. Also 
of significance is the fact that Lord Morris did not refer to whether or not the variant 
had any practical effect on the functioning of the invention. He also did not consider 
the matter from the point of view of what the patentee intended to be the essential 
elements. He decided what elements were essential on the basis of his view in this 
regard. He concluded that EXCALIBUR 59 did not infringe nor did EXCALIBUR 60. 
 
[118] Lord Morris referred to the plaintiffs‟ contentions that the form of connecting links 
devised by the defendants in their EXCALIBUR 59 which the plaintiffs described as 
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“C-shaped” were no different from or were the equivalent of a pair of opposite U-
shaped connecting bows and that because the defendants‟ connecting links would be 
found in or would rest or lie in the hollow sleeves they were “inserted” in the way in 
which that word was used in claim 1. Lord Morris rejected these contentions as 
involving ignoring the plain meaning of the words in claim 1.
160
 Lord Morris quoted a 
passage from the judgment of the judge of first instance in which that judge had 
described what, in his view, the plaintiffs‟ device. The quotation focused on the 
language of the claim. Lord Morris then said: 
 
“I can only regard such U-shaped connecting bows as being essential parts. The 
specification had stated that the feature of the chain band according to the invention is 
its „very great extensibility and flexibility? The specification had also set out that the 
chain band was composed of only three different parts (the sleeves, the connecting 
bows and the spring plates) and that its construction and assembly was extremely 
simple and its manufacture very economical „especially as the parts can be inserted 
within one another without any soldering or riveting‟.”161  
 
[119] Lord Morris then turned to the defendants‟ device. He said that the defendants‟ 
connecting links were different and, in his view, were essentially different. He pointed 
out that within one sleeve it was not possible to identify four limbs unless limbs 
without any terminal points were to be counted. Furthermore, he said that it seemed to 
him that in their context the words “inserted in” could only mean, and were only 
intended to mean, that a U-shaped connecting bow was to be inserted by being pushed 
in at the end of a sleeve so that one of its limbs would be in the open end of a sleeve 
in one layer and the other limb in the open end of an adjacent sleeve in the other layer. 
He observed that the defendants‟ fraction and method were such that their connecting 
links could not be pushed in the open ends of sleeve. His view was that the 
defendants‟ construction involved departures in material respects from the essential 
features of the plaintiffs‟ invention to which he had referred. Lord Morris pointed out 
that as a result of the differences the defendants did not achieve the flexibility which 
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[120] Despite the fact that Lord Morris recognised that the materiality of the differences 
between the patentee‟s invention and the defendants‟ device was important in the 
determination of non-textual infringement and actually referred also to the well-
known patent rule on immaterial variations he failed to apply this to the determination 
of non-textual infringement in the Rodi case. This happened because he failed to ask 
the question whether the differences to be found in the defendants‟ device were of any 
practical significance in the functioning of the device. He did note that the chain band 
in the defendants‟ device did not achieve flexibility but that should not have been the 
end of the enquiry. He should have asked what value flexibility added. Flexibility that 
did not add any functional value was immaterial. Lord Morris found that there was no 
infringement in respect of both devices. 
 
3.21 Lord Hodson’s Judgment 
 
[121] Lord Hodson also gave a separate judgment. He, too, adopted the approach that the 
question was whether the infringing apparatus was substantially the same as the 
apparatus said to have been infringed.
163
 In this regard he referred to Parker J‟s 
judgment in Marconi‟s case and to the judgment in Birmingham where it was, inter 
alia, said: 
 
 “The question therefore appears to be whether the allegedly infringing apparatus 
consists of substantially the same parts acting upon each other in substantially the 
same way the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention”.164 
 
 Lord Hodson reached the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal in terms of the 
essential elements of the relevant claim and on infringement. The observations made 
above about Lord Morris‟ speech apply with equal force to Lord Hodson‟s speech as 
well. 
 
[122] In considering whether or not EXCALIBUR 59 had been infringed, Lord Hodson did 
not refer to the rule of patent law on immaterial variations. However, he did refer to a 
passage in Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment in Birmingham where in relation to a case 
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where there was no textual or literal infringement but a combination, the Master of the 
Rolls said: 
 
“The question therefore appears to be whether the allegedly infringing apparatus 
consists of substantially the same parts acting upon each other in substantially the 
same way as the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention. It is not enough to 
find that the parts comprised in the respondents‟ apparatus produce the same result as 
the appellants‟ apparatus. It must be shown that the respondents‟ selection and 
arrangement of parts is substantially the same as the appellants‟ selection and 
arrangement of parts, for it is in such selection and arrangement that the appellants‟ 
invention resides.”165 
 
[123] Lord Hodson thereafter dealt with the question of what the claim in this case stated as 
essential. After quoting the claim, Lord Hodson dealt with the connecting bows. He 
said that, in his opinion, the connecting bows were claimed by the patentees as 
essential features. It is important to pause here and make the observation that in this 
regard Lord Hodson was not seeking to decide whether or not the connecting bows 
were, objectively speaking, essential features nor was he seeking to decide whether 
the notional addressee would have understood the patentee to have intended the 
connecting bows to be essential features. He sought only to decide what “the claim in 
this case state as essential”.166 In this regard he decided this according to his opinion. 
He said: 
 
“These are, in my opinion, claimed by the patentees as an essential”.167 
 
[124] In support of his opinion that the connecting bows were claimed by the patentees as 
essential features, Lord Hodson said: 
 that the connecting bows were described as inserted in pairs with one of the 
limbs of each in the open end of a sleeve of the one layer and with the other 
limb in one of the adjacent sleeves of the other layer which were in a 
staggered position and it was said that this produced a result which featured 
very great extensibility and flexibility of the chain band. 
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 that he could not regard the pieces of metal which the defendants used as 
connecting links as equivalent to the U- bows in the claim, he said that this 
was not simply a joining of one arm of each of two U-bows; he said that 
each performed the function of two U bows but in a different manner so 
that there was less flexibility than that which existed in the patent in suit. 
He said that “this member” could not be inserted in the ends of the sleeves 
by reason of its shape which in turn prevented it “falling out of either end of 
a sleeve”. 
 
 Lord Hodson also pointed out that simplicity of construction and assembly and 
economy of manufacture were advanced by the patentees as important features of 
their invention especially as the parts could be inserted within one another without 
any soldering or riveting. Lord Hodson expressed the view that the word “inserted” 
could only refer to the method of assembly. He pointed out that it was in this sense, 
that of being “put in”, that the word was used throughout the specification. He said 
that it would be odd if it were otherwise.
168
 Lord Hodson expressed the view that the 





[125] Lord Hodson said that one other feature that was claimed by the plaintiffs as an 
essential integer was the “spring plate which keeps the connecting bows firmly in the 
sleeve”.170 He pointed out that the plaintiffs‟ argument was that the bows were 
prevented from lying loosely within the sleeve and that this had been taken by the 
defendants. Lord Hodson thought that this construction gave too limited a meaning to 
the word “firmly”. He was persuaded by the defendants‟ construction that the phrase 
covered keeping in the sleeve so that the bows did not fall out.
171
 He said that, if read 
in this way, there was no infringement, for the defendants‟ article was so constructed 
that there were no U-bows to keep from falling out because they had been replaced by 
a single C-shaped piece of metal which was so designed that it did not require a spring 
to prevent it from falling out. Lord Hodson then pointed out that this particular 
argument of the plaintiffs was virtually abandoned during the hearing in the House of 
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Lord Hodson then agreed with the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal 
on the question of essentiality. He did not inquire into what the practical significance 
was of the C-shaped piece of metal nor did he refer to the patent law rule on 
immaterial variations.  
 
3.22 Lord Pearce’s Speech in the House of Lords in Rodi 
 
[126] Lord Pearce also delivered a separate speech. His speech produced the same result as 
that of Lord Reid although he made no reference to Lord Reid‟s speech. Two matters 
need to be mentioned with regard to Lord Pearce‟s speech. The one is that, unlike 
Lord Morris and Lord Hodson, Lord Pearce pointed out that it was important that “in 
construing a patent one should seek to find what it means to the reasonable person 
who is reasonably versed in the matters of which it speaks – in this case 
mechanical”.173 Lord Pearce continued in the next three sentences: 
 
 “It is directed to the workshop and the market place rather than to the cloister. For that 
reason a plain straightforward construction is generally to be preferred to one that is 
strained or literally or tortuous. And meticulous niceties of construction of which are 
wholly appropriate to the legal document may seem to the practical man to have a 
flavour of pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that they enable a copyist to avoid 
its ambit by means that seem to be concerned with words rather than essentials.”174 
 
 Lord Pearce then referred to the question as formulated in Birmingham‟s case. He also 
referred to Marconi‟s case in support of the principle that, if you borrow the substance 
of a patented invention, you cannot escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations to the patented invention.
175
 It is also significant that 




[127] Lord Pearce, like Lord Reid, found that EXCALIBUR 59 constituted a non-textual 
infringement of the plaintiffs‟ patent. Lord Pearce wrote with disapproval of an 
approach to the construction of patent claims which he described as “alphabetical” 
and “meticulous”. Lord Pearce said: 
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“A mechanically minded person at first sight when reading the specification might 
wonder what could be said to be the essential difference between the plaintiffs‟ and 
the defendants‟ bracelets and why the defendants could be said not to have infringed 
the plaintiffs‟ patent. The answer to the question, an answer which he might or might 
not find satisfactory is this. The defendants, instead of anchoring the connections at 
each end by the catching device in claim 2, anchored them by joining up one of the 
limbs of the connector at one end to one of the limbs of the connector at the opposite 
end of the sleeve. Thus two Us became one C. Since the claim refers to connectors as 
„U-shaped bows‟ it is said that a C-shaped connector cannot be an infringement. 
Considerable stress is laid on the alphabetical approach. It is even argued that had the 
U-shaped connector had uneven limbs (even though this produced no functional 
difference) so that it had the appearance of a J rather than a U, this would have 
enabled a defendant, to escape infringement.”177 
 
 In response to this construction Lord Pearce said: 
 
“I do not find this meticulous construction attractive. Had the claim been a direction 
to a printer or a type-setter, the alphabetical approach would seem to me correct, 
since the alphabet would clearly be relevant and the identity and formation of a 
particular letter would probably be the essential ingredient of the integer described. 
But the essence of the connector to anybody thinking on mechanical rather than 
literary lines would be a bridge connecting two parallel limbs which would lie in 
adjacent sleeves. That quality would be fulfilled whether one described it as U-shaped 
bows or J-shaped links or goal posts.”178 
 
[128] Lord Pearce pointed out that, if one discarded “alphabetical niceties”, there remained 
“the more solid argument that here, instead of the two U-shaped bows, one has 
running all through the sleeve one continuous integer albeit having at each end (at the 
relevant point of interconnection) a link which performs the same function as a U-
shaped link in that it acts as a bridge to join the adjacent sleeves and in that its limbs 
perform the pivotal action against the leaf springs”.179 
 
[129] Earlier on reference was made to a statement by Lord Pearce where he spoke against 
what he called “meticulous construction”.180 He also implied his rejection of a 
construction that ran along “literary lines”.181 He also referred to this approach to 
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construction as “the alphabetical approach”.182 After revealing his disapproval of the 
“meticulous” construction or the literary approach or the alphabetical approach to the 
construction of specifications, Lord Pearce then gave his view of what the correct 
approach was to the construction of patent claims. In this regard he said: 
 
“It is important that in construing a patent one should seek to find what it means to the 
reasonable person who is reasonably versed in the matters of which it speaks – in this 
case mechanical. It is directed to the workshop and the market place rather than to the 
cloister. For this reason a plain straight forward construction is generally to be 
preferred to one that is strained or literary or tortuous. And meticulous niceties of 
construction which are wholly appropriate to a legal document may seem to the 
practical man to have a flavour of pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that they 
enable a copyist to avoid its ambit by means that seem to be concerned with words 
rather than essentials.”183 
 
[130] With regard to what the real question was that had to be answered, Lord Pearce had 
this to say after setting out the correct approach for the construction of patent claims: 
 
“The real question is whether one finds here substantially the same parts acting in 
substantially the same way so far as concerns essentials (see Birmingham Sound 
Reproducers Ltd v Collaro [1956] RPC 232 at 245). It is a well-known rule of patent 
law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the 
consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations. From this point of 
view, the question is whether the infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the 
apparatus said to have been infringed. (Per Parker J in Marconi v British Radio 
Telegraph and Telephone Co Ltd (1911) 28 RPC 181 at 217.)”184 
 
Lord Pearce pointed out that the defendants had advanced three grounds upon which 
they had contended that there was no infringement. The first was that the connecting 
links in EXCALIBUR 59 consisted of the one C-shaped link in the place of the two 
connecting U-shaped bows. The second was that the C-shaped link was not capable of 
being inserted into the open ends of the sleeves in the process of assembly and it was 
the act of insertion which was protected. The third was that the spring plates in 
EXCALIBUR 59 did not perform the function of keeping the connecting bows firmly 
in the sleeves. 
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[131] Lord Pearce quickly disposed of the third ground on the basis that there was nothing 
left of that ground in argument when it became apparent that in EXCALIBUR 59 the 
spring did perform the function of keeping the bows firmly in the sleeves. Lord 
Pearce continued and pointed out that, since the upper sleeves had wide gaps which 
were bridged only by the spring on which the outside ends of the C-shaped link were 
held, one had only to remove the spring and the C-shaped ends would then fall apart 
through the gap and the bracelet would at once come to pieces.
185 
With regard to the 
other two grounds Lord Pearce had quite a lot to say. He rejected the proposition that 
“... inserted in pairs with one of the limbs of each in the open end of a sleeve and so 
forth necessarily connotes the method of assembly”.186 It seemed to him “too strained 
and meticulous a construction of the claim”.187 He said that “the more natural 
meaning” of the claim seemed to him to be that “inserted in pairs” was “a description 
of the completed article as it lies at the table”.188 
 
[132] Lord Pearce continued and made the following points in support of his construction: 
 
(a) that the earlier and later parts of the sentence confirmed his view; he said 
that the sentence dealt with the position in which the sleeves were 
“arranged”, meaning “the staggered arrangement which one finds in the 
constructed bracelet on the table without reference to the method by which 
the operator arranged the sleeves”.189 
(b) that the sentence went on to deal with the general in which the connecting 
bows were arranged, namely, in the longitudinal edge of the chain. 
(c) that the next thing that the sentence dealt with was “the intricate 
explanation of the interlocking of the bows with the sleeves, „which bows 
are inserted in pairs with one of the limbs of each in the open ends of the 
sleeve‟.”190 
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[133] Lord Pearce then observed that the sentence did not say that the bows were “inserted 
into the ends of the sleeve”.191 He said that it was perfectly reasonable “to start a new 
clause (as it does) for this rather lengthy explanation”.192 Lord Pearce then made the 
following points: 
 
1 Without the new clause the lengthy explanation would have to depend on 
the previous word “arranged” and would, “like a wounded snake, drag its 
slow length along”. 
2 The new clause might have repeated the word “arranged” but “inserted in 
pairs” was a reasonable choice of words for the purpose and made the 
matter far more clear. To regard the words “inserted in pairs” as 
demonstrating that the clause was switching over from the arrangement of 
the completed bracelet to the actual method of constructing it and then 
switching back again in the concluding part of the sentence to what was 
plainly a description of the spring as it lay on the table after assembly 
seemed to him too strained an interpretation. He took the view that the 
“pairs” were clearly the pairs which lay side by side in each open end of a 
sleeve, not pairs of which one half was at one end and one half at the other. 
He thought that this was demonstrated by two things. First, the rational way 
of describing the interaction of the integers was to refer to the interlocking 
of three sleeves so as to give an idea of one completed sleeve end. 
Naturally, said Lord Pearce, the other end of the sleeve would be similarly 
furnished to make the thing work, but there was no need to describe both 
ends. Secondly, any ambiguity was made plain by the sentence into 
specification (page 2 line 80) beginning: “The connecting bows are inserted 
in pairs next to each other with their upper limbs in the open end of a sleeve 
of the upper layer”, and so forth. He said that the words in italics were 
consistent only with what he regarded as a more normal construction of the 
words “inserted in pairs”, namely, that the pairs were the two Us side by 
side whose limbs shared the occupancy of the open end of a sleeve. 
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3 Further, if one is going to be so literal and say that “inserted” (alone among 
the various directions) refers to a method of assembly, one should 
presumably limit the claim to bows “inserted in pairs, so that it would not 
cover operators who chose to insert them one at a time. Moreover, he 
doubted if it was possible for an operator, strictly speaking, to insert them 
in pairs in the small holes at the end of the sleeves. He said that it would 
take great ambidexterity. Thus, the addition of the words “in pairs” seemed 
to him to tell strongly against the suggestion that it was the method of 
construction and not the article as completed which was the objective of the 
clause. He observed that in the judgment in the courts below there were 
various references which were inserted in brackets after the relevant case. 
He said that he would not wish this observation to be taken as an assertion 
that the learned judges had either inserted the references after completing 
their judgments, which he said would be unusual, or that they had inserted 
the references into the brackets after first writing out the brackets, which he 
said would be eccentric.
193 
 
[134] In conclusion on the issue of whether EXCALIBUR 59 was an infringement, Lord 
Pearce said that the real point of the case was whether the fact that two connectors 
were made into one was sufficient to avoid the infringement. He said that in his 
opinion it was not. He pointed out that it was not enough to say that the U-shaped bow 
was an essential integer and that the defendants had not got two U-shaped bows but 
only one C-shaped connector. Lord Pearce took the view that the question was 
whether the essential part of the essential integer was taken although the inessential 
parts of it had been omitted. Lord Pearce said that neither the individual U-shape (as 
opposed to any other alphabetical shape) nor its lack of attachment to the connector at 
the other end was its essential quality. He pointed out that its essential feature lay in 
that it connected two adjacent sleeves by a bridge between two parallel limbs that lay 
in the sleeves and pivoted on the spring. Lord Pearce observed that the C-shaped 
connector had this feature too, since it had at each end a U-shape which performed the 
functions of the plaintiffs‟ U-shaped bows and it pivoted on the spring in precisely the 
same way. He said that in all essential respects, therefore, it was the same. He 
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concluded that the matters in which it differed were inessential.”194 Lord Pearce found 
that EXCALIBUR 59 infringed the patent but not EXCALIBUR 60. It is to be noted 
that Lord Pearce did refer to and considered the rule of patent law on immaterial 
variations. 
 
3.23 Lord Upjohn’s Judgment 
 
[135] Lord Upjohn also delivered a separate speech. In dealing with the principles and the 
approach to the construction of patent claims and the determination of non-textual 




 (a) the question whether the relevant claim had been infringed was purely a 
question of construction of the claim read as a matter of ordinary language 
in the light of the complete specification taken as a whole; 
 (b) a specification had to be construed without having in mind the alleged 
infringement; 
 (c) what is not claimed is disclaimed; 
 (d) the claim must be read through the eyes of the national addressee, the man 
who is going to carry out the invention described; he also said that “this 
document must be read through the eyes of the common man at his 
bench”;196 
 (e) in considering a claim, the Court must ascertain what are the essential 
integers of the claim;
197 
 (f) the determination of what are the essential integers of a claim is a question 
of construction and no general principles can be laid down; 
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 (g) once the essential integers have been determined, the infringing article must 
be considered and, to constitute infringement, the article must take each and 
everyone of the essential integers of the claim; 
 (h) non-essential integers may be omitted or replaced by mechanical 
equivalents and there will still be infringement; 
 (i) where the invention, as in the Rodi matter, resides in a new combination of 
known integers but also merely in a new arrangement and interaction of 
ordinary working parts it is not sufficient to show that the same result is 
reached; the working parts must act on one another in the way claimed in 
the claim of the patent. In this regard Lord Upjohn referred to a passage in 
Lord Evershed‟s judgment in Birmingham‟s198 case; 
 (j) if the patentee has in his specification limited the essential features of his 
claim in a manner that may appear to be unnecessary, it may be that the 
copier can escape infringement by adopting some simple mechanical 
equivalent so that it cannot be said that every essential integer of the claim 
has been taken; 
 (k) it must not be forgotten that some claim may on a superficial reading appear 
to be unnecessarily circumscribed but those who have drafted them may 
have done so in the light of the prior art and have rightly been fearful of 
claiming too much with adverse effects upon the validity of the claim; 
 (l) the argument “that per incuriam there has been some unnecessary limitation 
could only be accepted in cases where there can be shown to have been 
some slip of the pen”;199 
 (m) Lord Upjohn, in the course of his consideration of the claim, referred to the 
notional reader as well as his own interpretation; and 
 (n) Lord Upjohn mentioned that the “difference might seem to be utterly 
irrelevant to a wrist watch bracelet”.200 
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[136] It is significant to highlight the point that in his speech Lord Upjohn did not refer to 
the rule of patent law on immaterial variations. That is the rule that no one who 
borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences of 
infringement by making immaterial variations to the patented invention. As to the 
principles on infringement Lord Upjohn referred to his own judgment in the Court of 
Appeal in Van der Lely (which was approved by the House of Lords) and to Winn 
LJ‟s judgment in the Court of Appeal. What is remarkable about all these judgments 
which guided Lord Upjohn with regard to the principles on infringement is the 
conspicuous absence of any reference to the rule on immaterial variations in each and 
everyone of them. Lord Upjohn concluded that EXCALIBUR 59 did not infringe the 
plaintiffs‟ claim 1. He also found that EXCALIBUR 60 also did not infringe. Lord 
Upjohn had no regard to the practical value of the variant nor did he have regard to 
the rule of patent law that, if you borrow the substance of a patented invention, you 
cannot escape the consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations. It is 
important to point out that by his own admission Lord Upjohn reached the conclusion 
that he reached in Rodi “upon the wording of the claim”.201 Lord Upjohn also 
indicated in terms that he was using “the literal words of the claim”.202 This supports 
the view that the Upjohn LJ approach was based on literalism. It is now necessary to 
deal with Lord Reid‟s speech. 
 
3.24 Lord Reid’s Speech in the Rodi Matter in the House of Lords 
 
[137] It is necessary to deal briefly with how Lord Reid came to the conclusion that he came 
to on the issue of infringement. It is important to point out that, unlike his speech in 
the Van der Lely case, Lord Reid‟s judgment in Rodi‟s case did not contain any 
discussion of the principles of construction and of the doctrine of pith and marrow. He 
simply set out the facts and applied to the facts the principles he believed to be 
applicable.  
 
[138] One of the factors that Lord Reid took into account in considering infringement was 
what value the difference in the defendants‟ device added to the invention. He said 
that EXCALIBUR 59 was made in exactly the same way as the plaintiff‟s bracelet but 
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for one alteration. He explained that in the plaintiff‟s bracelet the connecting links at 
one end of each sleeve were separate from those at the other end. He said that each 
one of the connecting links was roughly in the shape of a capital U, with the upright 
parts of the U going into different sleeves and the curved part forming a bridge or 
connection between them. He said that in EXCALIBUR 59 one limb of the U was 
extended and joined to the corresponding limb of the corresponding U at the other end 
of the sleeve, thus making a double link of the shape of an elongated letter C. Lord 
Reid then pointed out that in his opinion functionally this made “no material 
difference”. He said that it made the bracelet slightly less flexible if one tried to bend 
it in a way in which no one would normally try to do. He added: 
 
“It makes the role of the spring plates slightly different – a matter to which I shall 
return. It makes no material difference to the ease with which the parts can be 
assembled, or the bracelet can be shortened by taking out one or more sleeves.”203 
 
Lord Reid went on to point out that it was said that “this small change takes 
EXCALIBUR 59 out of the ambit of the claim in the plaintiffs‟ specification”.204 
 
[139] Lord Reid pointed out that it was not disputed that “a very slight alteration” of the 
wording of the claim would make it quite clear that the claim was wide enough to 
cover C-shaped connecting links.
205
 “But”, said Lord Reid, “it is said that the inventor 
has tied himself to words which are not wide enough to cover C-shaped links. It is not 
suggested that there was any possible reason for limiting the claim in this way. If it 
has been so limited it must have been per incuriam. No doubt, if the reader of a 
specification is astute enough to see that the patentee has framed his claim so 
narrowly as to leave it open to him by some small modification to use the invention 
without infringing the claim, he is quite entitled to do that. He cannot be accused of 
sharp practice. He is within his legal right.”206 
 
[140] It is not clear from the above passage what Lord Reid meant in the last three sentences 
in the above passage.
207
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simply recording what was being said in support of the proposition that the 
defendants‟ device did not infringe the plaintiff‟s invention is not clear. It is thought 
that he probably was recording what was being said in support of a no infringement 
finding. This has to be so because everything contained in those three sentences 
appears to be completely in conflict with Lord Reid‟s view of the legal position as set 
out in his minority judgment in the Van der Lely case as well as the way he came to 
the conclusion that EXCALIBUR 59 infringed the plaintiff‟s patent. It is, among 
others, in conflict with the trite principle of patent law that a person who borrows the 
substance of a patented invention cannot escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations thereto. And that is the principle which formed the basis 
of his judgment in Van der Lely and of his conclusion with regard to the infringement 
of the plaintiff‟s invention by EXALIBUR 59. 
 
[141] In the sentence following the three sentences referred to above in the passage, Lord 
Reid seemed to give an answer to what he said in those sentences was being said in 
support of a non-infringement finding. He said that claims are not addressed to 
conveyancers; they are addressed to practical men skilled in the prior art, and he did 
not think that they ought to be construed with that meticulousness which was once 
thought appropriate for conveyancing documents.
208 
It is suggested that in this 




[142] Lord Reid then referred to the part of claim 1 which dealt with connecting links. That 
part of the claim read thus: 
 
“… the connecting links are constituted by U-shaped connecting bows (14) arranged 
in the longitudinal edges of the chain, which bows are inserted in pairs with one of its 
limbs (15) of each in the open end of a sleeve (10) of the one layer and with the other 
limb (16) in one of the adjacent sleeves (11) of the other layer which are in a 
staggered position …”.209 
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Lord Reid pointed out that the crucial phrase in the relevant part of the specification 
dealing with connecting links was the phrase: “constituted by U- shaped connecting 
bows”. He then said: 
 
“This cannot be taken quite literally. „Bow‟ normally means or connotes a curve. But 
suppose the links consisted each of two straight parallel limbs joined by a straight 
piece at right angles to them. There would be no curve and the link would not be in 
the shape of any letter U ever used by a printer. Or suppose that one limb were made 
longer than the other so that the link had the shape of the letter J. Would any practical 
man listen for one moment to a contention that these were not „U-shaped bows‟? 
Then suppose you join the longer limbs of two J‟s together. Why do you cease to have 
U-shaped connecting links? That must surely depend on a construction of the claim as 
a whole read in the light of the rest of the specification. If this shows that there is any 
virtue in keeping the Us separate then this change would take the double link out of 
the ambit of the claim. But otherwise you still have two U-shaped connecting links, 
but they are joined together. The connecting link is, in my view, the part at the end of 
the sleeves which connects the two sleeves and it does not cease to be a U-shaped link 
because one limb has been joined to another link.” 
 
[143] Thereafter Lord Reid then addressed that part of the claim where the claim proceeds 
“which bows are inserted in pairs”. Lord Reid said that, if “pairs” referred to the pairs 
of links which the defendants had joined together, that would be important. However, 
he said that, as he read the claim, those were clearly not the pairs referred to. He said 
that both ends of the pairs which had been joined together connected the same link in 
the one layer with the same link in the other layer. But, said Lord Reid, here the 
reference was to the pair of links at the same end of one of the hollow sleeves: he said 
that one limb of each was to be “in the open end of a sleeve” and the other limb “in 
one of the adjacent sleeves of the other layer”. 
 
[144] Lord Reid pointed out that the whole point of this method of articulation was that the 
two links which each had one limb in the same sleeve would have their other limbs in 
different sleeves in the other layer. Lord Reid expressed the view that the defendants 
floundered on the word “inserted”. He pointed out that it was said that you could 
insert one limb of a U into a hollow tube but you could not insert a C into a tube. Lord 
Reid offered two answers to this. He pointed out that the defendants‟ sleeves were not 
closed tubes: they had longitudinal openings. Furthermore, he continued “inserted” 
did not need to mean that one had to be able to put the link in after one had finished 
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making the sleeve. Lord Reid said that it was not a misuse of language to say that the 
apple is inserted in the dumpling. 
 
 Lord Reid then proceeded to consider that part of claim 1 which dealt with the spring 
plates. That part read as follows: 
 
“… a leave spring comprising a bent spring plate (12) is provided in each sleeve, 
which spring plate keeps the connecting bow firmly in the sleeve and acts by spring 
action against their pivoting when the chain is stretched or bent”. 
 
Lord Reid observed that the spring plate had two functions, namely, to keep the 
connecting bows firmly in the sleeves and to act against their pivoting. He said that 
EXCALIBUR 59 did have spring plates and, admittedly, they did have the second 
function. He said that it was argued that joining two U‟s to make a C rendered the first 
function unnecessary. Lord Reid did not think so. He said that no doubt the C-
connecting link would come through the gap at the side of the sleeve and, in any case, 
the spring was necessary to prevent looseness.
210 
 
[145] With regard to the value or practical significance of or difference made by, the 
variant, Lord Reid made the following points: 
 
“EXCALIBUR 59 was made in exactly the same way but for one alteration. In the 
plaintiffs‟ bracelet as marketed and in the preferred embodiment described in their 
specification the connecting links at one end of each sleeve were separate from those 
at the other end. Each was roughly in the shape of a capital U, the upright parts of the 
U going into different sleeves and the curved part forming a bridge or connection 
between them. In EXCALIBUR 59 one limb of the U was extended and joined the 
corresponding limb of the corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, thus making 
a double link of the shape of an elongated letter C.” 
 
Lord Reid then said: 
 
“Functionally this, in my opinion, makes no material difference. It makes the bracelet 
slightly less flexible if one tries to bend it in a way which no-one would normally try 
to do. It makes the role of the spring plates slightly different – a matter to which I 
shall return. It makes no material difference to the case with which the parts can be 
assembled, or the bracelet can be shortened by taking out one or more sleeves. But it 
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is said that nevertheless this small change takes EXCALIBUR 59 out of the ambit of 
the claim in the plaintiffs‟ specification.”211 
 
 In the next paragraph Lord Reid said: 
 
“It is not disputed that a very slight alteration of the wording of the claim would make 
it quite clear that the claim is wide enough to cover C-shaped connecting links. But it 
is said that the inventor has tied himself to words which are not wide enough to cover 
C-shaped links. It is not suggested that there was any possible reason for limiting the 
claim in this way. If it has been so limited it must have been per incuriam. No doubt, 
if the reader of a specification is astute enough to see that the patentee has framed his 
claim so narrowly as to leave it open to him by some small modification to use the 
invention without infringing the claim, he is entitled to do that. He cannot be accused 
of sharp practice. He is within his legal rights. But claims are not addressed to 
conveyancers: they are addressed to practical men skilled in the prior part, and I do 
not think that they ought to be construed with that meticulousness which was once 
thought appropriate for conveyancing documents.”212 
 
[146] Lord Reid also did not refer in terms to the rule of patent law that no one who borrows 
the substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations. However, as he did in his speech in Van der Lely, he 
did take into account whether the variant was material or was of any practical 
significance and, when he concluded that the variant was immaterial or was of no 
practical significance, he effectively applied the abovementioned rule without 
expressly mentioning it. This approach drove him to the correct conclusion that 
EXCALIBUR 59 constituted an infringement but that EXCALIBUR 60 did not. 
 
[147] It is suggested that Lord Reid‟s judgment was correct and was in line with the rule 
that no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the 
consequences of infringement by making immaterial changes to the invention. The 
judgments of the other Law Lords that went against that of Lord Reid‟s were in 
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3.25 Comparison of Lloyd-Jacob J’s Judgment in Rodi with those of Lord Reid in 
Van der Lely and Rodi and that of Lord Pearce in Rodi 
 
[148] Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi‟s case is a remarkable contrast to his judgment in 
Van der Lely which was upheld by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
In Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J abandoned the LJ approach and adopted the Lord Reid 
approach. Unlike his judgment in Van der Lely, which was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords in subsequent appeals, to Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in 
Rodi was overturned by both the Court of Appeal and House of Lords. His judgment 
in Van der Lely entirely focused on the language used by the patentee in the claim to 
determine whether or not a disputed integer was an essential or not. In Rodi his 
approach changed, so did the results. In Van der Lely he found that there was no 
infringement of the patent whereas in Rodi he found that there was infringement. In 
Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J‟s approach was not exclusively based on the language of the 
specification but also considered other factors which Lord Reid had considered in his 
dissent in Van der Lely. The result was that the conclusion he reached was the same 
conclusion that Lord Reid was to later also reach in the same matter in the House of 
Lords. 
 
[149] The proposition that Lloyd-Jacob J changed his approach to the determination of 
non-textual infringement of patents and to the doctrine of pith and marrow in Rodi‟s 
case is supported by various features of his judgment in Rodi which are nowhere to 
be found in his judgment in Van der Lely. The following are the features: 
 
 although in his judgment in Rodi, Lloyd-Jacob J did not refer in terms to the 
patent rule on immaterial variations, it is clear from a reading of his 
judgment that he applied that rule. In Van der Lely, in the House of Lords 
Lord Reid had also not referred to that rule in terms but it is clear from a 
reading of his judgment that he applied the rule. 
 dealing with certain differences between the two devices relied upon by the 
defendants in support of their contention that in Rodi there was no 




 “For present purposes, they require examination to see to what extent, if any, 
their existence is inconsistent with any of the representations contained in the 
specifications so as to constitute all or any of the genuine distinctions as 
opposed to merely colourable differences from the patentees‟ invention”.213 
 
He also said:  
 
“This introduction of slight rigidity is not of any practical significance, as can 
readily be absorbed by manipulation of the exhibited EXCALIBUR 59”.214 
 
[150] Lloyd-Jacob J also rejected a distinction in respect of the thickness of the bracelets as 
being of “no practical difference”.215 
 
He further said: 
 
 “The difference between a pair of U-bows and a C-shaped member is for the 
connecting purpose devised by the patentee of no genuine significance, for the inter-
action between the associated parts is in all material respects identical. Each C-
member comprises in reality a pair of U bows, and this, although obscured, is not 
removed by the integral arm interposed between them. This arm serves no purpose 
necessary for successful operation, its presence does not deny the substantial 
attainment of the patentee‟s result. In fairness it should be disregarded as a colourable 
distinction introducing an apparent but not an actual difference from the invention 
claimed, and, so considered a finding of infringement must follow.”216 
 
These features reveal the same kind of reasoning that is to be found in Lord Reid‟s 
judgment in both Van der Lely and Rodi.  
 
[151] Lords Morris, Hodson and Upjohn found that there was no infringement. Lords Reid 
and Pearce found that there was infringement in respect of EXCALIBUR 59 but not 
in respect of EXCALIBUR 60. Therefore the result was that the House of Lords was 
split 3:2 in favour of those who found that there was no infringement. Once the split 
decision of the House of Lords in Rodi was handed down, it became clear that there 
were serious divisions in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords on the approach 
to the determination of non-textual infringement and to the doctrine of pith and 
                                                 
213
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi in the Chancery Division at 456 lines 14-18. 
214
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi at 457 lines 2-3. 
215
 Lloyd-Jacob in Rodi in the Chancery Division at 457 lines 10-15. 
216
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi in the Chancery Division at 458 lines 3-13. 
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marrow. In the Van der Lely case in the Court of Appeal it was 2:1 in favour of the 
Upjohn LJ approach. In the House of Lords in the Van der Lely case the split was 4:1 
in favour of the Upjohn LJ approach. Then in the Rodi matter the Judge of first 
instance had effectively followed the Lord Reid approach. 
 
[152] Although in the Court of Appeal in Rodi, the Upjohn LJ approach prevailed, once the 
matter came to the House of Lords, the split was 3:2 in favour of the Upjohn LJ 
approach. Lord Reid increased his support in that Lord Pearce decided the matter on 
the basis of the Lord Reid approach. The dissents given by Lord Evershed MR, in the 
Court of Appeal in Van der Lely, Lord Reid in the House of Lords in both matters as 
well as Lord Pearce‟s dissent in Rodi were all very powerful and well-reasoned. The 
obvious question that would have dominated the minds of all concerned would have 
been what would happen if another case arose which related to the doctrine of pith 
and marrow because, if the Upjohn LJ approach were to be applied to determine non-
textual infringement in such a case, the prospects of infringement being established 






4 SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE PERIOD FROM LLOYD-JACOB J‟S 





[1] The delivery of Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely 
which was followed by that of Upjohn LJ‟s and Pearson LJ‟s joint judgment in the 
Court of Appeal in the Van der Lely matter marked the beginning of a special era in 
English jurisprudence with regard to the determination of non-textual infringement of 
patents and to the doctrine of pith and marrow. Upjohn LJ‟s and Pearson LJ‟s 
understanding of the doctrine of pith and marrow as reflected in their joint judgment 
in Van der Lely was one which was based on the Court looking almost exclusively at 
the language of the claim in the specification in order to decide whether or not the 
doctrine applied. Of course, the doctrine would be held to apply if it was found, 
having regard to the language used by the patentee in the claim, that he had made a 
particular integer an unessential feature of his invention. The doctrine would be held 
not to apply if it was found that the patentee had, by the language he chose to use in 
formulating his claim, made the integer essential.  
 
[2] In seeking to determine non-textual infringement this approach adopted by Upjohn LJ 
and Peterson LJ did not involve asking the question whether the difference introduced 
by the alleged infringer added any value to the invention or was of any practical 
significance or had any material effect upon the way the invention functioned. Indeed, 
the Upjohn LJ approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow and towards the 
determination of non-textual infringement did not even seek to establish whether the 
                                                 
1
 In the 14
th
 edition of Terrel on the Law of Patents by W Aldous and others, the authors say that in the 13
th
 
edition of the book they discuss the pre-Catnic cases dealing with the principles governing liabilityfor patent 
infringement and will not discuss them in the 14
th
 edition in view of the comments of the Court of Appeal in 
Codex Racal Milgo [1983] RPC 369 CA at 380. There the Court of Appeal said that it would henceforth be 
unnecessary and undesirable for counsel to take the Court through the previous decisions referred to in Lord 
Diplock‟s speech in Catnic and to which the Court‟s attention was drawn in detail (Terrel on the Law of Patents 
(1994) (14
th
 ed) at 188). Such cases were Van der Lely, Rodi and Beecham. However, a reading of the 13
th
 
edition of Terrel on the Law of Patent reveals that the learned authors do not discuss the cases in any serious 
way, let alone, analyse them. In the main they simply provide quotations from some of the cases such as Van der 
Lely, Rodi, Beecham and Marconi with no analysis of those cases at all. Accordingly, a reading of that edition of 
this important work does not suggest that these learned authors appreciated the instability in the judicial 
handling of the English jurisprudence between 1960-1970 with regard to the determination of patent 
infringement (see Aldous et al Terrel on the Law of Patents (1982) (13
th
 ed) at 172-178). 
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alleged infringer was able to advance a reason for introducing the difference so as to 
see whether the difference was introduced for a valid or genuine reason or whether it 
was only introduced to disguise the theft of the patented invention.  
 
[3] The Van der Lely and Rodi decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, 
in so far as they related to the approach that had to be taken by the English courts on 
the issue of the determination of liability for the non-textual infringement of patent 
claims and the doctrine of pith and marrow made it extremely difficult for the English 
courts in the future to uphold a complaint of non-textual infringement. If the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely and Rodi were 
anything to go by, the mere mention of an integer in a patent claim or in a 
specification was enough to justify the conclusion that the integer was an essential 
integer. That automatically meant that there was no infringement if another person 
produced a device or product that was exactly the same as the patentee‟s patented 
invention except that it omitted one integer that was mentioned in the claims and, was, 
for that reason, taken as an essential even though it in fact was not essential for the 
functioning of the invention. That is why writing about the Upjohn LJ approach in 
Van der Lely, Lord Reid said in Van der Lely that Upjohn LJ “must have meant that 
the mere fact that [the patentees] only mentioned the hindmost wheels [in their 
claims] was sufficient to make the limitations to the hindmost wheels an essential 
feature of the claim”.2 Lord Reid then said about Upjohn LJ‟s approach in this regard: 
 
“But if that were right, then I cannot see how there could ever be an unessential 
feature or how this principle could ever operate. And I think the principle is very 
necessary to prevent sharp practice”.3 
 
[4] The difficulties with the Upjohn LJ approach were the following:  
 
(a) it regarded the mere mention of an integer in a claim in a specification as a 
sufficient basis to conclude that the patentee intended it to be an essential 
integer and that, therefore, the integer was an essential integer; 
                                                 
2
 At 76 line 51 to 77 line 2. 
3
 At 77 lines 2-4. 
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(b) it paid excessive attention to the language employed by the patentee in the 
claim; 
(c) it paid either no attention or little attention to the question of what value the 
integer in question or the difference introduced by the alleged infringer 
added to the patented invention or what practical significance the difference 
introduced by the alleged infringer to the invention made to the functioning 
of the invention; 
(d) it disregarded the rule of patent law on immaterial variations; and 
(e) it was premised on the assumption that it was possible for a patentee to 
formulate his claims in such a way that they could cover all eventualities so 
as to prevent patent pirates from in any way “stealing their inventions”. 
That is something that no language is good enough to cover for all 
conceivable eventualities. Blanco-White says as much. He writes: 
“However carefully a claim may be drafted, there are bound to be 
borderline cases but this will not render the claim invalid for lack of 
definition”.4 
 
[5] As a result of the deficiencies in the Upjohn LJ approach set out in the preceding 
paragraph, it was going to be almost impossible for any English court dealing with a 
case of alleged non-textual infringement to make a finding of infringement. In Graver 
Tank and Manufacturing Co v Linde Air Products Co,
5
 Justice Jackson, writing for 
the majority of the US Supreme Court, within the context of a discussion of the US 
doctrine of equivalents, said that: 
 
“[t]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail 
would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing . 
Such a limitation would leave room or indeed encourage the unscrupulous copyist to 
make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the patent which, 
though adding nothing, would be enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, 
and hence, outside the reach of law.”6 
 
                                                 
4
 Blanco-White Patents for Invention (1974) (4
th
 ed) at 75. 
5
 Graver Tank and Manufacturing Co v Linde Air Products Co 339 US 605. 
6
 USA Supreme Court through Justice Jackson in the Graver Tank case at 607. 
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 It is suggested that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in 
both Van der Lely and Rodi had the effect of, to use Justice Jackson‟s phrase, 
converting the protection of the English patent grant into “a hollow and useless 
thing”. 
 
[6] The other approach to or understanding of, the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents and to the doctrine of pith and marrow which had emerged 
was the one that was reflected in the minority judgment of Lord Evershed MR in the 
Court of Appeal in Van der Lely which was followed by Lord Reid in his speech in 
the House of Lords in Van der Lely and persisted in by both Lord Reid and Lord 
Pearce in their separate speeches in the House of Lords in Rodi.  
 
[7] The features or characteristics of the Lord Reid approach to the doctrine of pith and 
marrow were the following: 
 
(a) the mere mention of an integer in a claim in a specification was not by itself 
enough to justify the conclusion that the patentee intended the integer to be 
an essential feature of his monopoly; if the mere mention of an integer in a 
claim was enough, there would never be inessential integers in a claim and 
that could simply not be. 
(b) the primary focus was whether or not the difference introduced by the 
alleged infringer added any value or had any practical significance and, if it 
did not add any value or if it had no practical significance, it was simply 
regarded as a disguise for the theft of the patentee‟s invention.  
(c) the inquiry entailed asking what reason was advanced by the alleged 
infringer for introducing the difference; if no reason was advanced or if the 
alleged infringer could not point to any advantage derived from the 
difference introduced, the inference would be irresistible that it was 
introduced to disguise the theft of the patented invention.  
(d) if the patentee had in clear language specified that the integer was an 
essential feature of his invention, this would generally be accepted as 
meaning that the integer was essential but the Court would not shut its eyes 
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to facts that must have been known to the patentee at the time of framing 
his claim. 
(e) the Lord Reid approach advocated a construction of patents that was not 
literal and did not involve the meticulousness that was associated with the 
interpretation of conveyancing documents and other legal documents. 
(f) the Lord Reid approach required that patents be construed through the eyes 
of a reasonable person skilled in the relevant art. 
 
It also needs to be pointed out that the Lord Reid approach made it difficult for 
copying and patent pirates to „steal‟ a patented invention whereas the Upjohn LJ 
approach made it extremely easy to do so. 
 
[8] Highlighting that the two approaches to the doctrine of pith and marrow and setting 
out above their respective features, as has been done, will help in the understanding of 
the legal crisis that faced the House of Lords after its decisions in Van der Lely and 
Rodi which approved the Upjohn LJ approach. The crisis was that the House of Lords 
had twice approved an untenable approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow and to 
the determination of non-textual infringement. The Upjohn LJ approach was 
untenable because, literalist in its construction of patents as it was, and not inquiring 
into the practical significance of the difference introduced by an alleged infringer, it 
made it difficult for the courts in the future to find non-textual infringement of patents 
in many cases. Indeed, on the Upjohn LJ approach to the determination of non-textual 
infringement of the patents and to the doctrine of pith and marrow, there was no 




                                                 
7
 In the 12
th
 edition of their work Terrell on the Law of Patents, published in 1971, Falconer et al submitted that 
“in view of the detailed nature of modern claims there can be little scope for [the application of the doctrine of 
pith and marrow] in practice nowadays”. It is suggested that this view is based on the assumption that it is 
possible to formulate claims in such a way as to cover every possible trick that patent pirates can effect in order 
to reap where they did not sow. This is humanly not possible just as it is not possible in labour law to have a 
definition of the word “employee” that will cover every conceivable loophole that may be exploited by those 
who seek to opt out of labour legislation that protects employees. For some of the cases in English law and 
South African law in which the courts have sought to deal with the problems arising out of the difficulty in 
formulating a precise definition of the word “employee”, see Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber (2005) 26 ILJ 1256 
(LAC) and the cases discussed in that judgment. So big is the problem that in South Africa Parliament has even 
enacted section 200A of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act  no 66 of 1995) in terms of which a person is 
presumed to be an employee of another if one or more of eight factors set out therein is or are present. See also 
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[9] The obvious question that must have arisen in the minds of those who appreciated
8
 the 
legal crisis that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had created by approving 
the Upjohn LJ approach must have been: what would the House of Lords do next time 
a case which required the determination of non-textual infringement came up? Would 
it apply the Upjohn LJ approach to the doctrine with all its consequences or would it 
apply the Lord Reid approach to the doctrine? It is suggested that, if it applied the 
Upjohn LJ approach to the doctrine, the consequences would be disastrous because 
that approach in effect rendered the doctrine of pith and marrow illusory. On the 
Upjohn LJ approach it would be difficult in the future to find a case where the 
doctrine of pith and marrow would be found to be applicable. If it applied the Lord 
Reid approach, how would it explain its decision not to follow its own approach as 
reflected in Van der Lely and Rodi? It would not be an easy matter for the House of 
Lords to turn around and say that it had been clearly wrong in its approach in the two 
cases and that Lord Reid‟s, Lord Evershed MR‟s and Lord Pearce‟s dissents were 
correct. 
 
[10] In his discussion of Van der Lely in the House of Lords, Blanco-White expresses the 
view that the difference of opinion between the majority and the minority in Van der 
Lely was a point of principle rather than one of approach to the facts. He says actually 
this applies to the division of opinion in Rodi as well.
9
 In his discussion of the division 
of judicial opinion in the Rodi case in the House of Lords, Blanco-White says the 
majority asked the question: Are the essential integers present? And answered it in the 
negative whereas Lord Pearce, in the minority, asked the question: Is the essential part 
of each essential integer present? And answered it in the affirmative.
10
 With regard to 
the division of judicial opinion in the House of Lords in Van der Lely Blanco-White 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bosch Craigh “Are Sexual Workers „Employees‟” (2007) 26 ILJ 804; Van Niekerk Andre “Personal Service 
Companies and Definition of „Employee‟” (2005) 26 ILJ 1904; Benjamin Paul “An Accident of History: Who is 
(and who should be) an employee under South African Labour Law (2004) 25 ILJ 787; Le Roux Rochelle “The 
Meaning of „Workers‟ and the Road Towards Diversification: Reflecting on Discovery, Sita and „Kylie‟” (2009) 
30 ILJ 49. 
8
 A reading of Terrell on the Law of Patents, 12
th
 ed reveals that Falconer et al, as the authors of that edition of 
the well-known work which was published in 1971, seem not to have appreciated what was happening in 
English patent law jurisprudence in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases between 1960 and 1970. (Falconer et al 
Terrell on the Law of Patents (1971) (12
th
 ed)). This is said because, although in their book, they discuss the 
doctrine of pith and marrow, the issue of infringement and the cases of Van der Lely and Rodi, they do not say 
anything about the effect of these two cases on the determination of non textual infringement in English patent 
law. 
9
 Blanco-White Patents for Inventions (4
th




 ed) at 89. 
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says in effect that the majority took the view that it was the movability of the front 
wheels that was an essential feature of the patentee‟s claim whereas the minority, ie, 
Lord Reid took the view that it was the movability of the wheels that was an essential 
feature of the claim and it was not essential that the wheels be the front wheels.
11
 
Blanco-White expresses the view that Lord Reid‟s approach in Van der Lely was 
actually the same as Lord Pearce‟s approach in Rodi “put the other way round”.12 
Actually, since Lord Reid‟s judgment in the Van der Lely preceded Lord Pearce‟s 
judgment in Rodi, it is more accurate to say that Lord Pearce‟s approach in Rodi was 
actually the same as Lord Reid‟s approach in Van der Lely. 
 
[11] By the time of the 4
th
 edition of Blanco-White‟s work Patent For Inventions, which 
was published in 1974, all the decisions in Van der Lely and Rodi had been given. 
Blanco-White does discuss the House of Lords decisions in both cases but he does not 
discuss Lloyd Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi and how it differed from the approach 
Lloyd Jacob J had taken in his judgment in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely. It 
seems that the learned author did not appreciate fully the extent or depth of the 
judicial controversy which had arisen with regard to the determination of liability for 
non-textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow in English jurisprudence 
at the time. He did not realise that in effect Lloyd Jacob J turned his back on his own 
approach to be found in Van der Lely and on the decisions of the Court of Appeal and 




 the view that Lord Reid and Lord Pearce took the view they 
took in Rodi without apparently recognising that they were taking a different view of 
the law from that laid down in Van der Lely and Deere v Harrison, McGregor and 
Guest.
14
 This may arguably be so. If that is so, that may explain why in Rodi Lord 
Reid and Lord Pearce may not have felt bound by the approach that was adopted by 
the majority in the House of Lords in Van der Lely. That may also be the case with 
Lloyd-Jacob J‟s approach in Rodi in the Chancery Division. It may explain his 
conduct in feeling free to adopt the approach he adopted in Rodi and not to adopt the 








 ed) 89. 
13
 Blanco White (4
th
 ed) at 90. 
14
 [1965] RPC 461(HL). 
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one he had adopted in Van der Lely, which had been approved by both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords. The same explanation may also apply to the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in not following the Upjohn LJ 
approach and instead embracing the Lord Reid approach in Beecham which, it is 
suggested in this dissertation, was different from the Upjohn LJ approach adopted by 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely and Rodi. 
 
[13] The decision of the House of Lords in Rodi was delivered in 1968. It took a long time 
before another matter of importance relating to the doctrine of pith and marrow came 






5 THE PERIOD AFTER RODI 1978-1980 AND THEREAFTER:  




[1] Beecham Group Ltd
2
 were the owners of four patents relating to a new class of semi-
synthetic penicillins and to methods for their manufacture. One such penicillin was 
known as Ampicillin and proved to be a valuable antibiotic. Beecham Group Ltd also 
owned similar patents in the USA where the second defendants were their licensees. 
The first defendants, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the second defendants, imported 
and sold in UK an antibiotic known as Hetacillin which was an acetone derivative of 
Ampicillin. It was not disputed that the clinical effectiveness of Hetacillin was due 
entirely to the Ampicillin into which it reverted in the presence of water by a 
reversible chemical reaction whenever it was administered as an antibiotic. In 
response to this importation, Beecham Group Ltd sued the defendants for 
infringement of various claims of the four patents and by earlier proceedings had 
secured interim relief preventing further importation. 
 
[2] The starting point in the manufacture of Ampicillin was 6-amino penicillanic acid (6-
APA). This substance was the subject of claim 1 of one of the patents in suit („396). 
By acylation, 6-APA could be converted into Ampicillin which was a subject of 
product claims in Beecham Group Ltd‟s third and fourth patents (‟049 and ‟703 
respectively). The acylation process used by the second defendants in the USA was 
similar to that claimed in the principal process of Beecham Group Ltd‟s third UK 
patent, and claims in both the second and fourth patents also covered the preparative 
process. Hetacillin was manufactured by the reaction of Ampicillin produced by the 
primary manufacturing stages with acetone. 
 
[3] Beecham Group Ltd, inter alia, argued that infringement could be established on the 
basis of the doctrine of “pith and marrow”. The defendants argued that, having regard 
to the requirement in the present statute for precise claiming, the “Saccharin doctrine” 
no longer applied and that for the same reason the doctrine of “pith and marrow” was 
                                                 
1
 Beecham Group Limited v Bristol Laboratories Limited and others [1978] RPC 153 (Ch). 
2
 The facts of this case are taken from the summary thereof which appears in the law report. 
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obsolete. They further contended that, if Beecham Group Ltd’s claims were construed 
sufficiently broadly so as to embrace Hetacillin, they were invalid for ambiguity. 
 
[4] The trial judge found all four patents to be valid and infringed, but found 
infringement only on the basis of the infringing importation and not on the basis of 
the “pith and marrow” doctrine.  
 
5.1 Falconer QC’s Judgment 
 
[5] In Beecham at Court of first instance, Falconer QC, Deputy Judge in the Chancery 
Division, pointed out that hetacillin was formed by the chemical combination of 
ampicillin (formed as an intermediate acetone – a reaction which yielded hetacillin 
and water. He pointed out that, as could be seen from the formula of hetacillin, the 
acetone combined with the ampicillin by substituting for one hydrogen (H) atom in 
the 6-position in the penicillin nucleus and one hydrogen atom in the amino group in 





 Falconer QC pointed out that the reaction was a reversible reaction so that in 
appropriate conditions hetacillin in the presence of water would “hydrolyse” into 
ampicillin and acetone. He continued: 
 
“The evidence establishes that hetacillin has no antibacterial activity of its own but 
that its value as an antibacterial agent arises by virtue of its property of converting by 
hydrolysis into ampicillin – conversion which takes place in the body when the drug 
is taken. Mr Gratwick submits, therefore, that hetacillin is merely ampicillin with an 
addition, namely, acetone – as he picturesquely put it, „ampicillin with a hat on‟. He 
pointed out, as the evidence shows (if evidence be necessary to establish the fact) that 
drugs are often administered in a disguised form. Thus, he says, ampicillin may be 
administered in a capsule or in the form of a sodium or potassium salt or an ester of 
the drug.”4 
 
Falconer QC then turned to the law on the doctrine of infringement by taking the 
substance of a patented invention or the doctrine of “pith and marrow”. 
 
                                                 
3
 At 167. 
4
 At 167 lines 12-21. 
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[6] In dealing with the law relating to the doctrine of infringement by taking the 
substance of a patented invention, Falconer QC began by taking into account the rule 
that no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the 
consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations.
5
 Fowler QC was 
quoting a passage from the judgment of Parker J in Marconi. There Parker J, inter 
alia, said: 
 
“It is a well-known rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a 
patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making 
[im]material variations. From this point of view, the question is whether the 
infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus said to have been 
infringed.”6  
 
Falconer QC took the view
7
 that the scope of applicability of the doctrine of 
infringement by taking the substance of pith and marrow was to be found in three 
cases at that time, namely, Birmingham, Van der Lely and Rodi. 
 
 
[7] Falconer QC, inter alia, referred
8
 to Lord Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely where Lord 
Reid, inter alia, said: 
 
“Copying an invention by taking its „pith and marrow‟ without textual infringement 
of the patent is an old and familiar abuse which the law has never been powerless to 
prevent. It may be that in doing so there is some illogicality, but our law has always 
preferred good sense to strict logic. The illogicality arises in this way. On the one 
hand the patentee is tied strictly to the invention which he claims and the mode of 
effecting an improvement which he says is his invention. Logically it would seem to 
follow that if another person is ingenious enough to effect that improvement by a 
slightly different method he will not infringe. But it has long been recognised that 
there „may be an essence or substance of the invention underlying the mere accident 
of form; and that invention, like every other invention, may be pirated by a theft in a 
disguised or mutilated form, and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the 
alleged piracy is the same in substance and effect, or is a substantially new or 
different combination? (Per James LJ in Clark v Adie [1877] 2 App Cas 423)‟.”9 
 
                                                 
5
 At 167 lines 36-38 quoting Parker J in Marconi at 217. 
6
 Parker in Marconi‟s case at 217. 
7
 At 169 in Beecham. 
8
 Falconer QC at 170. 
9
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 as quoted by Falconer QC. 
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[8] The “illogicality” to which Lord Reid referred in the passage quoted by Falconer QC, 
is not, it is suggested, an illogicality at all. It is an exception to a general rule. All 
rules have an exception simply because nothing is absolute and there will always be 
some situation that was not thought of at the time of the formulation of the rule which 
strictly speaking, falls outside the rule but which would have been included within the 
rule had someone raised it at the time of the formulation of the rule. The general rule 
is that infringement happens when a product or process falls within the language of 
the patent claim of the patentee. However, if a product or process does not strictly fall 
within such language, you have to choose when to say there is no infringement and 
when to say there is infringement. In such a case if you say everything that does not 
fall strictly within the language of the patent claim is no infringement, you will render 
the rule ineffective, inoperative, nugatory and useless. You have to devise a way in 
which in the right cases you will say that, although the product or process falls outside 
the strict language of the claim, it, nevertheless, infringes the claim and there will 
have to be cases in which the product or process falls outside the strict language of the 
claim and you say there is no infringement.  
 
[9] In terms of the doctrine of pith and marrow the position, it is suggested, is that if the 
variation or omission or addition does not add any value to the practical use of the 
invention or is immaterial and the rest of the product or process falls within the 
language of the claim, there is infringement. That is why there exists the rule to which 
Parker J referred in his 1911 judgment in Marconi that no one who borrows the 
substance of a patented invention may escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations. The position is the same as the rule that “thou shall not 
kill”. It means that as a general rule you are not allowed to kill but you are allowed to 
kill in self-defence. Despite Falconer QC referring to all the correct dicta from various 
judgments relating to the doctrine and having regard to the well-known rule of patent 
law referred to by Parker J in Marconi, he concluded that the doctrine of pith and 
marrow did not apply. It was on the basis of another principle, namely, the Saccharian 
principle that he found that infringement had been proved. Falconer QC applied the 






5.2 The Court of Appeal Turns its Back on the Upjohn LJ Approach:  




[10] The judgment of the Court of first instance was taken on appeal to the Court of 
Appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was written by Russell LJ. The other 
two Judges were Stamp LJ and Mr Justice Brightman. None of the three Judges had 
sat in Van der Lely or in Rodi. The Court of Appeal found in favour of the plaintiffs 
on the basis of a principle called the Saccharian principle as well as on the basis of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow. 
 
[11] Russell LJ pointed out that it was agreed that on the construction of the ampicillin 
claim it was an essential feature or sine qua non of the chemical structure of the 
substance that “there is present the amino group NH in the alpha position”.11 After 
this sentence Russell LJ had the following to say:  
 
“It is agreed that this feature is not present in the substance hetacillin, the importation 
of which is the subject of complaint. There is ample authority which in terms requires 
that variations from the patented article in the article complained of be confined to 
features of the patented article that, though textually claimed, are non essential if the 
principle of infringement by taking the pith and marrow of an invention, or its 
essential substance is to be applied. It suffices to mention Van der Lely v Bamfords 
(supra) and Rodi v Showell (supra).”12 
 
 In this paragraph Russell LJ articulated the doctrine of pith and marrow. In the next 
two paragraphs of his judgment, Russell LJ referred to the arguments of the parties 
and sought to apply the doctrine of pith and marrow to the facts of the case. In the two 
paragraphs Russell LJ said: 
 
“But it is argued that the peculiar features of the present case are such as to show that 
in truth, as a matter of substance and reality, the defendants‟ hetacillin is ampicillin 
and the whole of ampicillin. It is ampicillin temporarily masked or disguised. It is 
simply ampicillin simply subjected to a reversible chemical reaction which is quite 
irrelevant to the function of hetacillin as an antibiotic. It is a sine qua non of hetacillin 
that it shall in due course become a mixture of ampicillin and separated out acetone, 
either before administration or in the body after administration. As a matter of reality, 
though not of chemical formularity, hetacillin is no less a mere carrier of ampicillin 
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 (1978) RPC 181 (CA). 
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 At 186 lines 21-23. 
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 Russell LJ at 186 lines 21-30. 
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than would be a capsule of ampicillin, or a mere mixture of ampicillin and water or 
any other substance not involving any chemical reaction. 
 
It is right to notice that it is not said that the producers of hetacillin set out 
deliberately to add a useless evanescent frill to ampicillin: it is accepted that some 
special value was hoped for in hetacillin, though on the evidence that hope was 
misplaced. But if the defendants can deny a pith and marrow infringement they could 
equally do so had their intentions been otherwise. In our judgment, hetacillin should 
also be held to infringe the claim to the substance ampicillin on the ground that as a 
matter of reality it is to be regarded as a reproduction of ampicillin. To take a 
substance and alter it in a manner which necessarily results, when relevantly applied, 
in the reconstitution of the substance, seems to us to be fairly described as 
reproduction of the substance, albeit temporarily masked.”13 
 
[12] It is clear from the part of Russell LJ‟s judgment dealing with the doctrine of pith and 
marrow that Russell LJ not only referred to the doctrine of pith and marrow but also 
that he had regard to the question of what value the variant added to the invention and 
that, although he did not in terms refer to the rule of patent law repeatedly referred to 
herein, he actually applied that rule to the facts of the case before him and concluded 
that there was infringement. The rule referred to is the rule that no one who borrows 
the substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations to the patented invention. Lastly, but very importantly, 
it is suggested that, when one carefully reads Lord Reid‟s dissent in the Van der Lely 
case and reads the passages quoted above from Russell LJ‟s judgment, the temptation 
to conclude that Russell LJ was, or, must have been, influenced by Lord Reid‟s 
reasoning and application of the doctrine of pith and marrow even though Lord Reid‟s 
judgment in Van der Lely was a minority judgment is irresistible. In fact Russell LJ 
specifically referred to the Van der Lely judgment. Although in referring to the Van 
der Lely judgment, Russell LJ made no mention of Lord Reid‟s judgment as such, the 
factors that Russell LJ referred to just before referring to the Van der Lely case and 
after referring to that case are factors that only Lord Reid discussed in that case and 
were not discussed or even referred to by the majority in their judgment.  
 
[13] Russell LJ‟s judgment is yet another indication that, if the question of what value the 
defendant‟s variant added to the patented invention was taken into account in 
considering the application of the doctrine of pith and marrow, more often than not 
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the correct conclusion on infringement was reached. Russell LJ applied the Lord Reid 
approach. In this case the Court of Appeal turned its back on the Upjohn LJ approach. 
The Court of Appeal effectively followed the example of Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi who, 
despite being bound to apply the Upjohn LJ approach in the light of the decision of 
the House of Lords in Van der Lely, nevertheless applied the Lord Reid approach. 
When in Rodi‟s case Lloyd-Jacob J turned his back on his approach that had been 
approved by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, he took that stand alone and 
must have felt quite isolated when in the subsequent appeals to the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords, both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords stuck to his 
previous approach, the Upjohn LJ approach. Of course, he was in the company of the 
dissenters whose camp he was joining. Those were Lords Evershed, Reid and Pearce. 
When, however, the Court of Appeal decided Beecham‟s case unanimously, Lloyd-
Jacob J and the dissenters were joined by three Judges of the Court of Appeal. This 
meant that by this time the Lord Reid approach “movement” on the determination of 
non-textual infringement of patents and the doctrine of pith and marrow had gathered 
serious momentum. It also meant that there were now seven Judges in the various 
courts in England who believed that the Lord Reid approach was the correct approach. 
The obvious question was: Would the House of Lords stick to its guns and continue to 
apply the Upjohn LJ approach? If so, for how long would it do so or would it do the 
right thing and also abandon the Upjohn LJ approach, follow Lloyd-Jacob J and adopt 
the Lord Reid approach? 
 
5.3 The House of Lords Turns its Back on the Upjohn LJ Approach and Embraces 
the Dissenters’ Approach: Beecham in the House of Lords14 
 
[14] In the House of Lords the appeal came before Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord 
Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Salmon and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. Except for Lord 
Diplock who was involved in Rodi, none of the other Law Lords had been involved 
either in Van der Lely or in Rodi. Lord Diplock wrote a speech in which the rest of the 
Law Lords concurred. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal 
and dismissed the appeal. In relation to the facts concerning the nature and 
functioning of the two products, Lord Diplock said: 
 
                                                 
14
 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Ltd and others [1978] RPC 192 (HL). 
135 
 
“Both ampicillin and hetacillin are prepared in powder form. They are administered 
to human beings either orally or by injection in aqueous solution. Hetacillin when 
administered to human beings was found to have therapeutic qualities and goods as, 
and indeed identical with, those of ampicillin. And well it might, for the chemical 
reaction between ampicillin and acetone, which results in the formation of hetacillin, 
is a reversible reaction. In the presence of water (H2O) hetacillin inevitably turns back 
almost entirely into acetone and ampicillin. This is what happens whenever it is used 
as an antibiotic either upon its being dissolved in water of the purpose of injection, or 
if taken orally, as soon as the hetacillin comes into contact with the moisture in the 
human stomach. If this reverse reaction did not take place in the conditions in which 
the antibiotic is administered, hetacillin would have no therapeutic value at all. So 
long as it maintains the molecular structure indicated above, it is not capable of 
destroying harmful bacteria in the human body. It is to the ampicillin to which 
hetacillin reverts on or before administration to a patient, that the therapeutic effects 
of administering hetacillin are wholly due.”15 
 
 It is notable that in this passage Lord Diplock did consider the issue of the value of 
the difference between the patented invention and the accused product. He said that in 
the presence of water (H2O) hetacillin inevitably turned back almost entirely into 
acetone and ampicillin and this happened whenever the hetacillin was used as an 
antibiotic either upon its being dissolved in water for the purpose of injection, or if 
taken orally, as soon as it comes into contact with the moisture in the human stomach. 
Then Lord Diplock said: 
 
“If this reverse reaction did not take place in the conditions in which the antibiotic is 
administered, hetacillin would have no therapeutic value at all”.16 
 
[15] The fact that in this case Lord Diplock, in considering the question whether there had 
been infringement, considered the question whether the variant or the feature of the 
alleged infringer‟s product or device which made it different from the patentee‟s 
invention as claimed in the claims, had any value is very important because it 
represented a departure from the approach that had been adopted by the majority in 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords to the determination of liability for non-
textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow in both the Van der Lely 
case and the Rodi case. In those cases the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
failed to take this factor into account despite being aware of Lord Reid‟s approach 
which took it into account in both cases. 
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[16] The effect of the above statement by Lord Diplock in regard to hetacillin was that the 
variation which the defendants had effected in their product was a difference that was 
for all intents and purposes immaterial. It is important that Lord Diplock took this 
factor into account because, it is suggested, it is a significant factor in determining 
whether there is non-textual infringement of a patent claim in a particular case. If the 
difference is material, there can be no infringement. However, if it is immaterial or 
insignificant, that should go a long way towards the establishment of non-textual 
infringement. 
 
[17] Lord Diplock referred to a certain passage in Parker J‟s judgment in Marconi‟s case 
on the doctrine of pith and marrow. Thereafter Lord Diplock said that the increasing 
particularity with which the claims were drafted and multiplied in modern 
specifications may have reduced the scope of application of the doctrine of pith and 
marrow, but he was unable to accept the argument advanced by Bristol that this had 
made the doctrine obsolete. He said that the doctrine remained a part of patent law as 
had been acknowledged in speeches delivered in the House of Lords in Van der Lely 
and Rodi. He expressed the view that, directed as it is against colourable evasion of a 
patent, it was not, in his view, confined to mechanical inventions or to claims for new 
combinations of integers, but in appropriate cases, though they may be rare, was 
applicable to claims for new products.
17 
Lord Diplock also referred to the fact that in 
the Chancery Division Beecham Group Ltd had argued that hetacillin was no more 
than a chemical equivalent of ampicillin. He said that Beecham Group Ltd were 
arguing that hetacillin was “ampicillin wearing a temporary mask to be discarded 
before it gets to work”.18 
 
[18] Lord Diplock said that the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable to claims for 
new products as well as to new processes.
19
 He further agreed with the Court of 
Appeal that the relationship of hetacillin to ampicillin provided a clear case for the 
application of the pith and marrow doctrine. In support of this, Lord Diplock said: 
 
“It was argued that what is claimed in the patents as an essential feature of the class of 
products to which ampicillin belongs is the presence of an amino group in the alpha 
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 At 197 lines 28-29. 
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position, and that this feature is absent in hetacillin. This was literally true at the time 
of importation and sale but it ceased to be true as soon as hetacillin was put to use for 
the only purpose for which it was intended. The substitution for the postulated amino 
group of the variant incorporated in hetacillin is evanescent and reversible and for all 
practical purposes of use can be regarded as the equivalent of the amino group in 
ampicillin. In the apt phrase used by the Court of Appeal, it is the reproduction of the 
substance ampicillin, albeit temporarily masked.”20  
 
Special attention should be drawn to Lord Diplock‟s statement in this passage that, 
although it was literally true that what was claimed in the patents as an essential 
feature of the class of products to which ampicillin belonged was the presence of an 
amino group in the alpha position and that this feature was absent in the hetacillin at 
the time of its importation and sale, it ceased to be true “as soon as hetacillin was put 
to use for the only purpose for which it was intended”.21 
 
[19] What is special about this reasoning on the part of Lord Diplock is that in considering 
whether the infringer‟s product infringed the patentee‟s patent, Lord Diplock 
considered whether, in regard to the use for which the invention was intended, the 
variant would make any difference. That is the same reasoning which Lord Reid used 
in his dissent in Rodi‟s matter to reach the conclusion that the defendants‟ bracelet 
infringed the plaintiffs‟ patent in that matter. In Rodi, after explaining that in the 
alleged infringer‟s product, EXCALIBUR 59 one limb of the U was extended and 
joined to the corresponding limb of the corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, 
thus making a double link of the shape of an elongated letter “C”, Lord Reid said that 
this difference made the bracelet slightly less flexible if one tried to bend it in a way 
which no one would normally try to do.
22
 Lord Diplock concluded that there was 
infringement and that he would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. Lord Diplock‟s 
judgment in this case represented the abandonment of the Upjohn LJ approach and the 
acceptance of the correctness of the Lord Reid approach. The rest of the Law Lords in 
the matter agreed with him. 
 
[20] In Beecham the House of Lords turned full circle. In Van der Lely and Rodi it had 
gone completely to one extreme with regard to the determination of liability for non-
textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow and had effectively sounded 
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the death knell to the concept of non-textual infringement of patents and the doctrine 
of pith and marrow in English patent law. In Beecham it in effect resurrected the 
doctrine of pith and marrow and effectively over-ruled its decisions in Van der Lely 
and Rodi without saying so expressly. Once again inventors whose patents had been 
infringed non-textually could take their complaints to the English courts and could 
successfully invoke the doctrine of pith and marrow. Annand has expressed the view 
that there is liberalisation detectable in Beecham and that such liberalisation “is said to 
have been taken much further by Lord Diplock with his purposive construction test in 
Catnic Components Ltd v Hill and Smith Ltd (1982) RPC 183 (HL).”23 
 
[21] The period from 1960 to 1978 was a very strange period in English patent law. First, 
there was Lloyd-Jacob J who, in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely, began a new 
approach to the determination of non-textual infringement which focussed exclusively 
on the language of the claims to determine what features in an invention were 
essential and which ones were not. He was then followed by the majority in the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords in the same matter all of which courts approved his 
approach. Then the same Lloyd-Jacob J changed his mind when he got the Rodi 
matter and did not follow his earlier approach which was now binding on him because 
it had been approved by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords and he applied 
the Lord Reid approach in Rodi. He had in all probability read the dissents of Lord 
Evershed MR in the Court of Appeal and Lord Reid in the House of Lords in Van der 
Lely and had been persuaded that his approach in Van der Lely, though approved by 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, was wrong. 
 
[22] In Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J now embraced the Lord Reid approach but this time he did not 
get the immediate approval of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Rodi 
because those two courts stuck to their guns and applied the approach that Lloyd-
Jacob J had applied in Van der Lely that the two Courts had applied. When the next 
important case concerning non-textual infringement of patents came up in the form of 
Beecham, the Judge of first instance, namely, Falconer QC, Deputy Judge, applied the 
approach approved by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely 
and Rodi. However, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords turned their backs 
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against their own previous decisions in Van der Lely and Rodi and followed Lloyd-
Jacob J in Rodi once again, thus also embracing the Lord Reid approach. 
 
[23] Blanco-White did not include in the 5
th
 edition of his work any analysis of the 
decisions in Van der Lely, Rodi, Beecham and Catnic at their different levels and their 









[24] One of the most important decisions to be handed down in the construction of patent 
claims in the United Kingdom over the past fifty years is the decision of the House of 
Lords in Catnic,
26
 the so-called Catnic decision of the House of Lords written by Lord 
Diplock. Although the subject of this discussion is the Catnic decision of the House of 
Lords, it is necessary in the context of this discussion and the issues to be discussed to 
have regard to the decisions of the Chancery Division and the Court of Appeal in the 
Catnic case as well. In the Chancery Division the Catnic case came before Whitford J. 
In the Court of Appeal the Catnic case came before Buckley LJ, Waller LJ, and Sir 
David Cairns. A summary of the facts must be given before legal issues can be 
considered. 
 
[25] The appellants in the Catnic matter were the proprietors of a patent for galvanised 
steel lintels for use in spanning the spaces above window and door openings in cavity 
walls built of bricks or similar constructional units. Since lintels are supported only at 
either end by the brick courses on which they rest and must themselves support the 
superimposed brick courses above the window or door space that they span, rigidity 
and strength were necessary characteristics. Heavy beams of timber or heavy – gauge 
metal girders possess the characteristics referred to and had long been used for this 
purpose. In the patent in suit the necessary strength and rigidity were obtained by 
adopting a box-girder structure with consequent lightness, economy of material, and 
ease of handling. The lintel could be made in modules, a three course module where 
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the height between the upper and lower horizontal plates was equivalent to three 
courses of bricks and mortar and a two course module where the height was 
equivalent to two courses only. 
 
[26] Only the first claim is relevant for present purposes. Claim 1 read as follows: 
 
“1. A lintel for use over apertures in cavity walls having an inner and outer skin 
comprising a first horizontal plate or part adapted to support a course or a 
plurality of superimposed units forming part of the inner skin and a second 
horizontal plate or part substantially parallel to the first and spaced there from 
in a downward vertical direction and adapted to span the cavity in the cavity 
wall and be supported at least at each end thereof upon courses forming parts of 
the outer and inner skins respectively of the cavity wall adjacent an aperture, 
and a first rigid inclined support member extending downwardly and forwardly 
from or near the front edge adjacent the cavity of the first horizontal plate or 
part and atom intermediate position which lies between the front and rear edge 
of the second plate or part at an intermediate position which lies between the 
from and rear edge of the second plate or part forming with the second plate or 
part and adapted to extend across the cavity, and a second rigid support 
member extending vertically from or from near the rear edge of the first 
horizontal plate or part to join with the second plate or part adjacent its rear 
edge.”  
 
[27] After the respondents had examined various brochures issued by various 
manufacturers of steel lintel including that of the appellants, they decided that the 
Catnic lintel was the best. They were unaware that it was the subject matter of a 
patent. They copied and manufactured it. At some stage the respondents produced a 
modified design – referred to in the litigation as DH4. Between DH4 and the design 
described in claim 1 of the appellant‟s specification the difference which the 
respondents relied upon to argue that their machine did not constitute an infringement 
of the plaintiffs‟ patent was that the back plate was not vertical, as required by claim 
1, but was inclined at a slight angle to the vertical, viz 6 in the case of the three-course 
module and 8 in the case of the two course module. In the appellant‟s design or 
invention the plate was a horizontal one. The question was whether the substitution of 
a back plate that was slightly inclined to the true vertical for one that was precisely 
vertical changed what the patentee by his specification had made an essential feature 
of the invention claimed having regard to the patentee‟s description of the back plate 
in claim one as extending vertically. 
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5.5 Whitford J’s Judgment: Whitford J Applies the Lord Reid Approach to the 
Doctrine of Pith and Marrow and not The Upjohn LJ Approach 
 
[28] The trial Judge was Mr Justice Whitford. In dealing with the issue of infringement 
Whitford J concluded that there was no infringement in terms. “The member 
described as an inclined member is only inclined at an angle of about 13º, and the 
question is asked: „How can members inclined at 8º or 6º be said to be vertically 
extending?‟ In my view, on the proper interpretation of the claim, there is no 
infringement in terms.” He then considered whether or not there was infringement on 
the basis of the doctrine of pith and marrow. This was in respect of the defendant‟s 
device referred to as DH4.  
 
[29] With regard to the question whether DH4 infringed the patentees‟ patent, Whitford J 
referred to various cases including Van der Lely, Rodi, Marconi and Birmingham. 
Whitford J borrowed from Romer J in Nobels Explosive Co
27
 to formulate the 
question to be asked to determine non-textual infringement. He said: 
 
“There remains the question as to whether DH4, to quote the words of Romer J, in 
Nobels Explosive Co Ltd v Anderson (1894) 11 RPC 115 at 118: „As a matter of 
substance is taking the invention claimed by the patent; not the invention which the 
patentee might have claimed if he had been well advised or bolder, but that which he 
has in fact and substance claimed on a fair construction of the specification‟.”28 
 
[30] Whitford J also quoted a passage from Lord Reid‟s dissent in the Rodi matter in 
which Lord Reid inter alia highlighted the fact that claims are not addressed to 
conveyancers but are addressed to “practical men skilled in the prior art” and warned 
that they “ought not to be construed with the meticulousness which was once thought 
appropriate for conveyancing documents”.29 Whitford J also referred to Lord Morris‟ 
speech in the Van der Lely case where Lord Morris referred to Parker J‟s statement in 
Marconi where Parker J inter alia referred to the rule of patent law that no one who 
borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences of 
infringement by making immaterial variations.
30 
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 Whitford J in Catnic at 213 lines 24-27. 
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[31] Whitford J further referred to a statement by Parker J in Marconi that: 
 
“Everyone who produces the same results by using the essential parts of the 
combination or process is an infringer, even though he has, in fact, altered the 
combination or process by omitting some unessential part or step which is, in fact, 
equivalent to the part or step he has omitted”.31  
 
 Whitford J quoted another passage from Lord Morris‟ speech in Van der Lely where 
Lord Morris inter alia said: 
 
“It becomes necessary, in the first place, to study claim 1 in order to see what is the 
invention of the plaintiffs: if necessary the claim must be construed. Thereafter, it has 
to be considered what the defendants have done. Have they or have they not taken all 
the essential features or integers of the invention claimed? If there are variations, are 
they immaterial? If there are differences, are they differences in essential respects or 
in inessential respects?”32 
 
[32] Whitford J referred to a passage in Lord Pearce‟s speech in Rodi where Lord Pearce 
inter alia said: “It is a well-known rule of patent law that no one who borrows the 
substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by 
making immaterial variations. From this point of view, the question is whether the 
infringing apparatus is substantially the same as the apparatus said to have been 
infringed.”33 
 
[33] In due course Whitford J dealt with what the question was which he had to answer in 
order to determine whether DH4 constituted a non-textual infringement. He dealt with 
such question thus: 
 
“So the question is: have the defendants in DH4 made an immaterial variation or have 
they, by introducing a sloping back plate, omitted an essential feature?”34  
 
In the next three sentences Whitford J said: 
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 Parker J in Marconi at 214 lines 11-19 quoting Parker J in Marconi‟s case at 217. 
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“The reason for any change made by an alleged infringer may not be without 
relevance. A change which does nothing more than avoid a strict textual infringement 
and which was made only for that purpose may well require the most careful scrutiny.  
A change to achieve some additional advantage may be in a wholly different 
category, although, in the classic phrase of Lord Russel of Killowen, „the super-
addition of ingenuity to robbery‟ will not necessarily avoid infringement.”35 
 
Whitford J found that DH4 did infringe the plaintiffs‟ patent. This finding was based 
on the doctrine of pith and marrow. In this passage Whitford J also applied his mind 
to the very important question of what the reason for the change or variation made by 
the alleged infringer was. That was one of the most important questions on which 
Lord Reid had focussed in determining whether or not the relevant integer was 
essential or whether or not there was infringement. It was a question which all the 
Judges who found no infringement in Van der Lely in the Court of first instance, the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords did not bother to address.  
 
[34] What is most important about Whitford J‟s judgment is that in considering the 
question whether DH4 constituted a non-textual infringement on the basis of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow he focused on the right issues. He considered the 
materiality of the variant. He also referred to the well-known rule of patent law that 
no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the 
consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations thereto. Thereafter he 
applied this to the facts of the case before him. This is reflected in the following 
passage of his judgment: 
 
“What then is the essential feature so far as the back wall is concerned? On the 
disclosure in the specification the essential feature of the back wall is the avoidance 
of the need to infill DH4. DH4 avoids the need to infill. The rear web is in truth not 
vertical, but the construction in my judgment has all the essential features of claim 1. 
So far as any question of function is concerned, in as much as there is this difference, 
it is not such a difference as ought to be considered, in my view, a material 
difference, applying in particular the criteria put forward by Lord Morris at the end of 
the passage from his opinion quoted by me. It is a construction having in my 
judgment all the essential features of claim 1.”36 
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[35] The approach adopted by Whitford J in the determination of non-textual infringement 
in respect of DH4 is to be commended. It was the correct approach. He applied the 
Lord Reid approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow and in determining the issue of 
infringement. It entailed having regard to not only the materiality of the variant but 
also the invocation of the well-known rule of patent law referred to above which led 
to the correct conclusion that DH4 constituted an infringement. There can be no 
criticism of Whitford J‟s judgment in regard to the application of the doctrine of pith 
and marrow. Whitford J‟s judgment is proof that the Catnic case, which Lord Diplock 
later decided on the basis of the Catnic test, could easily have been decided on the 
basis of the doctrine of the pith and marrow with just results or the same results as the 
results achieved when the Catnic test was used by Lord Diplock in the House of 
Lords. Whitford J applied the Lord Reid approach. An appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was noted. 
 




[36] The three Judges who heard the Catnic appeal in the Court of Appeal, namely, 
Buckley LJ, Walter LJ and Sir David Cairns, produced three judgments. Though 
Waller LJ agreed with Buckley LJ‟s judgment, he, in addition, wrote a separate 
concurring judgment. It is necessary to examine each one of the three judgments to 
determine how each one of them dealt with the issue of infringement within the 
context of the pith and marrow principle.  
 
5.7 Buckley LJ’s Judgment: Buckley LJ Applies the Upjohn LJ Approach 
 
[37] Lord Buckley made the following points by way of introduction to the topic of 
infringement by taking the substance or the “pith and marrow” of an invention: 
 
(a) To determine whether a claim of a patent has been infringed: 
 (i) one must first discover what is claimed;  
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 (ii) the claim must be construed and analysed to ascertain what the 
features or integers of the invention are;
38 
(b) the claim must be construed in the context of the specification as a whole;
39
 
(c) the claim must be construed in the light of any admissible evidence;
40 
(d) the claim must be read and interpreted as it would be read and interpreted 
by the notional addressee of the specification, that is to say, a man skilled in 
the relevant art who has at his disposal the common knowledge in that art at 
the date of publication of the specification;
41 
(e) when construed as aforesaid, the claim must be analysed to discover what 
the several features of the thing for which a monopoly is claimed are;
42 
(f) one must next consider the alleged infringement to determine whether it 
infringes the claim; 
(g) if the alleged infringement has all the features of the claim, it must infringe 
the claim, even if it also incorporates other features; 
(h) if the alleged infringement lacks one of the features of the claim, it may or 
may not infringe the claim; 
(i) if the feature which is lacking is an essential feature of the claim, there will 
be no infringement; and 
(j) if the feature of the claim which is lacking in the alleged infringement is an 
inessential feature of the claim, whether or not there is infringement of the 
claim will depend upon whether or not the alleged infringement has all the 
essential integers of the claim; if it has, there is infringement. This will be 
the position irrespective of whether or not the inessential feature has been 
wholly omitted without a replacement equivalent or whether it has been 
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replaced with an equivalent. If it does not have all the essential features of 




Buckley LJ stated that he thought that the above points represented the effect of the 
decision of the House of Lords in the Rodi case on this point, namely, construction of 
claims in the context of the application of the pith and marrow principle. 
 
[38] Buckley LJ then turned to the question of how a Court determines whether a feature is 
essential or inessential. He went on to say: 
 
“So it becomes necessary to consider what distinguishes a feature of a claim which is 
essential from one which is not essential. This gives rise to the question in what 
respect the feature must be essential. Must it be essential to the practical working of 
the invention; or must it be essential to the validity of the claim; or will it be essential 
for the relevant purpose if the patentee has indicated that he regards it as an essential 
feature of his invention, whatever its true essentiality may be; or will it suffice that 
the patentee has elected to limit his claim by the inclusion in it of the feature in 
question, thus disclaiming a monopoly in anything not incorporating that particular 
feature?”44 
 
[39] Buckley LJ then referred to the use of the expression “colourable evasion” or 
“colourable imitation” which he said had been used in many of the pith and marrow 
cases. He suggested that some of the cases appeared to be based on approaching the 
matter as if the motive of the alleged infringer was important. He said: “The 
expression „colourable evasion‟ has a condemnatory ring, suggesting that the alleged 
infringer has unfairly sought to sail as close to the wind as possible, to come as near to 
reproducing the patented invention as he can without actually being held to 
infringe”.45 
 
[40] Buckley LJ then quoted a passage from Lord Reid‟s judgment in the Rodi matter 
where Lord Reid said: 
 
“No doubt if the reader of a specification is astute enough to see that the 
patentee has framed his claims so narrowly as to leave it open to him by some 
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small modification to use the invention without infringing the claim, he is 
quite entitled to do that. He cannot be accused of sharp practice. He is within 
his legal rights.”46 
 
[41] Buckley LJ quoted what Diplock LJ said in Rodi in the Court of Appeal with regard to 
the expression: “colourable imitation”. The passage he quoted reads as follows: 
 
 “These emotive words mean no more than that the infringer has adopted all the 
essential features claimed in the patent but has altered one or more unessential 
features, or has added some additional feature which may or may not itself involve a 
new inventive step. A process or an article which makes use of the same principle as 
the patented invention or achieves the same result or makes use of some only of the 
essential features is not a „colourable imitation‟ in any sense relevant to patent law 
unless it does adopt all the essential features which the patentee specified in his 
claim.”47 
 
Buckley LJ took the view that “(t)he question whether there has been an infringement 
must be answered objectively by comparing the alleged infringing article with the 
claim said to have been infringed, without reference to any motive on the part of the 
alleged infringer”.48 In the next paragraph Buckley LJ made very important 
statements. He said: 
 
“If an inventor of an apparatus, for example, explicitly states in his specification, 
either expressly or upon construction, that part A of the apparatus must lie at a right-
angle to part B, and accordingly claims an apparatus in which part A lies at a right 
angle to part B, anyone who makes an apparatus for performing the same function 
which in other respects exactly resembles the inventor‟s apparatus but in which part 
A does not lie at a right angle to part B, will not infringe”.49 
 
[42] It is suggested that Buckley LJ‟s view as expressed in the passage just quoted is 
problematic. It is clear from the passage that this case is one where the alleged 
infringer‟s apparatus had the same features as the inventor‟s apparatus except that, in 
the alleged infringer‟s apparatus, the alleged infringer had made a minor variation, 
namely, where part A is supposed to lie at a right-angle to part B, the alleged infringer 
made sure that in his apparatus part A did not lie exactly at a right-angle to part B. 
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Buckley LJ‟s view was that, without any further question, the alleged infringer‟s 
apparatus did not infringe. His view means that, in such a case, it did not matter 
whether the alleged infringer‟s variation added any value to the working of the 
apparatus nor did the reason for the variation, if any. Indeed, Buckley LJ‟s view 
meant that an alleged infringer could copy an inventor‟s invention in every respect as 
long as he introduced some variation even if such variation was inconsequential.  
 
[43] It seems that Buckley LJ‟s view in this regard was in conflict with the principle of 
patent law that if you borrow the substance of an invention, you cannot escape the 
consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations to the invention. 
However, Buckley LJ went on to explain
50
 why he took the view that, once there was 
a variation such as the one he referred to in the passage quoted above, there was no 
infringement. He explained his view thus: 
 
“This is because the inventor has demonstrated that in his belief it is a necessary 
feature of his invention that part A should be at a right angle to part B. He has 
claimed it as a feature of his invention upon that footing. In such a case it matters not, 
in my opinion, that it may not be essential to the successful working of the invention 
that part A shall lie at a right-angle to part B.”51 
 
[44] It is clear from what Buckley LJ said in the passage just quoted that he made his 
decision on whether or not an inventor had deliberately chosen that a particular 
feature of his claim was an essential feature of his invention simply on the strength of 
the fact that the inventor had mentioned that feature in his claim and not because the 
words which the inventor chose to employ to mention that feature could necessarily 
be said to reflect an intention on his part to claim that such feature was, or, should be, 
regarded as an essential feature. That this was Buckley LJ‟s approach is to be inferred 
from the fact that with regard to the example which he gave in his judgment relating 
to part A of an apparatus lying at a right-angle to part B, he reached the conclusion in 
the passage just quoted that in that example “[t]he inventor [had] demonstrated that in 
his belief it [was] a necessary feature of his invention that part A should lie at a right 
angle to part B”.52 Hitchman and MacOdrum refer to Thorson P‟s judgment in 
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McPhar v Sharpe and quote him as inter alia having also held that the mention of a 
feature of an invention in a claim does not necessarily make it essential to the 




[45] Buckley LJ‟s reasoning in regard to the effect of the mentioning of a feature in a 
claim is not similar to the reasoning that was adopted in the Van der Lely case by the 
majority in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords. Buckley LJ applied the 
Upjohn LJ approach. On the normal rules governing the drawing of inferences, simply 
because a patentee has mentioned a certain feature in his claims cannot on its own 
give rise to an inference that he intended that feature to be an essential of his 
invention. It seems that this is, indeed, the way that the literalists approach cases of 
infringement.  
[46] The flaw in the approach is: what is it that would be needed before the doctrine of pith 
and marrow could be applied in a particular case? Furthermore, it is clear from the 
passage quoted above in which Buckley LJ was expressing his views on, for example, 
a part leaning at a right-angle to part B that in his view there was no role to be played 
by the doctrine of pith and marrow. It is also clear from the passage that has just been 
quoted that Buckley LJ‟s view was that the test for determining whether or not a 
feature of an invention was an essential one was not an objective one but a subjective 
one in the sense that, as long as the inventor intended, rightly or wrongly, that a 
particular feature of his invention should be an essential feature, it would be taken as 
an essential feature of the invention, even if, objectively speaking, it was not essential 
for the working of the invention.  
[47] Criticism can be levelled at Buckley LJ‟s view in this regard on the basis that it does 
not determine the real essentiality of a feature but only the supposed essentiality 
thereof as believed by the inventor. Another criticism of Buckley LJ‟s view in this 
regard would be that where, as in the example that he gave in the passage quoted 
earlier, the inventor simply said in the claim that part A shall lie at a right-angle to 
part B, that should not on its own be enough to justify the conclusion that the inventor 
intended that, if a slight variation was made, the resultant product or process would 
necessarily fall outside his monopoly. An inventor cannot be expected to deal with 
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every eventuality that can be thought out by those seeking to reap where he sowed 
without suffering the consequences of infringement of his invention. For that reason 
there will always be variations of his invention that he did not say would or would not 
be essential but which may or may not be essential. If the test is a subjective one, this 
will operate unjustly against the inventor. If, however, the test is an objective one, 
there will be an infringement and pirates will not be allowed to reap where they did 
not sow. 
 
[48] In support of his view
54 
Buckley LJ said the following: 
 
“In the Rodi and Wienenberger case both Lord Hodson (at 385 line 23) and Lord 
Upjohn (at 394 line 1) held that the inventor in that case had made the use of U-
shaped connecting bows an essential feature of his claim. Lord Morris, who was the 
third member of the majority in that case, reached the same conclusion (at 382 lines 3 
and 37). It was not, however, essential to a successful working of the device which 
was there patented that the connecting links should be U-shaped. The defendants‟ 
bracelet operated upon precisely the same mechanical principles and resembled the 
plaintiffs‟ bracelet in all essential respects except that the connecting links were of a 
different shape.”55 
 
[49] Buckley LJ went on to state that in the Rodi case the minority, consisting of Lord 
Reid and Lord Pearce, concluded that the defendants had taken the substance of the 
plaintiffs‟ invention but that the majority, consisting of Lord Hodson, Lord Morris 
and Lord Upjohn, took the view that the defendants in that case had not taken the 
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substance of the plaintiffs‟ invention because, so went the majority‟s reasoning, the 




[50] Buckley LJ then said that there could be a scenario in terms of which the specification 
would be less emphatic as the specification in the fictitious case he had given. In this 
regard he pointed out that: “The specification must be read and interpreted as it would 
be by a man skilled in the art”.57 He went on to say that it was possible that a man 
skilled in the art would, upon reading the specification, say that, although the patentee 
said 90, that obviously must be interpreted as “90 more or less within the normal 
accepted tolerances”. In such a case, said Buckley LJ, anyone who were to make the 
same invention but put the angle at more or less 90 that would not be an infringement 
because it would mean that 90 is not an essential but 90 more or less would be. He 
said that this would mean that on the true construction of the specification this was no 




[51] Buckley LJ expressed the view that the nature of the invention must be relevant to 
what its essential features are. This statement suggests that Buckley LJ was referring 
to the objective determination of what the essential features of an invention are as 
opposed to a determination of the inventor‟s subjective belief of what the essential 
features of his invention are. Indeed, if one contrasts this sentence with the one that 
followed it, this point becomes even clearer. In the next sentence Buckley LJ went on 
to say: 
 
“The language of the specification and the claims contained in it must be relevant to 
what the inventor claims to be the essential features of his invention and of the 
monopoly which he claims”.59 
 
 Buckley LJ then said: 
 
“The alleged infringement and the motive of the alleged infringer are irrelevant to the 
question of essentiality. The nature of the alleged infringement, but not the motive of 
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the alleged infringer, is relevant to whether the alleged infringement incorporates all 
the essential features of a claim”.60 
 
[52] Probably the most important paragraph in Buckley LJ‟s judgment is the one where, 
with courage, he ventured what he called generalisations on the question of 
essentiality.
61
 That passage basically reveals his view as to how a Court determined 
whether a feature of an invention was or was not essential. There Buckley LJ said: 
 
“(1) If that feature of the claim which is under consideration is in fact essential to 
the working of the claimed invention, then it must be an essential feature of 
the claim.  
(2) If the feature is not in fact essential to the working of the claimed invention, 
the applicant for a patent may nevertheless have made it an essential feature 
of the claim, that is to say, he may by the terms of the claim as properly 
construed have clearly limited his claim to a subject matter having that 
particular feature. If so, that feature will be an essential feature of the claim 
and anyone who makes a product or carries out a process which has all the 
features of the claim except that particular feature will not infringe the claim. 
 (3)  But, all claims are not perfectly framed. Sometimes a draftsman may include 
some feature in a claim either explicitly or by implication, which is not in fact 
essential to the working of the claimed invention and which the applicant has 
not by the terms of his specification and the claim clearly indicated as a 
feature which he regards as an essential feature of his monopoly. In such a 
case an alleged infringer may be held to have infringed the claim 
notwithstanding that his product or process does not incorporate the feature in 
question or substitutes some equivalent for it.  
(4) The fact that a claim incorporates a particular feature does not alone suffice 
to make that feature an essential one. If this were not so, no feature of a claim 
could ever be inessential, but the speeches in Rodi and Weinenberger all 
assume that a claim may include an inessential feature.”62 
 
[53] Buckley LJ then proceeded to apply the generalisations set out in the above paragraph 
to the facts of the Catnic case. In this regard Buckley LJ expressed the view that it 
could not be said that “it was essential to the efficacy of the lintel claimed in claim 1 
of the patent in suit that the back plate should be precisely vertical.”63 He went on to 
demonstrate how the evidence of Dr Gibbons supported that conclusion. He also went 
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on to consider the meaning of “vertical” as that term was used in the patent in suite. 
He said that the patentee had used the term “vertical” in contra-distinction to 
“inclined”. He said that, this being the sense in which the term was used, he felt no 
doubt that the patentee in the Catnic case had elected to limit his claim to a subject 
matter having that particular feature.
64
 Buckley LJ then referred to how the House of 
Lords had dealt with the issue in the Van der Lely case and went on to apply that same 
approach. The effect of Buckley LJ‟s decision on this point was that, while he had 
concluded that the lintel claimed in claim 1 of the patent in suit was not essential for 
the efficacy or working of the lintel in question,
65 
after referring to facts which 
supported that conclusion, he took the view
66
 that by the terms of his specification the 




[54] Buckley LJ referred to the fact that Whitford J, in the Chancery Division, had taken 
the view that the essential feature of the back plate was the avoidance of the need to 
in-fill, that is to say, to fill in the space in the inner skin wall between the base plate of 
the lintel and the upper arm of the “lazy Z”. Buckley LJ expressed the view that, 
while it was true that the presence of the back plate had the effect stated by Whitford J 
and that this was specifically mentioned in the specification, to his mind, to say that 
this was an essential feature of the back plate was “putting it too high”.68 Buckley LJ 
went on to say that the DH4 lintel of the allegedly infringing apparatus or device 
avoided the need to in-fill in just the same way as the lintel of claim 1, 
notwithstanding that its back plate was not vertical. He later said that, because DH4 
avoided the need to in-fill, Whitford J had reached the conclusion that it possessed all 
the essential features of claim 1 notwithstanding that its back plate was not truly 
vertical. Buckley LJ mentioned that Whitford J thought that, so far as any question of 
function was concerned, that difference ought not to be considered as material. 
 
[55] Buckley LJ disagreed with Whitford J‟s conclusion that DH 4 contained all the 
essential features of claim 1. The basis for his different view – that is Buckley LJ‟s 
different view – was that he construed claim 1 to require as an essential feature that 
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the back plate shall be truly vertical. Because, according to Buckley LJ, the back plate 
of DH4 was not vertical, DH4 did not, in his view, have all the essential features of 
claim 1. Accordingly, so concluded Buckley LJ, DH4 did not infringe claim 1. 
Buckley LJ then said that he would allow the defendants‟ appeal and dismiss the 
plaintiffs‟ cross-appeal. It is now necessary to turn to the judgment of Waller LJ in the 
Court of Appeal. Buckley LJ‟s judgment to the effect that in Catnic there was no 
infringement is a clear illustration of the effect of the Upjohn LJ approach to the 
determination of non-textual infringement. It is incomprehensible that anyone could 
conclude that there was no infringement in the Catnic case. The Catnic case was a 
much clearer case of non-textual infringement than the Van der Lely case and no 
judge should have had any hesitation in applying the doctrine of pith and marrow it he 
did not consider that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in 
Van der Lely and Rodi stood in the way of invoking the pith and marrow doctrine.  
 
5.8 Waller LJ’s Judgment 
 
[56] Waller LJ began his judgment by expressing agreement with Buckley LJ‟s judgment 
but then went on to give his own judgment. Waller LJ referred to a statement made by 
Whitford J in Catnic which ran thus: “The reasons for any change made by an alleged 
infringer may not be without relevance. A change which does nothing more than 
avoid a strict textual infringement and which was made only for that purpose may 
well require careful scrutiny”.69 A significant omission in the Upjohn LJ approach had 
been the omission to inquire into the reason for change introduced by the alleged 
infringer.  
 
[57] Waller LJ also referred to Lord Diplock‟s speech in Beecham where Lord Diplock 
referred to the pith and marrow doctrine as “directed as it is against colourable 
evasion of a patent
70
 …”. Waller LJ also draw attention to a passage in Parker J‟s 
judgment in Marconi, quoted with approval by Lord Pearce in Rodi. There Parker J 
said: 
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“It is a well known rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a 
patented invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making 
immaterial variations”.71 
 
 Waller LJ then referred to the fact that in Van der Lely Lord Reid observed that the 
respondents in that case “cannot point to any mechanical reason for making the 
change and that [the change] is simply done to try and evade the claim”,72 and then 
quoted James LJ in Adie where James LJ said: 
 
“But it has long been recognised that there may be an essence or substance of the 
invention underlying the mere accident of form; and that invention like every other 
invention may be pirated by a theft in a disguised or mutilated form and it will be in 
every case a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance and 
effect or is a substantially new or different combination”.73 
 
[58] The effect of most of the quotations made by Waller LJ in his judgment
74
 was that 
they supported the proposition that the making of immaterial variations to someone 
else‟s invention does not provide a basis for an alleged infringer to escape the 
consequences of infringement. In this regard it is significant that Waller LJ referred to 
the fact that in Adie in the House of Lords, Lord Cairns, LC had posed the question 
whether an instrument that in many but not all respects resembled a patented 
instrument would infringe the patented instrument and that the question would be for 
a jury or any tribunal judging the facts to say “whether that which was done by the 
alleged infringer amounted to a colourable departure from the instrument patented and 
whether in what he had done he had not really taken and adopted the substance of the 
instrument patented”.75 
 
[59] The importance of this statement taken from a passage in the judgment of Lord Cairns 
LC in Adie‟s case is two-fold. Firstly, it emphasised that formalism should not be 
allowed to prevail over substance and that the bottom line was whether or not the 
alleged infringer had taken the substance of the patentee‟s invention. Secondly, it 
made the point that it was not a sine quo non for infringement that only one feature of 
                                                 
71
 Parker J in Marconi‟s case at 217. 
72
 Waller LJ at 232 lines 12-15 quoting from Van der Lely‟s case at [1963] RPC 61 at 65. 
73
 Waller LJ in Catnic at 232 lines 16-21 quoting from James LJ in Clark v Adie (1873) LR 10 Ch at 667. 
74
 From 231 line 50 232 line 31. 
75
As quoted by Waller LJ in Catnic at 232 lines 27-31 
156 
 
the patented invention be missing from the accused device but more than one feature 
of the patented invention could be missing from the allegedly infringing product or 
device and the question would always be whether or not in doing what the alleged 
infringer did “he had not taken and adopted the substance of the instrument 
patented”.76 
 
[60] When he had to decide whether on the facts of the Catnic case, there had been an 
infringement of the patent en suite, Waller LJ did not follow the cases which directed 
that the Court should consider whether the alleged infringer had taken the substance 
of the invention. Instead, he asked the question whether the specification had made 
verticality essential. He said it had and, for that reason, he concluded that there was no 
infringement. Waller LJ‟s judgment is an exception to a number of cases discussed 
herein in that most of those which found no infringement were arrived at without the 
benefit of a consideration of the rule of patent law that, if you borrow the substance of 
a patented invention, you cannot escape the consequences of infringement by making 
immaterial variations to the invention. In the Catnic case Waller LJ referred to that 
rule but, nevertheless, came to the conclusion that there was no infringement. 
 
5.9 Sir David Cairns’ Judgment 
 
[61] Sir David Cairns also gave his judgment. He said that all relevant law was contained 
in the speeches of the Law Lords in the House of Lords in the Van der Lely and the 
Rodi cases. Sir David Cairns‟ view that as at the time of the Catnic case in the Court 
of Appeal the law was as set out in Van der Lely and Rodi was not correct. The 
decision of the House of Lords in Beecham had been handed down in 1977 and the 
Court of Appeal was dealing with the Catnic case in 1979. Accordingly, the legal 
position was as set out by the House of Lords in Beecham‟s case and not in Van der 
Lely and Rodi. Those two decisions had effectively been overruled by Beecham even 
though this was not said in any express terms. 
 
                                                 
76
 Waller LJ at 232 lines 30-31 quoting Lord Cairns in Clark v Adie (1877) 2 App. Cas. 315 (HL) at 320. 
157 
 
Sir David Cairns then went on to say that the relevant law could be summarised in 
five points. He said that those points
77
 were as follows: 
 
1 There are two types of infringement, textual infringement and 
infringement of the pith and marrow (Van der Lely 75 lines 35-9, per 
Lord Reid; 77, lines 45, per Lord Radcliffe; 79 lines 48-9, per Lord 
Jenkins; 80 lines 15-21, per Lord Hodson. Rodi, 380 lines 21-36, per 
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest; 384 line 6, per Lord Upjohn; 385 line 1, 
per Lord Hodson). 
2 The textual infringement occurs when the defendant‟s product contains 
all the features of the plaintiff‟s claim, interpreted literally (Van der 
Lely 75 lines 35-39 per Lord Reid; 80 per Lord Hudson. Rodi, 380 lines 
21-25 per Lord Morris; 385 line 1 per Lord Hudson). 
3 Infringement of the pith and marrow occurs when the defendant‟s 
product contains all the essential features of the plaintiff‟s claim 
despite some variation in inessential features (Van der Lely 75 lines 45-
50, per Lord Reid; 79 lines 43-7, per Lord Jenkins p 80 lines 15-19, per 
Lord Hudson. Rodi 380 line 38 to 381 line 3, per Lord Morris; 384 
lines 18-32, per Lord Hodson; 388 lines 8-15, per Lord Pearce; 391 
lines 14-20, per Lord Upjohn). 
4 The question of what are the essential features of a claim is a question 
of construction of the claim and is to be answered without reference to 
any alleged infringement. 
5 In construing the claim for the purpose of deciding what are its 
essentials, it is to be interpreted as it would be by a practical man 
skilled in the art. 
 
[62] Sir David Cairns went on to state that the difficulty was to decide, as a matter of 
construction, what, in any particular case, were the essentials of a claim under 
consideration. He said that the differences of opinion among different judges in the 
Van der Lely case and in the Rodi case on whether or not the patentee had made a 
particular feature an essential feature of the relevant claims showed that the problem 
of deciding whether the patentee has or has not made a particular feature essential 
may be a finely balanced one.
78
 He also said that, although in both cases the majority 
in the House of Lords held that the feature in question was made essential, it could not 
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be said that they laid down any principle which would enable a court to decide 
whether a feature is essential or not. Sir David Cairns took the view that probably no 
such principle could be enunciated and every case had to depend on its own facts.
79
 
Sir David Cairns went on to say that the mentioning of a particular feature in a claim 
was not sufficient to make that feature essential.
80
 This meant that there had to be 
something more in the wording of a claim than the mere mentioning to justify the 
conclusion that the patentee intended a particular feature to be an essential feature. 
This point had also been made by Lord Reid in the Van der Lely case. 
  
[63] Sir David Cairns went on to state that, apart from the expression “extending 
vertically” in claim 1, he could not find anything in the wording of that claim or in the 
specification as a whole to suggest that a strictly vertical back member was an 
essential feature.
81
 He went on to say that Whitford J had found that on the disclosure 
in the specification the essential feature of the back wall was the avoidance of the 
need to infill.
82
 Sir David Cairns further stated that Mr Everington, one of the Counsel 
in the matter, had contended that what was essential was the strength of the back wall. 
However, Sir David Cairns thought that each of these functions was complementary 
to the other. He expressed the view that neither function was spelt out in terms in the 
specification but he thought each would be obvious to the man skilled in the art 
reading it. 
 
[64] At this stage Sir David Cairns stated that “the question of construction involved … is 
not to be answered by the court putting its own meaning on the matter to be 
construed, but is to be answered as it would be by a man skilled in the art”83 and 
because of this, Sir David Cairns said that he considered it legitimate to take account 
of any evidence adduced as to the understanding of such persons.
84
 It seems from 
what Sir David Cairns was saying in this regard that his view was that whether or not 
a claim was to be construed to mean that a particular feature was an essential feature 
of such claim or whether the patentee could be said to have intended the feature to be 
                                                 
79
 At 235 lines 36-42. 
80
 Sir David Cairns at 235 lines 43-45. 
81
 At 236 lines 2-4. 
82
 Sir David Cairns at 236 lines 4-5. 
83
 Sir David Cairns at 236 lines 10-12. 
84
 At 236 lines 10-14. 
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an essential feature of the claim had to be decided on the basis of what the 
construction was that a man skilled in the art would give to the wording of the claim. 
If he would give a meaning that is to the effect that such a feature was intended to be 
an essential feature or whether such a feature was an essential feature, that would be 
the meaning that had to be given to the wording of the claim.  
 
[65] It is interesting to note that in his judgment Sir David Cairns did not refer to what the 
man skilled in the art would understand to have been the patentee‟s intention on the 
essentiality or otherwise of a particular feature but simply referred to what meaning 
such skilled man would give to the specification. In Adie it was not said that this was 
the position. What was said was that whether a feature was essential was a question of 
fact to be decided by the tribunal “judging of the facts”. However, when the Catnic 
case came to the House of Lords, it was said that it was the intention of the patentee 
as understood by the skilled man that was important. This made the question one of 
construction. 
 
[66] Sir David Cairns then analysed the evidence given by the “expert witnesses” – that is 
people skilled in the art – and concluded that, based thereon, the defendants‟ model 
DH4 contained all the essential features of the plaintiffs‟ patented invention and that 
the variation it had was an unimportant variation. Using the phrases used in other 
judgments he held that the defendants‟ lintel differed from the plaintiffs‟ lintel as 
described in claim 1 only in some unimportant respect
85
 and that the defendants‟ lintel 
was the same in substance and effect as the plaintiffs.
86
 He said that it was not a 
“substantially new or different combination” and that the variation was “an 
unimportant variation”. He observed that the defendants‟ lintel consisted of 
“substantially the same parts acting upon each other in substantially the same way‟ as 
the plaintiffs”.87 In conclusion he agreed with Whitford J that there had been 
infringement. In reaching this conclusion Sir David Cairns decided the Catnic case on 
the basis of the doctrine of pith and marrow. Quite clearly, he did not apply the 
Upjohn LJ approach because, if he had, he would not have reached the conclusion that 
there was infringement.  
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 Sir David Cairns at 236 lines 41-43. 
86
 Sir David Cairns at 236 lines 43-47. 
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[67] Sir David Cairns‟ judgment may be important for a number of reasons. One of these 
would be the basis upon which he concluded that there had been an infringement. He 
did not refer to what the patentee may have intended. He referred to the evidence of 
those witnesses who qualified to be referred to as people skilled in the art to establish 
what they understood with regard to the essentiality or otherwise of the feature in 
question. However, in the end he went back to the question of whether or not the 
accused article was the same in “substance and effect” as the patentee‟s article.  
 
[68] Since the majority in the Court of Appeal found that there was no infringement, the 
plaintiffs appealed to the House of Lords. Sir David Cairns‟ judgment was a dissent 
and minority. As the other two Judges in the Court of Appeal found that there was no 
infringement and Sir David Cairns found that there was infringement which was the 
same conclusion that Whitford J had also reached in the Chancery Division, this 
means that when the matter went on appeal to the House of Lords, it had been dealt 
with by four Judges and there was a tie as to whether there was infringement. Two 
had held that there was infringement and two had held that there was no infringement. 
It seems appropriate at this stage to make general observations about the application 
or non-application of the doctrine of pith and marrow in the cases discussed so far 
before a discussion of the all important decision of the House of Lords in Catnic.  
 
5.10 General Comments on the Approach to the Determination of non-Textual 
Infringement and to the Doctrine of Pith and Marrow Adopted in the Cases 
Discussed Above 
 
[69] In each of the cases discussed above, comments on various aspects of each case were 
made in the course of the discussion of those cases. These included comments and 
views on the court‟s decision in each case on either that the doctrine of pith and 
marrow was applicable or that it was not applicable. However, it is necessary at this 
stage to make some general observations about the cases. The cases in which the 
Courts found that the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable are: 
 
(a) The Incandescent Gas Light case 
(b) Marconi‟s case 
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(c) Lord Evershed MR‟s dissent in the Court of Appeal in the Van der Lely 
case 
(d) Lord Reid‟s dissent in the House of Lords in Van der Lely 
(e) Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi in the Court of first instance 
(f) Lord Reid‟s dissent in the House of Lords in Rodi 
(g) Lord Pearce‟s dissent in the House of Lords in Rodi. 
(h) Beecham in the Court of Appeal (Russell LJ‟s judgment) 
(i) Beecham in the House of Lords 
(j) Catnic in the Chancery Division 
(k) Sir David Cairns‟ dissent in Catnic in the Court of Appeal 
  
 It is suggested that a study of each one of these cases leads one to the conclusion that 
the correctness of the judgments which applied the doctrine of pith and marrow can 
simply not be questioned. Furthermore, in each one of these cases the Court had 
regard to whether or not the variant or integer that was omitted or varied added any 
value to the invention and this factor weighed heavily in the decision whether or not 
there had been infringement. In most, if not all, the cases, before the courts or the 
Judges concerned concluded whether or not there had been infringement, they 
referred to and considered the well-known rule of patent law on immaterial variations. 
The result in each one of the cases was a just result. 
 
[70] The cases discussed above in which it was decided that the doctrine of pith and 
marrow did not apply are the following: 
 
(a) Birmingham;  
(b) Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely 
(c) the majority judgment in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely; 
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(d) the majority judgment in the House of Lords in Van der Lely; 
(e) the judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rodi; 
(f) the majority judgment of the House of Lords in Rodi; 
(g) the judgment of Falconer QC in Beecham 
(h) the majority judgment in the Court of Appeal in Catnic. 
 
[71] In these cases it was decided that the doctrine of pith and marrow did not apply. It is 
suggested that of these cases only the Birmingham case was correctly decided in this 
regard. The others, namely, Van der Lely, Rodi, Beecham in the Chancery Division 
and Catnic at Court of Appeal level were wrongly decided. There can be absolutely 
no doubt that Beecham in the Chancery Division and the majorities in both the Court 
of Appeal and in the House of Lords in Van der Lely and in Rodi and in Catnic at 
Court of Appeal level erred in a fundamental way in coming to the conclusion that the 
doctrine of pith and marrow did not apply in those cases and that there was no 
infringement. The fundamental reasons why the majority in Van der Lely at Court of 
Appeal level and in the House of Lords reached the conclusion that the doctrine of 
pith and marrow was of no application to the case and that, therefore, there was no 
infringement are: 
 
(a) that the majority did not consider nor did it even refer to, the question of 
whether the defendants‟ decision to dismount the foremost instead of the 
hindmost wheels added any value to the invention. 
(b) that the majority did not consider nor did it even refer to the well-known 
rule of patent law that no one who borrows the substance of a patented 
invention can escape the consequences of infringement by making 
immaterial variations to the patented invention. 
(c) that the majority elevated the mere mention of an integer in a claim to a 
statement by the patentee that he considered such an integer to his invention 
essential despite the fact that there was nothing more to suggest this than 
the mere mentioning of the integer in the claim. 
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(d) that the majority failed to deal with the reasons given by Lord Reid as to 
why the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable in that case. 
(e) that the majority overemphasised the language of the claim far above other 
relevant factors with the result that form was elevated above substance. 
(f) that the majority did not inquire into what the reason was for the change or 
variation made by the alleged infringer so that, if there was a no reason or 
no convincing reason, this would support the conclusion that there was 
infringement. 
 
[72] Lord Reid‟s dissent88 in Van der Lely was a powerful dissent. Extensive comments 
were made on Lord Reid‟s dissent in the course of the discussion of the Van der Lely 
judgment. It is not necessary to repeat those save to emphasise four points thereanent. 
These are that: 
 
(a) Lord Reid took into account the question of whether or not the defendants‟ 
variant added any value at all to the invention and found that it did not. 
(b) Lord Reid considered whether the defendants had given any reason as to 
why they had chosen to dismount the foremost wheels instead of the 
hindmost wheels as specified in the specification and found that the 
defendants had not proffered any explanation or reason for this decision on 
their part. 
(c) Lord Reid heeded the well-known rule of patent law that no one who 
borrows the substance of a patented invention can escape the consequences 
of infringement by making immaterial variations to the invention. 
(d) Lord Reid appreciated that the mere mention of an integer in a claim was no 
sufficient basis for concluding that the patentee had intended such an 
integer to be an essential integer of the invention. 
 
                                                 
88
 Pendleton has also described the dissents in the House of Lords in Van der Lely and in Rodi as “powerful 
dissents” (see Pendleton Michael “The Purposive Approach to Patent Construction: A Divergence in Anglo-
Australian Judicial Interpretation” (June 1983) 14 Melbourne University Law Review  75 at 77) 
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[73] It is suggested that Lord Reid‟s powerful dissent in the Van der Lely case as well as in 
the subsequent case of Rodi, but particularly in Van der Lely, had far reaching 
implications. It exposed the fundamental flaw in the approach taken by the majority in 
the same case in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The approach of 
the majority in Van der Lely was such that, if followed, it would have effectively 
meant that the doctrine of pith and marrow would not have been applicable in any 
case and patent pirates were given a licence to make immaterial variations to patented 
inventions for which they could proffer no reason or explanation but suffer no 
consequences of infringement. It is suggested that, when, subsequently, Lord Diplock 
wrote his judgment in Beecham‟s case, he probably sought to rescue the situation that 
had been created by the majority in Van der Lely. When one reads his speech in the 
Beecham case, one observes that he did not repeat the error committed by the majority 
in Van der Lely of not considering inter alia what value the defendants‟ variant added 
to the patented invention. In fact it is suggested that there are features in that judgment 
which he seems to have taken from Lord Reid‟s dissent in the Van der Lely case.  
 
[74] Lord Reid correctly applied the doctrine of pith and marrow in the Van der Lely case 
and the majority erred in not applying it. The Beecham case was also a correct 
application of the doctrine of pith and marrow. Justice was done in the Beecham case. 
Justice would also have been done in the Van der Lely case if the majority had 
approached the matter the way Lord Reid had approached it. In the Catnic case at the 
level of the Court of first instance the doctrine of pith and marrow was applied but in 
the Court of Appeal the majority found that the doctrine of pith and marrow did not 
apply and found that there was no infringement. Only Sir David Cairns in the Court of 
Appeal in the Catnic case found that the doctrine of pith and marrow was applicable 









[1] In the House of Lords the appeal in the Catnic case was heard by Lord Diplock, Lord 
Keith of Kinkel, Lord Seaman, Lord Lowry and Lord Roskill. Lord Diplock wrote the 
speech in which all the other members of the House concurred. It seems that Lord 
Diplock understood the question before the House of Lords to have been whether “the 
substitution of a back plate that was slightly inclined to the true vertical for one that 
was precisely vertical change what the patentee by his specification had made an 
essential feature of the invention claimed having regard to the patentee‟s description 
of the back plate in claim 1 as „extending vertically‟.”2 
 
[2] In his speech Lord Diplock pointed out that the appellant‟s invention was designed for 
use by builders engaged in ordinary building operations. He also pointed out that the 
readers to whom the appellants‟ specification was addressed were builders engaged in 
ordinary building operations. He pointed out that, as any builder would know, “a 
slight inclination from the vertical of an upright support reduces its load bearing 
capacity proportionately to the cosine of the angle of such inclination”. He continued:  
 
“Where that angle is 6 as in the [respondent‟s] three-course module DH4 the 
reduction is 0.6 percent, where it is 8 as in the two course module the reduction is still 
1.2 per cent. From the point of view of function a reduction of this order in vertical 
support provided for the upper horizontal plate is negligible.”3  
 
It is interesting to note here that, as he did in Beecham, following upon Lord Reid‟s 
dissents in Van der Lely and Rodi, Lord Diplock took into account the question 
whether the variant affected the functioning of the device or apparatus. 
 
                                                 
1
 Catnic Components Limited and Another v Hill and Smith Limited [1982] RPC 183 (HL). 
2
 At 241 lines 29-32. 
3
 At 241 line 40 to p. 242 line 2. 
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[3] Lord Diplock drew attention to how the parties in the Catnic matter had dealt with the 
concepts of “textual infringement” and infringement of the “pith and marrow” of the 
invention. 
 




“My Lords, in their closely reasoned written cases in this House in the oral argument, 
both parties to this appeal have tended to treat „textual infringement‟ and 
infringement of the „pith and marrow‟ of an invention as if they were separate causes 
of the action, the existence of the former to be determined as a matter of construction 
only and of the latter upon some broader principle of colourable evasion. There is, in 
my view, no such dichotomy; there is but a single cause of action and to treat it 
otherwise, particularly in cases like that which is the subject of the instant appeal, is 
liable to lead to confusion.”5 
 
Then Lord Diplock explained the phrase “no textual infringement” thus: 
 
“The expression „no textual infringement‟ has been borrowed from the speeches in 
this House in the hay-rake case, Van der Lely v Bamfords, where it was used by 
several of their Lordships as a convenient way of saying that the word „hindmost‟ as 
descriptive of rake wheels to be dismounted could not as a matter of linguistics mean 
„foremost‟: but this did not exhaust the question of construction of the specification 
that was determinative of whether there had been an infringement of the claim or not. 
It left open the question whether the patentee had made his reference to the 
„hindmost‟ (rather than any other wheels) as those to be dismounted, an essential 
feature of the monopoly that he claimed. It was on this question that there was a 
division of opinion in this House and in the Court of Appeal in the hay-rake case.”6 
 
[4] What Lord Diplock was saying in this passage was that the phrase “no textual 
infringement” was used in the speeches of the House of Lords in the Van der Lely 
                                                 
4
 At 242 lines 25-32. 
5
 For a South African lawyer who is familiar with the Constitutional Court judgment in Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers of SA: In re EX PARTE President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), it is 
difficult to read this passage of Lord Diplock‟s speech without being reminded of a passage in Chaskalson P‟s 
judgment in that case which has lines that run along almost the same theme as the lines in the passage of Lord 
Diplock‟s speech. In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers it was argued that, when a litigant relied upon common law 
grounds of review, the matter was not to be treated as a constitutional matter, in which case, the Constitutional 
Court, said at 696B-C (par 44). “I cannot accept this contention, which treats the common law as a body of law 
separate and distinct from the Constitution. There are not two systems of law, each dealing with the same 
subject matter, each having similar requirements, each operating in its own field with its own highest Court. 
There is only one system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, 
including the common law, derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to constitutional control.” 
6




case to say nothing more than simply that the use by the patentee in that case of the 
phrase “hindmost” to describe the rake wheels to be dismounted in performing his 
invention could not as a matter of language mean “foremost”. That is the first point 
Lord Diplock made. In other words that is the context in which the phrase “no textual 
infringement” was used in the Van der Lely case. The second part of that same point 
that Lord Diplock made in the passage quoted is that to say that there was “no textual 
infringement” “did not exhaust the question of construction of the specification that 
was determinative of whether there had been an infringement of the claim or not”. It 
is interesting to note that in Catnic, Lord Diplock said that the fact that as a matter of 
language the word “hindmost” could not mean “foremost” did not exhaust the 
question of construction of the specification that was determinative of whether there 
was infringement in Van der Lely. This is interesting because the Upjohn LJ approach 
took the language of the claims in a specification as decisive of the question of 
construction for the determination of whether there was infringement of a patent or 
not. In this regard it needs to be pointed out that Lord Diplock (as Diplock LJ) 
delivered a judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rodi in which he expressed agreement 
with the principles set out in the judgment of Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the Court 
of Appeal in Van der Lely. In other words Lord Diplock clearly and unequivocally 
endorsed the principles and approach adopted by the two Lord Justices. 
 
[5] This second part of the point that Lord Diplock made revealed the second point. The 
second point he made was that … “the [correct] question of construction of a 
specification that was determinative of whether there had been an infringement of the 
claim or not”7 was “whether the patentee had made his reference to the „hindmost‟ 
(rather than any other wheels) as those to be dismounted, an essential feature of the 
monopoly that he claimed”.8 This suggests that Lord Diplock was saying that the 
question that was determinative of whether or not there had been infringement of a 
claim in any particular case was whether or not it could be said that the patentee had 
made that particular feature an essential feature of the monopoly that he claimed. If he 
had not made that feature an essential feature of his invention, then there was 
                                                 
7
 At 242 lines 38-39. 
8
 At 242 lines 39-41. 
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infringement. If he had, then there was no infringement. Those are the two points that 




[6] After making the two points referred to above, Lord Diplock proceeded to make what 
must rank as the most frequently quoted passage of his judgment in the Catnic case. 
He said: 
 
“My Lords, a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words 
of his choosing, addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject 
matter of his invention (ie, skilled in the art), by which he informs them what he 
claims to be the essential features of the new product or process for which the letters 
patent grant him a monopoly. It is those novel features only that he claims to be 
essential that constitute the so-called „pith and marrow‟ of the claim. A patent 
specification should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one 
derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers 
are too often tempted by their training to indulge. The question in each case is: 
whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in 
which the invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance 
with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by 
the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would 
fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon 
the way the invention worked.”10 
 
It is in this passage that the essence of the Catnic test is contained. In the first 
sentence of Lord Diplock‟s passage commencing with “My Lords, a patent 
specification is …” Lord Diplock says that in a specification a patentee informs those 
who are likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of his invention what 
the essential features of his product or process are for which he seeks a grant of 
                                                 
9
 Lord Diplock made the two points at 242 lines 33-43. Catherine has expressed the view that purposive 
construction requires the Court to focus on the reasons for enacting the legislation and the directions in which it 
points, rather than strictly on the meaning of the text (Catherine NG “The Purpose of „Purposive Construction‟” 
(2000-2001) Intellectual Property Journal  at 5). Catherine says these reasons and directions are drawn from 
two sources: from authoritative descriptions of purpose by the drafter as well as by scholars in the field, and 
from inferences made from the text, from the circumstances, from the context and the mischief to be cured at the 
time of the legislation, from its relationship to other legislative scheme or structure and from legislative 
evolution (idem at 5). 
10
 Lord Diplock at 242 line 44 to 243 line 11. Brian Reid doubts whether in using the term “purposive” in 
describing the interpretive approach that Lord Diplock adopted in Catnic, Lord Diplock meant anything much 
more than “sensible view”. (Reid Brian C A Practical Guide to Patent Law (1999) (3rd ed) at 108). Brian Reid 
then went on to remark that “purposive construction” happened to be a phrase then favoured by their Lordships 
(particularly in relation to the interpretation of statutes) and Catnic was the first instance where it was applied by 
them in a patent context (Reid Brian C (3
rd




monopoly. Lord Diplock says it is only those novel features that the patentee claims 
to be essential that constitute the “pith and marrow” of the invention.  
 
[7] What Lord Diplock said in the first two sentences of the passage quoted in the 
preceding paragraph is that in his specification the patentee indicates the essential 
features of his invention. Lord Diplock puts this as if the essential features are the 
only features that a patentee indicates in his specification. The fact of the matter is 
that in conveying what he conveys in the specification the patentee makes mention of 
both essential and unessential features. Accordingly, Lord Diplock‟s statements in the 
first two sentences of the paragraph are misleading. The more correct statement would 
be to say that a specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of his 
choosing, addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject matter of 
his invention by which he informs them of the features – essential and unessential – of 
the new product or process and in respect of which essential features the letters patent 
grant him a monopoly. In this regard one cannot fail to remember Sir David Cairns‟ 
statement in his judgment in the Catnic case in the Court of Appeal where he said that 
“the mention of a particular feature in the claim is not sufficient to make that feature 
essential”.11 No impression must be created that there are no unessential features to 
which the patentee refers in his specification. The Supreme Court of Canada pointed 
out in paragraph 31(e) of its judgment in the Free World that the claims language will, 
on a purposive construction, show that some elements of the claimed invention are 
essential while others are non-essential. 
 
[8] It is clear from the passage from Lord Diplock‟s speech under consideration that his 
test for determining the essentiality or otherwise of any feature of a claim is intention-
based. It is intention-based in that the question is answered with reference to what the 
patentee intended as understood by persons with practical knowledge and experience 
in the kind of work in which the invention was intended to be used. Lord Diplock‟s 
approach was not based on what the claim means – as it would objectively be 
understood by the persons to whom it was addressed or by persons in general. It 
seems that what Lord Diplock had in mind was that the understanding that would be 
used to determine what the patentee intended was that of a person with practical 
                                                 
11
 Sir David Cairns in the Catnic case in the Court of Appeal at 202. 
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knowledge and experience in the relevant field and not the Court‟s understanding 
thereof. 
 
[9] What Lord Diplock said in the fourth sentence – which is the last sentence of the 
passage – is that: 
 
(a) the determinant of whether or not a feature is an essential feature is the 
intention of the patentee; if he intended it to be an essential feature, then it 
is an essential feature; if he did not intend it to be an essential feature, then 
it is not an essential feature. 
(b) whether the patentee intended a particular feature to be essential or 
unessential is not determined on the basis of the Court‟s opinion or view of 
what the patentee intended but on the basis of what persons with practical 
knowledge and experience in the relevant art would understand from the 
specification to have been the patentee‟s intention.  
(c) in seeking to determine what the intention of the patentee was, persons with 
the skills and experience in the relevant art look at a particular word or 
phrase in the relevant claim and express an opinion whether the patentee 
intended strict compliance with that word or phrase in the claim to be an 
essential feature of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the 
monopoly. This is done in the light of the prior art at the time of the 
publication of the patent. 
(d) If the position is that persons with practical knowledge and experience in 
the relevant art would understand that the patentee intended the feature that 
is omitted or varied or replaced to be an essential feature, then there would 
be no infringement. However, if they say that he did not so intend, there 
would be infringement. 
 
[10 In the last part of the fourth sentence of the passage starting with the words “My 
Lords” Lord Diplock said that this would be the case even if the feature would have 
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no material effect upon the way the invention worked.
12
 What the last part of the last 
sentence reveals is that Lord Diplock was saying that, even if the feature is immaterial 
to the working of the invention, if the persons with knowledge and experience in the 
relevant art understand that the patentee intended that there would be strict 
compliance with a certain word or phrase in the claim, there is no infringement if 
there is no strict compliance with such word or phrase in a particular case – and that 
marks the end of the matter. This means that in terms of the Catnic decision a feature 
of an invention which does not add any value upon the way the apparatus or device 
works can be treated as unessential as long as it is found that it would be the 
understanding of persons with the knowledge and experience in the relevant art that 
the patentee did not intend that strict compliance therewith be an essential 
requirement of the invention. Accordingly, the view of the Court and the objective 
position count for nothing in a case where the feature does not affect the working of 
the invention. They are not even some of the factors to be taken into account. 
 
[11] In the third sentence of the passage quoted above Lord Diplock said that a 
specification must be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one. 
Clarizo views purposive construction as meaning that the claims must be interpreted 
so as to further the object or purpose of the invention and it is necessary when reading 
the patent to try to determine what was the intention of the inventor when the 
invention was made.
13
 It is suggested that in this passage Lord Diplock did not say 
anything to the effect that words must not be given their ordinary and grammatical 
meaning when a patent specification is being construed. That can still be done. What 
Lord Diplock said should not be done is to give words a “purely literal” meaning. 
 
[12] Lord Diplock went on to make the point that the question does not arise where the 
variant would have a material effect upon the functioning of the invention.
14
 He said 
that the question also does not arise in a case where at the date of publication of the 
specification it would be obvious to the informed reader that the variant would have 
no material effect upon the functioning of the invention. Lord Diplock put it thus: 
 
                                                 
12
 At 242 of the reported judgment. 
13
 Clarizo Dino P “The New Test for Claim Construction and Patent Infringement in Canada” (2003-2004) IPL 
Newsletter 15 at 16. 
14
 At 243 lines 12-13. 
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“The question, of course, does not arise where the variant would in fact have a 
material effect upon the way the invention worked. Nor does it arise unless at the date 
of publication of the specification it would be obvious to the informed reader that this 
was so. Where it is not obvious, in the light of the then existing knowledge, the reader 
is entitled to assume that the patentee thought at the time of the specification that he 
had good reason for limiting his monopoly so strictly and had intended to do so, even 
though subsequent work by him or others in the field of the invention might show the 
limitation to have been unnecessary. It is to be answered in the negative only when it 
would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or 
phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was so skilled in 
the art, to exclude minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the 
readers to whom the patent was addressed, could have no material effect upon the 
way in which the invention worked.”15  
 
[13] In a certain
16
 passage Lord Diplock addressed four situations. The first situation he 
addressed is a situation where the question would not arise as to whether people with 
practical knowledge and experience in the field in which the invention was intended 
to be used would understand that the patentee intended that there be strict compliance 
with a particular word or phrase in a claim was to be an essential requirement. He said 
that such a case would be where the variant would not have a material effect upon the 
invention. The second scenario where the question does not arise is where at the date 
of publication of the specification it would be obvious to the informed reader that the 
variant would not have a material effect upon the functioning of the invention. The 
third situation that Lord Diplock addressed when it would not be obvious is where the 
reader would be entitled to assume that the patentee had a good reason to limit his 
monopoly the way he did. This would be the case even where subsequent work by the 
patentee or others showed that it was unnecessary for the patentee to limit his 
monopoly in that way. Lord Diplock stated that the question is to be answered in the 
negative where it would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular 
descriptive word or phrase could not have been intended by the patentee to exclude 
minor variants which, to the knowledge of both himself and the intended readers, 
                                                 
15
 At 243 lines 12-24. Young et al Terrel on the Law of Patents refer to the sentence in Lord Diplock‟s Catnic 
decision that says “Nor does it arise unless at the date of publication of the specification it would be obvious to 
the informed reader that this was so”. This is the second sentence of the paragraph in Lord Diplock‟s judgment 
in Catnic which begins with the sentence “the question of course, does not arise where the variant would in fact 
have a material effect upon the way the invention worked”. Young et al express the view that the word “this” at 
the end of the second sentence of the paragraph refers back to the qualification “even though it could have no 
material effect upon the way the invention works” rather than to its immediately preceding sentence. (Young et 
al 187) 
16
 That passage is at 243 lines 12-24. 
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could not have any material effect upon the way the invention worked.
17
 Lord Diplock 
then stated the differing judicial views in Van der Lely and Rodi cases. He dealt with 
the Beecham Group case as well. 
 
[14] The passage in Lord Diplock‟s speech quoted above which starts with the words: “My 
Lords …” and ends with the words “… the way the invention worked” is the passage 
in Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic which Lord Hoffmann subsequently said in par 51 
of his speech in Kirin-Amgen he tried to summarise with the use of the Protocol 
questions. In relation to this passage it is important to bear in mind what Lord 
Hoffmann said in par 52 of his speech in Kirin-Amgen.
18
 There Lord Hoffmann, inter 
alia, said: 
 
“When speaking of the „Catnic principle‟ it is important to distinguish between, on 
the one hand, the principle of purposive construction which I have said gives effect to 
the requirements of the Protocol, and on the other hand, the guidelines for applying 
that principle to equivalents, which are encapsulated in the Protocol questions. The 
former is the bedrock of patent construction, universally applicable. The latter are 
only guidelines, more useful in some cases than in others. I am bound to say that the 
cases show a tendency for counsel to treat the Protocol questions as legal rules rather 
than guides which will in appropriate cases help to decide what the skilled man would 
have understood the patentee to mean. The limits to the value of the guidelines are 
perhaps most clearly illustrated by the present case…”.19 
 
[15] In Kirin-Amgen Lord Hoffman also said: 
 
“The determination of the extent of protection conferred by a European patent is an 
examination in which there is only one compulsory question, namely that set by 
article 69 and its Protocol: What would a person skilled in the art have understood the 
patentee to have used the language of the claim to mean? Everything else including 
the Protocol question is only guidance to a judge trying to answer that question. But 
there is no point in going through the motions of answering the Protocol questions 
when you cannot sensibly do so until you have construed the claim. In such a case – 
and the present is in my opinion such a case – they simply provide a formal 
justification for a conclusion which has already been reached on other grounds.”20 
 
                                                 
17
 At 243 lines 12-24. 
18
 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others v Hoecht Marion Russell Ltd and Others (2005) RPC 169 (HL). 
19
 Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen at par 52. 
20
 Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen at par 69. 
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Lord Hoffmann also inter alia said “The Protocol questions are useful in many cases, 
but they are not a substitute for trying to understand what the person skilled in the art 
would have understood the patentee to mean by the language of the claims.”21 
 
[16] There seems to be a link of some kind between the judgment of Lord Reid in the Van 
der Lely case and Lord Diplock‟s judgment in the House of Lords in Catnic. The link 
appears to be the reference in both judgments to obviousness of variants and the 
question of whether or not a variant has a material effect upon the way that the 
invention works. In Van der Lely Lord Reid addressed
22
 the question of an “obvious 
equivalent”. He said: “… you cannot avoid infringement by substituting an obvious 
equivalent for an unessential integer”.23 In the second last sentence of the first 
paragraph at 76 in Van der Lely Lord Reid pointed out that he could not “imagine any 
more obvious equivalent than substituting the foremost for the hindmost wheels in 
that machine”.24 In Catnic Lord Diplock also dealt with the applicability or otherwise 
of the question he said had to be asked in every case to situations where it would be 
obvious to the informed reader that the variant would in fact have a material effect 
upon the way the invention worked and where it would not have been obvious that 
this would be the case. Satiriadis
25
 seems to also take the view that Lord Diplock‟s 
judgment in Catnic has some features of Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely. He 
has said that some of the most important elements of the doctrine of purposive 
construction require the court in cases of infringement in substance to analyse the 
variant in order to ascertain whether it does in fact have a material effect upon the 
way the invention works. He then says: “In Catnic the House of Lords in this respect 
vindicated the position of Lord Reid, who had rendered the minority decision in C 
Van der Lely NV v Bamfords Limited “hay rake a case.”26 
 
[17] Hoffmann J also addressed in his judgment in the Improver
27
 case the situation where 
it would have been obvious that the variant had no material effect upon the way the 
                                                 
21
 Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen at par 71. 
22
 In the first paragraph at 76 in Van der Lely. 
23
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely in the first par at 76 
24
 Lord Reid in the second last sentence in Van der Lely at 76. 
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 Satiriadis Bob H “Purposive Construction in Canadian Patent Infringement Cases since O‟ Hara” (1996) 11 
IPJ 111 at 112. 
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 Ibid at 112. 
27




invention worked. The obviousness was to be to the person skilled in the art. In the 
Van der Lely case Lord Reid pointed out that “[n]othing could be less inventive than 
selecting the hindmost against the foremost wheels when the selection makes no 
practical difference as regards efficiency. No one suggests that the use by the 
respondents of the foremost wheels results in producing an inferior machine.”28 In 
Catnic Lord Diplock said that the question that should be asked in each case did not 
arise “where the variant would in fact have a material effect upon the way that the 
invention worked.”29 In the first of the Protocol questions in the Improver case 
Hoffmann J referred to a situation where the variant did not have a material effect 
upon the way the invention worked.  
 
[18] Finally, in Van der Lely Lord Reid pointed out that, while the position was that, if the 
specification made it clear that the patentee regarded a particular integer as essential, 
the integer had to be treated as essential, he could not see “why one should shut one‟s 
eyes to facts of which the patentee must have been aware when framing the 
specification”, Lord Diplock, inter alia, said that the question30 he refers to in his 
speech has to be answered in the negative “only when it would be apparent to any 
reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim 
cannot have been intended by a patentee, who was also skilled in the art, to exclude 
minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the readers to whom the 
patent was addressed, could have no material effect upon the way in which the 
invention worked.”31 
 
[19] Lord Diplock stated 
32
that the essential features of the invention that was the subject 
of claim 1 of the patent in suit in Catnic were much easier to understand than those of 
any of the patents in the Van der Lely, Rodi and Beecham cases. He said that, put in a 
nutshell, the question to be answered was: “Would the specification make it obvious 
to a builder familiar with ordinary building operations that the description of a lintel 
in the form of a weight-bearing box girder of which the back plate was referred to as 
„extending vertically from one of the two horizontal plates to join the other, could not 
                                                 
28




 Lord Diplock at 243 lines 12-13. 
30
 That question is the one appearing at Lord Diplock‟s speech at 243 lines 5-11. 
31
 At 243 lines 18-24. 
32
 At 244 line 3. 
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have been intended to exclude lintels in which the back plate although not positioned 
at precisely 90 to both horizontal plates was close enough to 90 to make no material 
difference to the way the lintel worked when used in building operations?”33 This is a 
very long
34
 question. However, it seems that the gist of it is that the question that Lord 
Diplock said in effect would determine the issue there under consideration was 
whether or not the specification of the patent in question would make it obvious to the 
person who would work with it that the description of the relevant feature of the 
patent in the claim specification as it stands could not have been intended by the 
patentee to exclude the variant in the allegedly infringing product or process. If yes, 
there is no infringement. If no, there is infringement because the feature in question is 
covered by the patent.  
 
[20] Lord Diplock went on to say: 
 
“No plausible reason has been advanced why any rational patentee should want to 
place so narrow a limitation on his invention. On the contrary, to do so would render 
his monopoly for practical purposes worthless, since any imitator could avoid it and 
take all the benefit of the invention by the simple expedient of positioning the back 
plate a degree or two from the exact vertical.”35 
 
[21] It seems from this passage that Lord Diplock was saying that, if no plausible reason 
could be advanced why any rational patentee should have narrowed his monopoly in 
the manner indicated in the allegedly infringing article or product, this would be an 
indication that he could not have intended to exclude the variant or substitution in the 
allegedly infringing product or process to be an essential of his invention. If the 
majority in Van der Lely in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords had, like 
Lord Diplock in the passage in Catnic, enquired into whether or not there could be a 
plausible reason for the patentee in that case to have narrowed his monopoly to the 
hindmost wheel, which is what Lord Reid did in the Van der Lely case, they would 
have found that there was infringement. It seems that, according to Lord Diplock, if a 
                                                 
33
 At 244. 
34
 Brian Reid says Lord Diplock, in particular, “had a predilection towards the long word and convoluted 
phrase” and provides examples taken from Lord Diplock‟s other speeches (Reid Brian C (3rd ed)108). Brian 
Reid says that the Catnic question was subsequently redefined in simpler terms by the Patents Court in Improver 
Corporation v Consumer Products [1990] FSR 181 (Reid Brian C (3
rd
 ed) 109). This statement by Brian Reid 
supports the proposition made in this dissertation that Lord Diplock‟s Catnic test was confusing. 
35
 At 244. 
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construction would have the effect that the patentee‟s monopoly would for all 
practical purposes be worthless because somebody could take it and simply make 
some minor variation, then, generally speaking, the patentee could not be taken to 
have intended the variant to be an essential feature of his invention and, therefore, 
there would be infringement.
36
 What Lord Diplock said in this regard ran contrary to 
the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely 
because in Van der Lely the mere fact that the patentee had mentioned an integer in 
his claim was taken as a sufficient basis to justify the conclusion that he intended that 
feature to be an essential integer of his invention. 
 
[22] Lord Diplock went on to say that the expressions “horizontal”, “parallel”, “vertical” 
and “vertically”, when used by a geometer addressing himself to fellow geometers, 
could be understood as words of precision. However, when used in the description of 
a manufactured product intended to perform the practical function of a weight-bearing 
box girder in supporting courses of brickwork over window and door spaces in 
buildings, the expression “extending vertically” is descriptive of the position of what 
in use will be the upright member of a trapezoid-shaped box girder. Lord Diplock also 
said that it was capable of meaning positioned near enough to the exact geometrical 
vertical to enable it in actual use to perform satisfactorily all the functions that it could 
perform if it were precisely vertical. He then said that that was, in his view, the sense 
in which “extending vertically” would be understood by a builder who was familiar 




Lord Diplock said that another way of putting this would be to say that “[i]t would be 
obvious to [a builder familiar with ordinary building operations] that the patentee did 
not intend to make exact verticality in the positioning of the back plate an essential 
feature of the invention claimed.”38  
 
[23] Lord Diplock reached the same conclusion as the trial judge, namely, that there had 
been infringement. In Canadian patent law it has been said that the identification of 
elements of a patent claim as essential or non-essential is made: 
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 At 244 lines 15-17. 
37
 At 244 lines 19-31. 
38
 At 244. 
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(i) on the basis of the common knowledge of the worker skilled in the art to 
which the patent relates; 
(ii) as of the date the patent is published; 
(iii) having regard to whether or not it was obvious to the skilled reader at the 
time the patent was published that a variant of a particular element would 
not make a difference to the way in which the invention works; or 
(iv) according to the intent of the inventor, expressed or inferred from the 
claims, that a particular element is essential irrespective of its practical 
effect; and 
(v) without, however, resort to extrinsic evidence of the inventor‟s intention.39 
 
[24] The doctrine of purposive construction as advocated by Lord Diplock in Catnic is 
used for the determination of the essential features of a patent claim and not to 
provide a general tool of construction of a specification. That Lord Diplock advocated 
the adoption of purposive construction as a tool for the identification of the essential 
integers of a patent claim is supported by at least four sentences in his speech in 
Catnic. The first of those sentences is the one which Lord Diplock began with the 
words: “My Lords, a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee …” 
The second, third and fourth sentences are the three sentences that come immediately 
after that sentence. These four sentences read thus: 
 
“My Lords, a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words 
of his own choosing, …, by which he informs [those skilled in the art] what he claims 
to be the essential features of the new product or process for which the letters patent 
grant him a monopoly. It is those novel features only that he claims to be essential 
that constitute the so-called „pith and marrow‟ of the claim. A specification should be 
given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying 
to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by 
their training to indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with practical 
knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was intended to 
be used would understand that strict compliance with a particular descriptive word or 
phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential 
requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the monopoly 
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 Binnie J in Free World par 31. 
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claimed, even thought it could have no material effect upon the way the invention 
worked.”40 
 
[25] Dealing with the principles of construction of patent claims in Whirlpool
41
 Binnie J, 
inter alia, said: 
 
“The key to purposive construction is therefore the identification by the court, with 
the assistance of the skilled reader, of the particular words or phrases in the claims 
that describe what the inventor considered to be „essential‟ elements of his invention. 
This is no different, I think, than the approach adopted roughly 40 years earlier by 
Duff CJ in JK Smit and Sons Inc v McClintock [1940] SCR 279.”42 
 
 David Vaver says purposive construction reminds judges not to read patents too 
literally.
43
 He says purposive construction allows the brushing aside of technical 
objections so that specifications are construed “fairly with a judicial anxiety to 
support a really useful invention if it is can be supported on reasonable construction of 
the patent.”44 In support of this, Vaver cites Hinks and Son v Safety Lighting Co.45 
 
[26] It is suggested that the Canadian Supreme Court‟s first statement in the above 
quotation does not correctly reflect the Catnic test or purposive construction. In the 
statement the Canadian Supreme Court said that the Court identifies the particular 
words or phrases in the claims that describe what the inventor considered to be 
“essential” elements of his invention assisted by the skilled reader. The true Catnic 
approach is that it is the notional addressee who identifies such elements and not the 
Court. According to Binnie J in the Free World case the Catnic approach has been 
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 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 242 lines 44 to 243 line 11 (autor‟s emphasis). 
41
 Camco Inc and General Electric Company v Whirlpool Corporation and Inglis Ltd 2000 SCC 67 or [2000] 2 
SCR 1067. 
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 At par 45 in Whirlpool. 
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 Vaver David “Essentials of Canadian Law” (1997) Intellectual Property at 142. 
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 Vaver at 142-143. 
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 (1876) 4 Ch D 607 at 612. 
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Associates Ltd v Pacific Coilcoaters Ltd (1994) 29 IPR 635 (HC), and Swale v North Sails Ltd [1991]3 NZLR 
19 (HC). Binnie J says in Australia approval of the Catnic approach has been given in the case of Populin v HB 
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Chemical Service (Pty) Ltd (1986) 68 ALR 77 (Fred CT) (Gen Div.) at 92-93. Binnie J says in Hong Kong such 
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[27] It is suggested that, after the Rodi decision of the House of Lords, Lord Diplock 
realised that the approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow which had been applied 
by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in both the Van der Lely and the Rodi 
cases was wrong
47
 and sought to introduce a new way forward by way of the Catnic 
test and embraced the thrust of the Lord Reid approach to the doctrine. The reasons 
upon which this proposition is based are the following: 
 
(a) both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely and Rodi 
did not criticise the Lord Reid approach; 
(b) both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords did not deal in any way 
with the reasons given by Lord Evershed MR, Lord Reid and Lord Pearce 
for their approach to the doctrine of pith and marrow; 
(c) in Beecham, the first opportunity that Lord Diplock and the House of Lords 
got after its Rodi decision to continue using its model of the doctrine of pith 
and marrow, Lord Diplock and the House of Lords elected not to do so but, 
instead, elected to effectively apply the model or approach to the doctrine of 
pith and marrow which had been used by Lord Reid, Lord Evershed MR, 
and Lord Pearce in their dissents in Van der Lely and Rodi;  
(d) in Catnic Lord Diplock criticised an approach to the construction of patent 
claims that was “purely literal” and based on a “meticulous verbal analysis” 
in which he said lawyers were too often tempted by their training to 
indulge; a careful analysis of the English patent law jurisprudence before 
the Catnic decision reveals that the decisions that were most recent before 
Lord Diplock‟s Catnic decision in which such “purely literal” and 
“meticulous verbal analysis” approach was adopted were the majority 
decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in both Van der 
Lely and Rodi; this, therefore, means that in Catnic Lord Diplock criticised 
the Upjohn LJ approach but did not criticise the Lord Reid approach to the 
doctrine of pith and marrow; 
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 Pendleton also states that it has been argued that Catnic involved an implicit over-ruling by the House of 
Lords of its decisions in Van der Lely and Rodi (see Pendleton Michael “The Purposive Approach to Patent 
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(e) the dissents of Lord Reid and Lord Pearce in Rodi had spoken against the 
same approach to the construction of patens against which Lord Diplock 
spoke in Catnic, namely, one that is “purely literal”, one that is marked by 
the meticulousness associated with conveyancing and other legal 
documents and one that is “alphabetical” and concerned itself with words 
and not with essentials; 
(f) in Catnic Lord Diplock did not criticise the Lord Reid approach nor did he 
criticise the conclusions reached by Lord Reid and Lord Pearce in their 
speeches in Van der Lely and Rodi and the reasons each one gave for his 
conclusion; 
(g) in Beecham and Catnic, Lord Diplock adopted some of the reasoning that 
Lord Reid had used in Van der Lely and Rodi to reach the conclusions that 
he had reached in his two dissents in those cases; and 
(h) if Lord Diplock was in disagreement with the Lord Reid approach after 
Rodi, he would not have used it in his Beecham speech nor would he have 
failed to criticise it in Catnic.  
 
[28] In the 3
rd
 edition of his work published in 1999 Brian C Reid has said that the 
correlation of Catnic with Rodi, given that both cases were decided under the 1949 
Patent Act of the UK, is as yet to be clarified.
48
 It is suggested that this dissertation 
provides the clarification not only of the correlation of Catnic with Rodi, but also that 
of Catnic with a number of other important decisions of the English Courts on the 
issue of the determination of patent infringement handed down during the last half of 
the 20
th
 century, particularly Van der Lely, Rodi, Beecham and Catnic. In other words, 
this dissertation responds to the issue raised by Reid and provides the clarification 
needed on the issue, and more. 
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7 SPECIAL COMMENTARY ON THE CATNIC DECISION 
 
[1] According to Lord Diplock the test for determining the essentiality or otherwise of an 
integer or feature of an invention has as its basis the intention of the patentee. What is 
important is to establish that intention. However, that intention is not established in 
the same way that a court establishes the intention of parties to a contract when it 
interprets a contract nor is it established in the same way that a court establishes the 
intention of the legislature when it interprets a statute on the basis of the doctrine of 
intentionalism. According to Lord Diplock in Catnic the Court does not read the 
patent claims and make up its own mind about whether or not the patentee intended a 
particular feature in an invention to be an essential integer. The reason why the Court 
does not establish the patentee‟s intention in this way is that the specification is 
addressed to a certain category of persons and, in formulating the claims in the terms 
that the patentee formulates them, it is said that he would have expected the persons to 
whom he was addressing the claims to understand them in a certain way. He would 
also be entitled to assume that such people had a certain amount of knowledge of the 
field in which his invention would be utilised.  
 
[2] To establish the patentee‟s intention, the Court brings in a “middle” man. That is a 
person who comes from the class of persons to whom the patentee was addressing the 
claims. That is a person with practical knowledge and experience in the field in which 
the invention is intended to be used. The Court asks the question: would a person with 
practical knowledge and experience in the relevant field understand that the patentee 
intended that strict compliance with the descriptive word or phrase in the claim would 
be an essential requirement with the result that any variant would fall outside the 
monopoly claimed by him even if the variant could not have any material effect upon 
the working of the invention? If the answer is that such a person would understand 
that the patentee did not so intend, then strict compliance with such descriptive word 
or phrase in the claim is not an essential requirement of the invention and, therefore, 
there is infringement of the patented invention. If the answer is that such a person 
would understand that the patentee did intend that there be strict compliance with 
such descriptive word or phrase in the claim, the feature is an essential requirement of 
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the invention and the variant does not infringe the patent.
1
 That is because, if the 
accused device is without one of the essential integers of the patented invention, that 
is enough to take the accused product or process out of the claims of the patent and 
this means that the accused device is not an infringement. 
 
[3] Before dealing with the next issue that Lord Diplock mentions in this regard, it is 
important to remember what, according to Lord Diplock, the question is in each case. 
According to Lord Diplock the question in each case is: 
 
“Whether persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in 
which the invention was intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance 
with a particular descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended was 
intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the invention so that any 
variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed, even though it could not have any 
material effect upon the way the invention worked?”2 
 
Lord Diplock said that this question would only be answered in the negative when it 
would be apparent to a reader skilled in the art that such a descriptive word or phrase 
could not have been intended to exclude minor variants which would have no material 
effect upon the working of the invention.
3
 An answer in the negative to the above 
question would be an answer that says: No, persons with practical knowledge and 
experience would not understand that the patentee intended strict compliance with the 
particular word or phrase to be an essential requirement for the invention even if the 
variant would have no material effect upon the way the invention worked! Lord 
Diplock said that that answer could only be given “when it would be apparent to a 
reader skilled in the art that such a descriptive word or phrase could not have been 
intended to exclude minor variants which would have no material effect upon the way 
that the invention worked?”4 
 
[4] It is suggested that what Lord Diplock meant on this last point is this: After putting 
the question framed above but before answering it, there is another question that you 
must ask. That is: would it be apparent to a reader skilled in the art that the particular 
                                                 
1
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 241. 
2
 Lord Diplock at 243 lines 5-11. 
3
 Catnic at 243 lines 18-24. 
4
 Catnic at 243 lines 18-24. 
184 
 
descriptive word or phrase could not have been intended to exclude minor variants 
from the monopoly claimed? If the answer to this subsidiary question is: yes, it would 
be apparent to the reader skilled in the art that the descriptive word or phrase could 
not have been intended to exclude minor variants from the monopoly claimed, there is 
infringement. It stands to reason that, if the answer is: No, it would not be apparent to 
the reader skilled in the art that the descriptive word or phrase could have been 
intended to exclude minor variants, then there is no infringement. 
 
[5] Lord Diplock said the question of whether persons with practical knowledge and 
experience in the relevant art would understand the patentee to have intended that 
strict compliance with a descriptive word or phrase was to be an essential feature of 
the invention does not arise where the variant would in fact have a material effect 
upon the way the invention worked. Lord Diplock then went on to say in the next 
sentence: 
 
“Nor does it arise unless at the date of publication of the specification it would be 
obvious to the informed reader that this was so”.5  
 
The sentence just quoted above is the second sentence in that paragraph. The first 
sentence means that, if the variant would, as a matter of fact, have a material effect on 
the way the invention worked, the question of whether the patentee had intended such 
variant to be part of the monopoly does not arise and that variant does not constitute 
an infringement. This is in line with the principle that the doctrine of “pith and 
marrow” only applies to those cases where the variant is unessential. It would, 
therefore, seem
6
 from the first sentence in the second paragraph of page 243 of the 
Catnic judgment that Lord Diplock said that, if the variant would, objectively 
speaking, have a material effect on the working of the invention, no infringement 
occurred. 
 
[6] What happens if it would be obvious to the informed reader at the date of publication 
of the specification that the variant would have a material effect on the way the 
                                                 
5
 Catnic at 243. The sentence that is to the effect that the question does not arise where the variant would in fact 
have a material effect upon the working of the invention is the 1
st
 sentence of the 2
nd
 paragraph at 243 of the 
judgment. 
6
 See the 1
st
 sentence in the 2
nd
 par at 243 of the Catnic judgment. 
185 
 
invention worked? The answer to this question is in the second sentence of the second 
paragraph at 243 of the Catnic judgment. The answer is that, if it would be obvious to 
the informed reader at the date of publication of the specification that the variant 
would have a material effect upon the way the invention worked, the question of what 
the understanding of the informed reader would be as to whether the patentee 
intended that there be strict compliance with the descriptive word or phrase would not 
arise. The reason why it would not arise is because the patentee would obviously also 
have intended that such a variant would fall outside the monopoly that he sought to be 
granted in respect of his invention. 
 
[7] What if it would not have been obvious to the informed reader, in the light of the then 
existing knowledge, that the variant would have a material effect upon the way the 
invention worked? The answer to this question is to be found in the third sentence of 
the third paragraph at 243 of the Catnic judgment. That is that, if it would not have 
been obvious to the informed reader that the variant would in fact have a material 
effect on the way the invention worked, according to Lord Diplock the informed 
reader is entitled to assume that the patentee intended to limit his monopoly so strictly 
and had a good reason to do so even though subsequent work by him or others in the 




[8] The last sentence of the second paragraph at 243 deals with when the relevant 
question should be answered in the negative. The relevant question here is whether 
persons with practical knowledge and experience in the relevant art would understand 
the patentee to have intended strict compliance with the descriptive word or phrase to 
be an essential requirement of the invention. It reads: 
 
“It is to be answered in the negative only when it would be apparent to any reader 
skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim cannot 
have been intended by a patentee who was also skilled in the art, to exclude minor 
variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the readers to whom the patent was 
addressed, could have no material effect upon the way in which the invention 
worked”.8 
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This is an extremely long sentence. However, all it means is that, where it would be 
apparent to any reader skilled in the art that the patentee could not have intended to 
exclude the variant from his monopoly, the answer must be that persons with practical 
knowledge and experience in the relevant field would not understand that the patentee 
intended that strict compliance with the descriptive word or phrase should be an 
essential feature of the monopoly with the result that any variant would fall outside 
the monopoly claimed. That would be an answer in the negative to the question and 
that would mean that there is infringement. 
 
[9] The following additional points or observations can be made about Lord Diplock‟s 
speech in Catnic: 
 
(a) that part of Lord Diplock‟s speech in which he considered the issues on 
appeal before the House of Lords as opposed to setting out the history and 
background of the case and the decisions of the earlier Courts which had 
dealt with the matter is brief; it comprises only a few paragraphs starting 
with the words “My Lords, in their closely reasoned written cases in this 
House …”.9 He considered the principles of construction in that paragraph 
and the next two paragraphs. After that he sought to apply the principles to 
the facts of the case. He did this in the following five paragraphs. The 
famous passages from Lord Diplock‟s speech that have been quoted in 
various jurisdictions including South Africa, Canada and the USA are to be 
found in the second half of page 242 and the first half of page 243 of the 
judgment. 
(b) Subject to what will be said later herein, there is no difficulty with the main 
question that Lord Diplock said would have to be asked in every case. That 
is the question whether persons with practical knowledge and experience in 
the relevant field would understand the patentee to have intended that strict 
compliance with the descriptive word or phrase would be an essential 
requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the 
monopoly claimed. There is also no difficulty with the statement to the 
                                                 
9
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 242. 
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effect that this question does not arise where the variant would in fact have 
a material effect upon the way the invention worked. 
(c) One part of Lord Diplock‟s speech which is problematic is the one in which 
he said that a patent specification is a statement by the patentee “by which 
he informs” those skilled in the art “what he claims to be the essential 
features of the new product or process for which the letters patent grant him 
a monopoly”, and that “It is those novel features only that he claims to be 
essential that constitute the so-called „pith and marrow‟ of the claim”.10 The 
difficulty with this part of Lord Diplock‟s speech is in the formulation of 
those two sentences. They are formulated in a way that gives the impression 
that everything that is mentioned in a claim by a patentee is something he 
intends to be an essential feature of his invention and that there are no 
features contained in a claim which the patentee would not intend to be 
essential integers. The fact of the matter is that there will be such features in 
a claim. Once that is factored into the interpretation of a claim, the task of 
interpreting a claim will be more balanced and will be based upon an 
acknowledgement that there are features or integers which the patentee 
intended to be essential integers of his invention and there are others which 
he would not be intending to be essential integers. 
(d) Another part that is problematic in Lord Diplock‟s speech is the third 
sentence of the second paragraph at 243. That is the sentence which deals 
with what should happen if it would not have been obvious to the informed 
reader that the variant would have a material effect upon the way the 
invention worked. That sentence says that in such a case the reader is 
entitled to assume that the patentee thought at the time of the specification 
that he had a good reason for limiting his monopoly so strictly that such a 
variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed. The difficulty with the 
approach contained in this sentence is that, without any justification or 
warrant, it facilitates the escape from liability of an infringer whose variant 
may otherwise fall within the monopoly. Lord Diplock advanced no reason 
why in such a case the patentee must be assumed to have deliberately 
                                                 
10
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 242 lines 44 to 243 line 3. 
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wanted to exclude such a variant from his monopoly. It is suggested that the 
better approach would be to say that, if the defendant‟s apparatus or process 
is the same as the invention of the patentee and falls within the patentee‟s 
claims except for an immaterial difference, there would be infringement 
but, if the difference is a material difference, there would be no 
infringement of the patentee‟s patent. In either case any inquiry into what 
the patentee intended or did not intend should be irrelevant. 
(e) Lord Diplock said that a patent specification should be given a purposive 
construction rather than a purely literal one derived from applying to it the 
kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted 
by their training to indulge. A superficial reading of this sentence may give 
the impression that Lord Diplock was advocating an approach to 
interpretation that would ignore the literal meaning of words used in a 
claim. However, he said no such thing. He was simply against an approach 
that was too literal. 
(f) It is to be noted that in those paragraphs of his speech in which Lord 
Diplock dealt with the construction of claims, he only referred to the Van 
der Lely, Rodi and the Beecham Group cases. The Catnic decision was 
handed down in 1980. At that time there was case law stretching over a 
period of at least a century during which the Courts, including the House of 
Lords, had given judgments dealing with what the correct approach to adopt 
was in dealing with cases of infringement by the pith and marrow. These 
included cases such as Marconi, Birmingham, Beecham, Lord Reid‟s 
judgment in Van der Lely and in Rodi, Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment in 
Van der Lely and Lord Pearce‟s judgment in Rodi in the House of Lords. 
The approach which was used as at that time was different from the 
approach that Lord Diplock advocated and yet he did not refer to those 
cases, let alone discuss them and say what was wrong with the approach 
that the Courts had followed for so long. He should have given reasons why 




[10] In a number of cases it had been said that, where the defendant‟s apparatus was 
different in one or other respect from the description in the claim of the patentee‟s 
invention, the question to ask to determine whether there was infringement of the pith 
and marrow of the patented invention was whether the defendant‟s apparatus or 
process was the same in substance as that of the patentee and whether it worked in 
substantially the same way to produce substantially the same result. It was said that, if 
the answer to this question was yes, then there was infringement but, if the answer 
either to all or anyone of the elements of the question was no, then there was no 
infringement. Lord Diplock did not say what he saw as wrong with that approach to 
justify abandoning it. It is suggested that it was a simple and straightforward approach 
that was flexible enough to strike a fair balance between the need for certainty for the 
public and the need for the protection of the patentee‟s monopoly. Instead, Lord 
Diplock advocated an approach that was cumbersome, complicated and confusing 
which brought about, it is suggested, much uncertainty that would have been avoided 
if he had followed the approach that had been followed by all the Courts in the UK for 
over a century. 
 
[11] In the Court of Appeal in Catnic, Buckley LJ set out a number of “generalisations”,11 
as he called them, which, it is suggested, are like principles to be followed in the 
determination of what is and what is not an essential feature of a patented invention. 
Some of the principles set out by Buckley LJ are similar to those set out by Lord 
Diplock in Catnic but the principles set out by Buckley LJ are clear and simple and 
cannot result in confusion or uncertainty. Since it was Buckley LJ‟s judgment that 
was on appeal in the House of Lords in Catnic, it is not apparent why Lord Diplock 
shied away from following the same principles
12
 that Buckley LJ set out, nor is it 
apparent what it was that he found wrong with Buckley LJ‟s principles. Buckley LJ 
set out four principles. They were the following: 
 
(1) If that feature of the claim which is under consideration is in fact essential 
to the working of the claimed invention, then it must be an essential feature 
of the claim. 
                                                 
11
 Buckley LJ in Catnic at 228 lines 9-30. 
12
 Buckley LJ set those principles out at 228 Lines 9-30 
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(2) If the feature is not in fact essential to the working of the claimed invention, 
the applicant for a patent may nevertheless have made it an essential feature 
of the claim, that is to say, he may by the terms of the claim as properly 
construed have clearly limited his claim to a subject matter having that 
feature. If so, that feature will be an essential feature of the claim and 
anyone who makes a product or carries out a process which has all the 
features of the claim except that particular feature will not infringe the 
claim. 
(3) Not all claims are perfectly drafted. Sometimes a draftsman may include 
some feature in a claim, either explicitly or by implication, which is not in 
fact essential to the working of the claimed invention and which the 
applicant has not by the terms of his specification and claim clearly 
indicated as a feature which he regards as an essential feature of his 
monopoly. In such a case an alleged infringer may be held to have infringed 
the claim notwithstanding that his product or process does not incorporate 
the feature in question or substitutes some equivalent for it. 
(4) The fact that a claim incorporates a particular feature does not alone suffice 
to make that feature an essential one. If this were not so, no feature of a 
claim could ever be inessential, but the speeches in Rodi and Wienenberger 




For convenience these four principles will be referred to as the BLJ principles. In this 
instance the letters BLJ stand for Buckley LJ. 
 
[12] The first of the BLJ principles corresponds with the principle contained in the first 
sentence of the second paragraph at 243 of Lord Diplock‟s speech in the House of 
Lords in Catnic. There is not a certain correspondence between the rest of the BLJ 
principles and the rest of the statements of Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic.14 
However, in other parts of his speech Buckley LJ did make statements which seem to 
be to the same effect as some of the statements to be found in Lord Diplock‟s speech. 
                                                 
13
 Buckley LJ in Catnic at 228 lines 9-30. 
14
 At 242-244. 
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Buckley LJ said that “(t)o determine whether a claim of a patent has been infringed 
one must first discover what is claimed”:15 He went on to say: 
 
“The claim must be construed and analysed to ascertain what are the features – 
sometimes called the integers – of the subject matter for which a monopoly is 
claimed. The claim must be construed in the context of the specification as a whole 
and in the light of any admissible evidence. It must be read and interpreted as it 
would be read and interpreted by the notional addressee of the specification, that is to 
say, a man skilled in the relevant art who has at his disposal the common knowledge 
in the art at the date of the publication of the specification. When so construed the 
claim must be analysed to discover what are the several features of the thing for 
which a monopoly is claimed. One must next consider the alleged infringement to 
determine whether it infringes the claim. If the alleged infringement of the claim has 
all the features of the claim it must infringe the claim, even if it also incorporates 
other features. If it lacks one of the features of the claim, it may or may not infringe 
the claim. If the feature which is lacking is an essential feature of the claim, there will 
be no infringement; but, if the feature which is lacking is an inessential feature of the 
claim, the fact that it is wholly omitted from the alleged infringement or is replaced 
by some equivalent, will not save the alleged infringement from being an 
infringement, for, if it has all the essential features of the claim, it will infringe the 
claim notwithstanding the omission or substitution of an inessential feature.”16 
 
[13] It will be noticed that in the passage quoted above Buckley LJ said that a claim “must 
be read and interpreted as it would be read and interpreted by the notional addressee 
of the specification, that is, to say, a man skilled in the relevant art who has at his 
disposal the common knowledge in that art at the date of the publication of the 
specification”.17 This seems to be substantially the same as what Lord Diplock said18 
in relation to the person whose interpretation must be used to construe a claim. The 
difference between the two is simply that in respect of the qualifications of the 
addressee Buckley LJ referred to such person being “skilled” in the relevant art 
whereas Lord Diplock referred to someone who has “practical knowledge and 
experience” in the relevant art. The two persons do not necessarily have the same 
qualifications. 
 
[14] One of the criticisms levelled at Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic above is to the 
effect that the approach that he advocated on how to establish the intention of the 
                                                 
15
 Buckley LJ in Catnic at 225 line 19-20. 
16
 Buckley LJ in Catnic at 225 lines 20-39. 
17
 Buckley LJ in Catnic at 225 lines 23-27. 
18
 At 243 lines 5-11 Catnic. 
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patentee gives the impression that the contents of a claim consists only of the essential 
features of the invention whereas they also include unessential features. It is 
interesting to note that Buckley LJ warned against such an approach.
19
 There Buckley 
LJ said: 
 
“The fact that a claim incorporates a particular feature does not alone suffice to make 
that feature an essential one. If this were not so, no feature of a claim could ever be 
inessential… .”20 
 
In fact Sir David Cairns said the same thing in his separate judgment in the Court of 
Appeal in Catnic. He put it thus: 
 
“Since the cases recognise a difference between textual infringement and 
infringement of the pith and marrow, it must follow that the mention of a particular 
feature in the claim is not sufficient to make that feature essential”.21 
 
[15] In fact that approach was set out as the correct approach in Birmingham
22
 which was 
quoted in the judgment of the Court of first instance in Catnic, namely, in Whitford 
J‟s judgment. In Birmingham it was said in the relevant passage: 
 
“The question therefore appears to be whether the allegedly infringing apparatus 
consists of substantially the same parts acting upon each other in substantially the 
same way as the apparatus claimed as constituting the invention”.23  
 
As this approach had been included in Whitford J‟s judgment, it is even more 
puzzling why Lord Diplock said absolutely nothing about it in his judgment before 
adopting the new approach in Catnic. In fact even in the judgment of Waller LJ in the 
Court of Appeal in Catnic, Waller LJ did refer to what was said in Adie‟s case where 
James LJ, inter alia, said: 
 
“and that invention like every other invention may be pirated by a theft in a disguised 
or mutilated form and it will be in every case a question of fact whether the alleged 
                                                 
19
 Catnic in the Court of Appeal at 228 lines 26-28 which is the fourth of the BLJ principles. 
20
 Buckley LJ in the Court of Appeal in Catnic at 228 lines 26-30. 
21
 Sir David Cairns in the Court of Appeal in Catnic at 235 lines 43-45. 
22
 [1956] RPC 232 at 245. 
23
 Whiford J in Catnic at 214. 
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piracy is the same in substance and effect or is a substantially new or different 
combinationé”.24 
 
[16] Sir David Cairns said that he could find nothing in the wording of the claim in Catnic 
or in the specification as a whole to suggest that a strictly vertical back member was 
an essential feature of the invention. Hitchman and MacOdrum express the view that 
Lord Diplock‟s admonition to give claims a purposive construction did not mean that 
the other established principles relating to the claims were to be disregarded. They say 







 has expressed the view that the adjective “purposive” in “purposive 
construction” as used in Lord Diplock‟ speech in Catnic is to be equated with the 
more common and understandable word “reasonable” or as he puts it its synonym 
“sensible”: In support of this statement, Burrell cites the decision of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, as the Supreme Court of Appeal was then called, in 
Stauffer Chemic and Co and Another v Safson Marketing and Distribution Co (Pty) 
Ltd
27
 and the authorities there cited. This proposition by Burrell is consistent with: 
 
(a) Lord Diplock‟s statement in Antonios Campania Naviera SA v Salen 
Raderierna AB
28
 where Lord Diplock, using in effect purposive 
construction to construe a charter party, too that opportunity of restating 
that if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial 
contract was going to lead to a conclusion that fainted business common 
sense. It had to be made yield to business common sense. 
 
(b) The statement made by Lord Hoffmann in Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoecht 
Marion Roussell Ltd,
29
 within the context of a discussion of purposive 
construction, that construction is objective in the sense that it is concerned 
                                                 
24
 Waller LJ at 232 lines 15-21. 
25
 See Hitchman and MacOdrum at 202. 
26
 Burrell Tim South African Patent Law and Practice (1986) (2
nd
 ed) at 246. 
27
 1986 BP 462 (A) at 480C. 
28
 (1985) AC 191 at 201. 
29
 (2005) 1 All ER 169 (HL) at par 32. 
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with what a reasonable person to whom the utterance was addressed would 
have understood the author to use the words to mean. 
 
(c) The statement made by Lord Denning MR in James Buchanan and Co Ltdv 
Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK)
30
 that the European judges, when 
interpreting an instrument, “ask simply: what is the sensible way of dealing 
with this situation so as to give effect to the presumed purpose of the 
legislation?” 
 
(d) The view expressed by Zondo JP in his minority judgment in Equity 





(e) The view expressed by Mureinik that purposive interpretation enjoins a 
reader to prefer the construction that makes sense of the statue as a whole; 
Mureinik also said that purposive interpretation seeks the construction that 




(f) The view expressed by Lord Hoffmann, which was concurred in by the 
majority in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Brownwich 
Building Society
33
 in explaining what in effect was purposive construction 
of contracts, that any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life 
and that “interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the 
document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background 
knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the 
situation in which they were at the time of contract”.34 
 
(g) The fact that, within the context of applying the Catnic approach in 
Wheatley (Davina) v Drillsafe Ltd,
35
 Aldious LJ said that “It is reasonable 
to infer, absent express words to the contrary, that the patentee intended to 
                                                 
30
 [1977] 1 All ER 518 (CA).  
31
 (2009) 30 ILJ 1997 (LAC) at par 65. 
32
 Mureinik: “Administrative Law in South Africa” (1986) SALJ 615 at 620. 
33
 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Brownwich Building Society, The Weekly Law Reports 22 May 
1998 at 896. 
34
 See Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Brownwich Building Society, The Weekly 
Law Reports 22 May 1988 896 at 912H. 
35
 [2001] RPC 7 at 23. 
195 
 
include within his monopoly that can be termed immaterial variant was not 
intended to be within ambit of the monopoly....”.36 
                                                 
36





8 HOW THE CATNIC TEST CAME TO REPLACE THE DOCTRINE OF PITH AND 
MARROW IN ENGLISH PATENT LAW 
 
[1] The question which arises is: why did Lord Diplock decide to replace the doctrine of 
pith and marrow in the first place and, in the second place, why he decided to replace 
it with the Catnic test. To answer this question one needs to understand what 
happened in the various stages of the Van der Lely case and the Rodi case and to 
analyse Beecham‟s case and Catnic. This includes understanding the composition of 
the panel of the Judges and Law Lords in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases at different 
levels, particularly in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords. 
 
[2] The composition of the panels in the Chancery Division, Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases was as follows: 
 
 Van der Lely case    The Rodi Case  
 
Chancery Division: 1960   Chancery Division 
Lloyd-Jacob J 1960    Lloyd-Jacob J 1965 
 
Court of Appeal: 1961   Court of Appeal: 1965 
 Lord Evershed MR    Harman LJ 
 Upjohn LJ     Diplock LJ 
 Pearson LJ     Winn LJ 
  
House of Lords: 1962   House of Lords: 1968 
 Lord Reid     Lord Reid 
 Viscount Radcliffe    Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest  
 Lord Jenkins     Lord Hodson  
 Lord Hodson     Lord Pearce 




[3] From the above one can see that in 1961, when the Court of Appeal decided the Van 
der Lely case, Upjohn LJ was part of the panel which decided that case. In fact he 
delivered the majority judgment which was a judgment of himself and Pearson LJ in 
the Van der Lely case in terms of which they found that there was no infringement. 
Lord Evershed MR delivered a dissent in which he found that there was infringement. 
As it was pointed out earlier in the discussion of Upjohn LJ‟s judgment, he and 
Pearson LJ found that the doctrine of pith and marrow was of no application in the 
case and concluded that the patentees had chosen to confine their monopoly in a 
manner which allowed the alleged infringer to produce the apparatus that it did. Their 
approach was almost exclusively focussed on the language of the claims and they 
made no reference whatsoever to the rule on immaterial variations. They did not even 
consider whether the variant chosen by the alleged infringer was of any practical 
significance or had any material effect on the functioning of the invention. Indeed, 
they did not deal with the reasons given by Lord Evershed MR in his dissent for the 
contrary conclusion that he reached.  
 
[4] It is suggested that Lloyd-Jacob J‟s judgment in the Chancery Division in Van der 
Lely was the first judgment which opened the way to the Upjohn LJ approach. 
Thereafter, the judgment of Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the Court of Appeal 
followed the approach to the determination of patent infringement and the doctrine of 
pith and marrow that was initiated by Lloyd-Jacob J in Van der Lely. It is suggested 
that Upjohn LJ‟s and Pearson LJ‟s judgment was the first judgment of the Court of 
Appeal to adopt the Upjohn LJ approach. When the Van der Lely case went on appeal 
to the House of Lords, the majority of the panel in the House of Lords upheld Upjohn 
LJ and Pearson LJ and even approved their understanding of the doctrine of pith and 
marrow, thus producing another one of the judgments which were based upon a 
wrong understanding of the doctrine of pith and marrow. Particular note must be 
taken of the fact that Lord Reid, who gave a dissent in the Van der Lely case in the 
House of Lords, and, Lord Hodson, were members of the panel which heard the 
appeal in the Van der Lely matter in the House of Lords. Lord Reid found that there 
was infringement of claim 11 whereas Lord Hodson found that there was no 
infringement of that claim. It is important to also point out that the majority 
effectively adopted the same approach as Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the Court of 
Appeal and that Lord Reid adopted a different approach which, it is suggested, 
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revealed the correct understanding of the determination of patent infringement and the 
doctrine of pith and marrow. The approach adopted by Lord Reid in the House of 
Lords in Van der Lely was effectively the same as the approach reflected in Lord 
Evershed MR‟s dissent in the Court of Appeal.  
 
[5] As indicated above, the Court of Appeal decided the Van der Lely matter in 1961 and 
the House of Lords decided the appeal in 1962. Three years thereafter, namely in 
1965, the Rodi matter came before Lloyd-Jacob J in the Chancery Division. Lloyd-
Jacob J had also decided the Van der Lely matter in the Chancery Division. He found 
in the Rodi matter that there was infringement of the plaintiffs‟ patent by the 
defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59. This was interesting because the Van der Lely case was 
a clearer case for infringement than was the Rodi matter and in the Van der Lely 
matter he had found no infringement. It is also very interesting that in Rodi Lloyd-
Jacob J neither referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal nor to that of the 
House of Lords in Van der Lely. What is even more interesting is that he specifically 
referred to Lord Reid‟s speech in the House of Lords in the Van der Lely matter. In 
fact he referred to it as if it was the majority decision. Lloyd-Jacob J made the 
reference to Lord Reid‟s speech in the following terms: 
 
“But if a finding of non-infringement is to be justified the court must additionally be 
satisfied that the substance of the invention claimed, the pith and marrow of it, in 
Lord Cairns‟ phrase, has not been appropriated by the defendants, for the House of 
Lords has recently re-affirmed that the court should not permit a patent monopoly to 
be avoided by what, in the language of Lord Reid, may constitute sharp practice (see 
Van der Lely v Bamfords Ltd [1963] RPC 61)”.1  
 
Ironically, the majority decision of the House of Lords in Van der Lely effectively 
made such avoidance very easy.  
 
[6] Furthermore, when one reads Lloyd-Jacobs J‟s judgment in Rodi and one reads Lord 
Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely it seems very clear that Lloyd-Jacob J did not apply the 
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely but 
                                                 
1
 Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi at 458 line 47 to 459 line 2. Lloyd-Jacob J is not the only one who treated Lord Reid‟s 
dissent in the Van der Lely matter as if it was the majority decision of the House of Lords. Catherine NG also 
did so in the article: “The Purpose of Purposive Construction” (2000-2001) Intellectual Property Journal 1 at 2. 
Fox also seems to have treated Lord Reid‟s dissenting judgment in the House of Lords in Van der Lely as if it 
was the majority decision. See Fox Canadian Patent Law and Practice (1969) (5
th




in effect applied the approach adopted by Lord Reid in his dissent. It is difficult to 
resist the temptation to think that Lloyd-Jacob J, despite the fact that he, too, had 
found no infringement in Van der Lely, had subsequently been persuaded that Lord 
Reid‟s dissent in Van der Lely was right and that the majorities in both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords were wrong. That would explain why reference to any 
of those decisions is conspicuous by its absence in his judgment. That also explains 
why he referred to Lord Reid‟s dissent in the terms in which he did. Indeed, it is 
suggested that Lloyd-Jacob J played a very important role in the abandonment of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow.  
 
[7] Through his judgment in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely, Lloyd-Jacob J 
initiated an approach to the determination of patent infringement and the doctrine of 
pith and marrow which, once approved by the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords in Van der Lely later effectively put the final nail in the coffin of the doctrine of 
pith and marrow in English patent law and yet he was also the first one, after the 
House of Lords‟ decision in Van der Lely, to turn his back on that approach and 
effectively adopted the approach of the dissenters. He did this in his judgment in Rodi 
in the Chancery Division. Although his new direction was initially not followed by 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the Rodi matter, it was ultimately 
followed by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Beecham. It was when the 
Beecham case came before the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords that the Court 
of Appeal and the House of Lords turned their backs on the Upjohn LJ approach and 
embraced the Lord Reid approach. 
 
[8] The appeal from the judgment of Lloyd-Jacob J in Rodi to the Court of Appeal was 
heard in 1965. The three Judges who heard the appeal, namely, Harman LJ, Diplock 
LJ and Winn LJ, all gave separate judgments, but all found that the defendants‟ 
EXCALIBUR 59 did not infringe the patentee‟s patent. In their separate judgments 
neither Harman LJ nor Diplock LJ made any reference to the rule of patent law on 
immaterial variations. In his judgment, Harman LJ referred to the Van der Lely case 
which he said was “a striking example” of the proposition that, “once you find that an 
essential element of the patented invention is not found in the rival machine, the latter 
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does not infringe the former.” 2 Harman LJ then proceeded to say of the Van der Lely 
case: 
 
“The change from displacing the hindmost wheels of the hayrake to that of displacing 
the foremost wheels seem[s] to be a merely mechanical alteration: nevertheless the 
claim for infringement failed”.3 
 
In this passage Harman LJ seems to have taken the view that Lord Reid was probably 
right in his conclusion in Van der Lely and the majority in the Court of Appeal and in 
the House of Lords probably not right.  
 
[9] In his judgment Diplock LJ accepted Upjohn LJ‟s approach in the Van der Lely matter 
in the Court of Appeal, which had subsequently been approved by the majority in the 
House of Lords as being the correct approach. Diplock LJ said in this regard: 
 
“The law as to principles of construction of claims in specifications in the modern 
form seems to me so laid down clearly and authoritatively in the judgment of Upjohn 
LJ in Van der Lely v Bamfords Ltd [1961] RPC 296 at 312, which was approved by 
the majority of the House of Lords on appeal: [1963] RPC 61”.4 
 
The effect of the above statement by Diplock LJ was that he accepted as correct 
Upjohn LJ‟s understanding of the doctrine of pith and marrow and how it was to be 
applied. Diplock LJ, like Upjohn LJ in the Van der Lely matter, decided the issue of 
non-textual infringement with no regard to the rule of patent law on immaterial 
variations and no regard to the question whether or not the variant added any value or 
was of any practical significance. He did not refer to or in any way discuss Lord 
Evershed MR‟s dissent in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely. Diplock LJ also did 
not refer to the Marconi judgment or the Birmingham judgment which had discussed 
the doctrine of pith and marrow. In his defence it may be said that there was no need 
for him to refer to or discuss such judgments in the light of the then recent judgment 
of Upjohn LJ in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely which had just received the 
House of Lords‟ “imprimatur”. Winn LJ did refer in his judgment to the judgment of 
                                                 
2
 Harman LJ in Rodi at 465 lines 10-15. 
3
 Herman LJ in Rodi at 465 lines 15-17. 
4
 Diplock LJ in Rodi at 467 lines 17-21. 
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the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely. He made no reference to the rule on immaterial 
variations. 
 
[10] The Rodi matter came before the House of Lords in 1967 and the decision was handed 
down early in 1968. In the meantime Upjohn LJ, who had written the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal in Van der Lely which had been approved by the House of Lords, had 
been promoted to the House of Lords. The panel that heard the Rodi appeal in the 
House of Lords consisted of Lord Reid, who had given a dissent in the House of 
Lords in Van der Lely, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, who had never been involved in 
the Van der Lely matter at any stage, Lord Hodson, who had concurred in the majority 
speech of Viscount Radcliffe in the House of Lords in Van der Lely, Lord Pearce, 
who had not been involved in any way in the Van der Lely matter and Lord Upjohn. 
So two of the Law Lords in the panel had already adopted the Upjohn LJ approach to 
the determination of patent infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow. One 
had already adopted the Lord Reid approach to the doctrine which, it is suggested, 
was the correct understanding of the doctrine. That is Lord Reid. Two of the Law 
Lords had not had any involvement in the Van der Lely case. Those were Lord Morris 
and Lord Pearce. Which way the House of Lords was going to go was to depend upon 
the views taken by the two Law Lords who had had no prior involvement in the Van 
der Lely case.  
 
[11] As it turned out Lord Reid stuck to the approach he had adopted in his dissent in Van 
der Lely. Lord Upjohn and Lord Hodson stuck to the Upjohn LJ approach. Lord 
Pearce wrote a separate speech in which he adopted the same approach as Lord Reid. 
Lord Morris came to the same conclusion as Lord Upjohn and his judgment proved 
decisive against the Lord Reid approach. The result of the appeal in the Rodi matter in 
the House of Lords was that the appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
was dismissed by a majority of 3 to 2. The minority, consisting of Lord Reid and Lord 
Pearce, would have upheld the appeal. The majority was continuing in its adherence 
to the Upjohn LJ approach. As stated earlier, in Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J had turned his 
back on the Upjohn LJ approach but the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in 
Rodi did not follow him as they had done in the Van der Lely matter. The Upjohn LJ 
approach, followed once again by the House of Lords in Rodi, confirmed the closure 
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of any avenue for the application of the doctrine of pith and marrow in English patent 
law. 
 
[12] Viscount Radcliffe‟s speech adopted the same approach as that adopted by Upjohn LJ 
and Pearson LJ in the Court of Appeal. He looked at the language of the specification 
to see whether the patentee had not, by the manner in which he had framed his claim 
in fact left room for the infringer to do what he did. He refused to inquire into whether 
or not the variant added any value or whether it made any practical difference. He 
said: 
 
 “When, therefore, one speaks of theft or piracy of another‟s invention or says that it 
has been „taken‟ by an alleged infringer and this „pith and marrow‟ principle is 
invoked to support the accusations, I think that one must be very careful to see that 
the inventor has not by the form of his claim left open to the world the appropriation 
of just that property that he says has been filched from him by piracy or theft. After 
all it is he who has committed himself to the unequivocal description of what he 
claims to have invented, and he must submit in the first place to be judged by his own 
action and words.”5 
 
 This passage reveals in effect an admission by Viscount Radcliffe that he would allow 
form to prevail over substance in a case where “by the form of his claim” the patentee 
had left open to the whole world the appropriation of just that property that he says 
has been filched from him.  
 
[13] A little later Viscount Radcliffe expressed the view that claim 11 envisaged the 
dismounting of the hindmost wheels as an essential feature, and, that, therefore, he 
could not consider whether the dismounting of the hindmost wheels was an essential 
feature of the invention or not “because it seems to me that the patentee himself has 
told us by the way that he has drawn up claim 11 that this dismountability of the 
hindmost wheels is the very element of his idea that makes it an invention”.6 The 
other Law Lords adopted the same approach as Viscount Radcliff in the House of 
Lords or Upjohn LJ in the Court of Appeal. Davidson et al say that the early approach 
to construction of claim was one of literalism. In support of this assertion these 
                                                 
5
 Viscount Radcliffe in Van der Lely at 78 lines 10-17 (author‟s emphasis). 
6
 Viscount Radcliffe in Van der Lely at 78 lines 23-28. 
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authors cite the Van der Lely case.
7
 These authors say that courts found ways of 
circumventing the type of colourable evasion that could result where claims were 
construed using a literalist interpretation. In support of this statement they refer to 
Lord Reid‟s dissenting judgment in the House of Lords in Van der Lely at 77.8 
 
[14] It is suggested that the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in 
Van der Lely and in Rodi and the approach they adopted in the determination of non-
textual infringement of patent claims were disastrous for the future determination of 
non-textual infringement cases in English patent law. It is suggested that Lord 
Diplock realised this. That is why, when next the House of Lords was required to 
decide an appeal relating to the determination of non-textual infringement of patents, 
he did not follow the approach of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in those 
two cases despite the fact that he had agreed with that approach in Rodi in the Court 
of Appeal.  
 
[15] In Beecham in the House of Lords in effect adopted Lord Reid‟s approach. Later on in 
Catnic he introduced the Catnic test as the test for the determination of infringement 
of patents in which he embraced a good deal of Lord Reid‟s approach without giving 
him any credit. To show how Lord Diplock turned his back on the Upjohn LJ 
approach that had been approved not only by himself but also by the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords, it is necessary to highlight certain special features of Lord 
Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely and Rodi as well as certain special features of Lord 
Pearce‟s speech in Rodi all of which are to be found in Lord Diplock speeches in both 
Beecham and Catnic. Where it is deemed necessary, some of the special features in 
Lord Reid‟s and Lord Pearce‟s speeches will be underlined. 
 
[16] Certain features in Lord Reid‟s dissent as well as in Lord Pearce‟s dissent in Rodi 
need to be highlighted. The reason for highlighting them will emerge later herein. 
However, before that is done, it may be helpful to briefly highlight certain features of 
Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely and certain 
features of Lord Reid‟s speech in Van der Lely. Hitchman and MacOdrum9 discuss 
                                                 
7
 Davidson et al Australian Intellectual Property Law (2008) at 514. 
8
 Davidson et al at 514. 
9
 Hitchman and MacOdrum at 175-178. 
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the Van der Lely, Rodi, Beecham and Catnic cases but seem not to have appreciated 
the extent of the legal significance of each of these cases to the evolution of English 
patent law jurisprudence with regard to the determination of patent infringement. The 
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9 SPECIAL FEATURES OF CERTAIN JUDGMENTS OF THE DISSENTERS AND 
LORD DIPLOCK‟S SPEECHES IN BEECHAM AND CATNIC 
 
9.1 Special Features of Lord Evershed MR’s Dissent in the Court of Appeal in Van 
der Lely 
 
[1] In considering whether the defendants‟ apparatus in Van der Lely had infringed the 
patented invention, Lord Evershed MR considered what the defendants had done. He 
said:  
 
“What then have the respondents done by way of avoidance (as Mr Forrester thought 
and said) of infringement of the claim? So far as relevant to the claim under 
consideration, no more than reverse direction of the machine. If the appellants‟ 
machine and that of the respondents were placed side by side upon the ground 
without any indication of the direction of traction, then those of the wheels to be 
disposed and remounted would be in both cases the same three. So in each case 
would the transition from side raking to swath turning be identically achieved. The 
result in each case would be that the six wheels would become disposed in the 
required position, „adjacent and parallel‟. For my own part I would therefore hold that 
the appellants‟ claimed device had in substance been infringed. Regarding the 
machines as pieces of mechanism the same three of the wheels of each are to be 
displaced and remounted; but because the directions in use are reversed the three 
wheels are called hindmost in the one and foremost in the other.”1 
 
 It is suggested that this passage in Lord Evershed MR‟s judgment reveals that, in 
seeking to determine whether there had been non-textual infringement, he, inter alia, 
focused his mind on what difference in substance the variant made. It is suggested 
that that was a very important part of the inquiry under the doctrine of pith and 
marrow. 
 
9.2 Special Features of Lord Reid’s Speech in Van der Lely in the House of Lords 
 
[2] In Van der Lely, Lord Reid, inter alia, directed his mind to the question whether the 
respondents could point to any mechanical reason for the variant or to any advantage 
                                                 
1
 Lord Evershed MR in Van der Lely in the Court of Appeal at 319 lines 31-44. 
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resulting from the variant.
2
 He said that the variation “is simply done to try to evade 
the claim and the respondents‟ method. But they do avoid textual infringement of 
claim 11 because claim 11 refers to dismounting „rake wheels situated hindmost in the 
direction of motion.”3 After pointing out that “[c]opying an invention by taking its 
„pith and marrow‟ without textual infringement of the patent is an old and familiar 
abuse which the law has never been powerless to prevent”,4 Lord Reid pointed out 
that it had “long been recognised that  there may be an essence or substance of the 
invention underlying the mere accident of form, and that that invention, like every 
other invention, may be pirated by a theft in disguised or mutilated form, and it will 
be in every case a question of fact whether the alleged piracy is the same in substance 
and effect, or is a substantially new or different combination‟” (Per James LJ in Clark 
v Adie (1873) LR 10 Ch 667). It was in Clark v Adie that Lord Cairns used the 
expression pith and marrow of the invention (1877) 2 App Cas 315 at 320.”5  
 
[3] Lord Reid also took into account the question of whether the alleged infringer‟s 
decision to introduce the variant made “any practical difference as regards 
efficiency”.6 While Lord Reid acknowledged that, if the specification made it clear 
that the patentee regarded a particular integer as essential it had to be treated as 
essential, he pointed out that “if the question was one of construction of the 
specification”, he could not see why “one should shut one‟s eyes to the facts of which 
the patentee must have been aware when framing the specification”.7  
 
[4] Lord Reid criticised the approach taken by Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the Court of 
Appeal on, inter alia, the basis that they had taken the mere mention of an integer in a 
specification as meaning that the patentee had intended such integer to be an essential 
feature of the invention. Lord Reid said that, if that were the correct approach to take, 
he could not see “how there could ever be an unessential feature or how this principle 
[of pith and marrow] could ever operate. And I think that the principle is very 
                                                 
2
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 lines 27-36. 
3
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 lines 30-36. 
4
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 lines 37-39.  
5
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 lines 37-53. 
6
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 22-24. 
7
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 29-33. 
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necessary to prevent sharp practice.”8 Other special features of Lord Reid‟s speech in 
Van der Lely are the following: 
 
(a) Lord Reid said:  
 
   “Nothing could be less inventive than selecting the hindmost as against the 
foremost wheels when the selection makes no practical difference as regards 
efficiency. No one suggests that the use by the respondents of the foremost 
wheels results in producing an inferior machine”.9  
 
  Lord Reid pointed out: 
 
   “… you cannot avoid infringement by substituting an obvious equivalent for 
an unessential integer. On the other hand [Sir Lionel Heald], for the 
respondents, said, again I think rightly, that you cannot be held to have 
taken the substance of an invention if you omit, or substitute something else 
for an essential integer. I cannot imagine any more obvious equivalent than 
substituting the foremost for the hindmost wheels in this machine. So the 
question is whether selecting the hindmost wheels on claim makes them 
essential or an unessential integer.”10  
 
  Lord Reid observed:  
 
   “If the specifications makes it clear that the patentee regards a particular 
integer as essential, then it must be treated as essential, but otherwise even if 
the question is one of construction of the specification I cannot see why one 
should shut one‟s eyes to facts of which the patentee must have been aware 
when framing the specification”.11 
 
(b) Lord Reid also had this to say: 
 
   “It must be true as Lloyd-Jacob J says that in framing their specification the 
applicants did not appreciate that the same results could be achieved by 
moving the foremost wheels, for otherwise they would have made their 
claims wide enough to cover this. But surely the same must be true of most 
if not all cases where there is an attempt to avoid infringement by the 
substitution of a mechanical equivalent: if the patentee had foreseen that 
possibility he would have made his claim cover it. If that were a good 
                                                 
8
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 5 to p. 77 line 4. 
9
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 21-24. 
10
 Lord Reid: Van der Lely: at 76 lines 7-13. 
11
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 29-33. 
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reason for refusing protection to the patentee against a person who later 
thinks of and adopts the mechanical equivalent, it seems to me that there 
would be very little left of this principle. Upjohn LJ said that the appellants 
have deliberately chosen to make it an essential feature of the claim that the 
hindmost wheels should be detachable. If by that he meant that there is 
something in the specification to show that they deliberately refrained from 
including the foremost wheels or went out of their way to make hindmost 
wheels an essential feature, I cannot find anything on which to base such a 
conclusion. But I do not think that he meant that because he went on to 
agree with Lloyd-Jacob J that apparently the appellants did not appreciate 
the possibility that the foremost wheels might be moved. So I think that he 
must have meant that the mere fact that they only mentioned the hindmost 
wheels was sufficient to make the limitation to the hindmost wheels an 
essential feature of the claim. But if that were right, then I cannot see how 
there could ever be an unessential feature or how this principle could ever 
operate. And I think that the principle is very necessary to prevent sharp 
practice.”12 
 (c) Lord Reid went on to say: 
   “In my judgment taking the way in which the specification is framed and the 
nature of the mechanism in respect of which this claim is made, the 
reference to the hindmost wheels is of minor importance and is an 
unessential integer. The respondents‟ substitution of the foremost wheels is 
merely a mechanical equivalent and therefore they must be held to have 
infringed this claim.”13 
 
9.3 Special Features of Lord Reid’s Speech in Rodi in the House of Lords 
 
[5] The first feature of Lord Reid‟s speech in Rodi to highlight is the fact that, consistent 
with the approach he had taken in Van der Lely, Lord Reid asked himself the question 
whether functionally the variant made any material difference. After considering the 
relevant features of the patented invention, Lord Reid turned his attention to the 
defendants‟ EXCALIBUR 59. He then said: 
 
“In EXCALIBUR 59 one limb of the U is extended and joined to the corresponding 
limb of the corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, thus making a double link 
of the shape of an elongated letter C. Functionally this, in my opinion, makes no 
material difference. It makes the bracelet slightly less flexible if one tries to bend it in 
a way which no one would normally try to do. It makes the role of the spring slightly 
different – a matter to which I shall return. It makes no material difference to the case 
                                                 
12
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at p76 line 36 to 77 line 4. 
13
 Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 77 lines 5-9. 
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with which the parts can be assembled or the bracelet can be shortened by taking out 
one or more sleeves. But it is said that nevertheless this small change takes 
EXCALIBUR 59 out of the ambit of the claim in the plaintiff‟s specification.”14 
 
A little later Lord Reid pointed out that it was not disputed that: 
 
“a very slight alteration of the wording of the claim would make it quite clear that the 
claim is wide enough to cover C-shaped connecting links. But it is said that the 
inventor has tied himself to words which are not wide enough to cover C-shaped 
links. It is not suggested that there was any possible reason for limiting the claim in 
this way. If it has been so limited it must have been per incuriam. No doubt if the 
reader of a specification is astute enough to see that the patentee has framed his claim 
so narrowly as to leave it open to him by some small modification to use the 
invention without infringing the claim, he is quite entitled to do that. He cannot be 
accused of sharp practice. He is within his legal rights. But claims are not addressed 
to conveyancers: they are addressed to practical men skilled in the prior art, and I do 
not think that they ought to be construed with that meticulousness which was once 
thought appropriate for conveyancing documents.”15 
 
9.4 Special Features of Lord Pearce’s Speech in Rodi in the House of Lords 
 
[6] Some features of Lord Pearce‟s dissenting speech in Rodi also need to be highlighted. 
6.1. Referring to a construction which the defendants sought to place upon the 
patentee‟s claim in Rodi, Lord Pearce described their approach to construction 
as “the alphabetical approach”16 He also referred to the defendants‟ 
construction as a “meticulous construction.”17 He said that he did not find it 
attractive.  
 
6.2 Lord Pearce also wrote of someone “thinking on mechanical rather than 
literary lines”18 and said, in the context of the facts of the Rodi case, that to 
such a person the essence of the connector “would be a bridge connecting two 
parallel limbs which would lie in adjacent sleeves”.19 Lord Pearce had the 
following to say: 
 
                                                 
14
 Lord Reid in Rodi at 377 line 40 to 378 line 3 (author‟s emphasis). 
15
 Lord Reid in Rodi at 378 lines 6-18 (author‟s emphasis). 
16
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 line 27. 
17
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 lines 30-31. 
18
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 line 34. 
19
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 lines 34-37. 
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“It is important that in construing a patent one should seek to find what it 
meant to the reasonable person who is reasonably versed in the matters of 
which it speaks – in this case mechanical. It is directed to the workshop and 
the market place rather than to the cloister. For that reason a plain 
straightforward construction is generally to be preferred to one that is strained 
or literary or tortuous. And meticulous niceties of construction which are 
wholly appropriate to a legal document may seem to the practical man to 
have a flavour of pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that they enable a 
copyist to avoid its ambit by means that seem to be concerned with words 
rather than essentials.”20  
 
A little later Lord Pearce once again referred to a construction of the claim that he 
described as “too strained and meticulous a construction of the claim”.21  
 
9.5 Special Features of Lord Diplock’s Speech in Beecham 
 
[7] When the Beecham case came before the House of Lords, Lord Diplock appears to 
have been the most senior of the Law Lords who heard that appeal. When one looks at 
the facts of the Beecham case and the wording of the relevant claim, one can say that 
the case was not materially different from the Van der Lely case. If Lord Diplock had 
decided it upon the same approach as had been adopted by the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords in Van der Lely, it would have been accepted as something to be 
expected. However, he did not follow that approach. Instead he followed in effect the 
Lord Reid approach and found that there was infringement.  
 
[8] It is suggested that the fact that Lord Diplock chose not to follow the Upjohn LJ 
approach in the Beecham case despite the fact that the Upjohn LJ approach had twice 
been approved by the House of Lords speaks volumes. This is more so because in his 
speech in Beecham Lord Diplock did not explain why it could be said that the 
doctrine of pith and marrow applied in that case when it had been held not to apply in 
both the Van der Lely case and in the Rodi case. It is well to remember that Lord 
Diplock had in his judgment in the Rodi matter in the Court of Appeal approved the 
Upjohn LJ approach as reflected in Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in Van der Lely in the 
Court of Appeal. Why then did Lord Diplock not follow the same approach in 
Beecham? 
                                                 
20
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 lines 44 to 388 line 7. 
21
 Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 lines 44 to 388 line 7. 
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[9] In Beecham Lord Diplock took into account a factor which had been disregarded in 
the Upjohn LJ approach in the Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords in both the 
Van der Lely and the Rodi cases. That is the question whether or not the variant, or in 
the Beecham case, the addition, was of any practical significance or whether it added 
any value. This is a factor that Lord Evershed MR, Lord Reid and Lord Pearce all 
took into account in considering whether or not the accused product in the Van der 
Lely case and the Rodi case had infringed the patented invention. Those Judges who 
had effectively adopted the Upjohn LJ approach had neglected to take this factor into 
account and had focused on the language of the claims in the specification. In 
Beecham Lord Diplock said: 
 
“Both ampicillin and hetacillin are prepared in power form. They are administered to 
human beings either orally or by injection in aqueous solution. Hetacillin when 
administered to human beings was found to have therapeutic qualities as good as, and 
indeed identical with, those of ampicillin. And well it might, for the chemical reaction 
between ampicillin and acetone, which results in the formation of hetacillin, is a 
reversible reaction. In the presence of water (H2O) hetacillin inevitably turns back 
almost entirely into acetone and ampicillin. This is what happens whenever it is used 
as an antibiotic either upon its being dissolved in water for the purpose of injection, 
or if taken orally, as soon as the hetacillin comes into contact with the moisture in the 
human stomach. If this reverse reaction did not take place in the conditions in which 
the antibiotic is administered, hetacillin would have no therapeutic value at all. So 
long as it maintains the molecular structure indicated above, it is not capable of 
destroying harmful bacteria in the human body. It is to the ampicillin to which 
hetacillin reverts on or before administration to a patient that the therapeutic effects of 
administering hetacillin are wholly due.”22  
 
[10] There is another feature of Lord Diplock‟s speech in Beecham that is important. Its 
importance lies in the fact that it reveals the type of reasoning that Lord Reid had 
adopted in his dissent in Rodi. Before reference can be made to that feature it is 
important to remember that the Upjohn LJ approach to which Lord Diplock had 
subscribed in Rodi focussed on the language used by the patentee in the claims 
whereas Lord Reid‟s approach went beyond the language and also considered what 
the practical significance of the difference introduced by the alleged infringer was.  
 
[11] In Beecham‟s case it was argued that what was claimed in the patents as an essential 
feature of the class of products was the presence of an amino group in the alpha 
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 Lord Diplock in Beecham at 195 lines 22 to 196 line 3 (author‟s emphasis). 
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position and that, since this feature was absent in the hetacillin, there was no 
infringement. In response to this argument Lord Diplock had this to say in Beecham: 
 
“This is literally true at the time of importation and sale but it ceases to be true as 
soon as hetacillin is put to use for the only purpose for which it is intended. The 
substitution for the postulated amino group of the variant incorporated in hetacillin is 
evanescent and reversible and for all practical purposes of use can be regarded as the 
equivalent of the amino group in ampicillin. In the apt phrase used by the Court of 
Appeal, it is the reproduction of the substance ampicillin, albeit temporarily 
masked.”23  
 
[12] The statement in the above passage by Lord Diplock that it was true that the amino 
group was not present in the hetacillin whereas it was what was claimed in the patents 
in respect of the ampicillin but that this “ceased to be true as soon as hetacillin was 
put to use for the only purpose for which it [was] intended” resonates with the 
statement by Lord Reid in Rodi in respect of the difference introduced by the 
defendant in EXCALIBUR 59: There Lord Reid said of the difference introduced by 
the alleged infringer. 
 
 “Functionally this, in my opinion, makes no material difference. It makes the bracelet 
slightly less flexible if one tries to bend it in a way which no-one would normally try 
to do.”24 
 
It is also suggested that Lord Diplock‟s statement in the passage quoted above that the 
substitution for the postulated amino group of the variant incorporated in hetacillin 
could for all practical purposes of use, be regarded as the equivalent of amino group 
in ampicilin was in effect a statement about the practical significance of the variant. 
 
[13] It is suggested that at this stage Lord Diplock had realised that the Upjohn LJ 
approach was wrong and that the Lord Reid approach was the correct one but lacked 
the courage to say so. That is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from his 
decision to use the Lord Reid approach in Beecham and not the Upjohn LJ approach. 
The soundness of this proposition is fortified by certain features of Lord Diplock‟s 
speech in Catnic to which the discussion now turns. 
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 Lord Diplock in Beecham at 202 lines 14-23 (author‟s emphasis). 
24
 Lord Reid in Rodi at 377 line 42-44 (author‟s emphasis). 
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9.6 Special Features of Lord Diplock’s Speech in Catnic 
 
[14] With regard to Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic it is important to highlight the fact 
that Lord Diplock did not in terms criticise any of the judgments that had adopted the 
Lord Reid approach. He did not criticise any of Lord Reid‟s dissents nor did he 
criticise Lord Evershed M.R‟s judgment or Lord Pearce‟s speech in Rodi. Not only 
that, but he also did not deal with any of the reasons upon which Lord Reid, Lord 
Pearce and Lord Evershed MR had based their conclusions in the Van der Lely and 
Rodi cases. It is also important to point out that he said nothing about Whitford J‟s 
judgment in Catnic despite the fact that in Catnic Whitford J adopted the Lord Reid 
approach without saying so in so many words. It is also noted that Lord Diplock did 
not in terms say that the doctrine of pith and marrow would no longer be used. 
However, what he said when he framed the question to be asked is what in effect 
sounded the death knell to the doctrine of pith and marrow in English patent law. That 
is because it was a different question from the question that used to be asked under the 
doctrine of pith and marrow.  
 
[15] In Van der Lely and Rodi the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had followed 
literalism in dealing with the construction of patent claims and the determination of 
non-textual infringement. In Beecham‟s case the House of Lords turned its back on 
literalism and the Upjohn LJ approach. In Catnic it continued with its rejection of 
literalism. At that time the recent cases in which literalism had been very prominently 
used were Van der Lely and Rodi. In its subsequent decision in Kirin-Amgen the 
House of Lords, through Lord Hoffman, made a statement which corroborates the 
proposition that in Catnic the House of Lords turned its back on literalism. Lord 
Hoffman wrote: 
 
“If literalism stands in the way of construing patent claims so as to give fair 
protection to the patentee, there are two things that you can do. One is to adhere to 
literalism in construing the claims and evolve a doctrine which supplements the 
claims by extending protection to equivalents. That is what the Americans have done. 
The other is to abandon literalism. That is what the House of Lords did in the Catnic 
case, …”25 
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 Lord Hoffman in par 41 in Kirin-Amgen. 
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It is clear from what Lord Hoffman said in this passage that he was of the view that 
prior to Catnic the House of Lords had used literalism and literalism had stood in the 
way of construing patent claims so as to give fair protection to the patentee. The 
question that arises is: which cases were the ones in which the application of 
literalism prompted the House of Lords to abandon literalism and advocate the use of 
the Catnic test?  
 
[16] Of course, of all the cases which may have come before the House of Lords on this 
issue over the period of about 100 years before Catnic, Van der Lely and Rodi emerge 
as the most probable cases in which literalism was applied and stood in the way of fair 
protection for the patentee. Accordingly, the House of Lords‟ own decisions in Van 
der Lely and Rodi as well as the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the same two 
cases must have been the ones which Lord Hoffman had in mind when he wrote the 
passage quoted above from the Kirin-Amgen case as the instances where literalism 
had stood in the way of fair protection for the patentee. That is why in Beecham and 
Catnic the House of Lords turned its back on the Upjohn LJ approach. It was too 
literalist and failed to provide fair protection for the patentee. The House of Lords said 
in Kirin Amgen
26
 that article 69, which came after the Catnic case, firmly shut the 
door on any doctrine which extends protection outside the claims. It is suggested that 
the House of Lords overstated the position because humanly it is impossible to have a 
system where anyone can draw a claim or claims which cover literally all 
eventualities. There will always be eventualities which fall outside the literal terms of 
the claims but which, without any doubt, were intended to be covered and should, in 
all fairness, be covered by a particular claim. 
 
[17] Cornish says that before the 1977 Patent Act of the UK there were two poles of 
thought. He says that one laid stress on the public duty of the patentee to define the 
scope of his monopoly while the other emphasised the danger of making it easy to 
avoid infringement by too meticulous an approach to the scope of the claim.
27
 Cornish 
refers to an approach in terms of which, if in the defendant‟s chemical combination, 
for example, an integer was replaced by something that did not fall within the 
description, it would be taken as not infringing. Cornish says that in such a case there 
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would be no investigation to see whether the alterations made any functional 
difference. He says that this was the majority approach and in support thereof he 
refers to the judgment of Viscount Radcliffe in Van der Lely. That judgment found 
that there was no infringement at all in Van der Lely and did not investigate to see 
whether the alteration made any functional difference. Cornish‟s view supports the 
view expressed in many areas in this dissertation that the majority in both Van der 
Lely and Rodi, in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, did not inquire 
into whether or not the variant made any practical difference or added any value to the 
invention. Cornish says that the approach of the minority entailed embarking precisely 
upon this type of enquiry. In this dissertation the view is expressed that the Upjohn LJ 
approach, which is the approach that was applied by the majority to which Cornish 
refers, focused on the literal meaning of words used in a claim and disregarded the 
question of whether the variant added any value or made any practical difference and 
that the dissenters went into this issue in their inquiry. 
 
[18] The features of Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic which must be highlighted are the 
following: 
 
(a) In advocating the purposive construction of patents, Lord Diplock said that 
that was the approach to be used “rather than a purely literal one derived 
from applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers 
are too often tempted by their training to indulge”.28 It is suggested that it 
could not have been a coincidence that Lord Diplock wrote with 
disapproval of an approach to construction that was a “purely literal one” 
and involved a “meticulous” verbal analysis when both Lord Reid and Lord 
Pearce in their dissents in Rodi had also written specifically against an 
approach to construction of patents that was literal or involved 
“meticulousness” associated with legal documents or conveyancing 
documents. 
(b) In his speech in Catnic, Lord Diplock highlighted the importance of 
inquiring into the materiality or otherwise of those features of the accused 
device or apparatus that made it appear different from the description in the 
                                                 
28





 In some of the judgments using the Lord Reid approach 
the reference to this factor is reflected by a statement to the effect that the 
variant or difference had no practical significance or made no practical or 
material difference. In the judgments and speeches using the Upjohn LJ 
approach, this factor was not taken into account. The fact that in Catnic 
Lord Diplock gave this factor a prominent place or role also supports the 
proposition that Lord Diplock had realised that continuing with the Upjohn 
LJ approach as shown in the Van der Lely and Rodi decisions in both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords was simply unsustainable in the 
long term and that the correct approach was the Lord Reid approach. 
(c) When he sought to apply the Catnic test to the facts of the case before him 
in Catnic, Lord Diplock formulated the question that had to be asked thus: 
“would the specification make it obvious to a builder familiar with ordinary 
building operations that the description of a lintel in the form of a weight-
bearing box girder of which the back plate was referred to as „extending 
vertically‟ from one of the two horizontal plates to join the other, could not 
have been intended to exclude lintels in which the back plate although not 
positioned at precisely 90º to both horizontal plates was close enough to 90º 
to make no material difference to the way the lintel worked when used in 
building operations?”30 In seeking to answer this question, Lord Diplock 
inquired into whether or not there was any plausible reason why any 
rational patentee should have wanted to place so narrow a limitation on his 
invention that a slight variation would fall outside his monopoly. His 
answer was that: “No plausible reason has been advanced why any rational 
patentee”31 should have done so. In fact he said: 
 
“On the contrary, to do so would render his monopoly for practical purposes 
worthless, since any imitator could avoid it and take all the benefit of the 
invention by the simple expedient of positioning the back plate a degree or 
two from the exact vertical”.32 
 
                                                 
29
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 10 to 244 line 2. 
30
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 244 lines 6-13. 
31
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 244 lines 13-14. 
32
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 244 lines 13-18. 
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[19] An analysis of Lord Diplock‟s speech reveals that the fact that there was no plausible 
reason why the patentee should have placed so narrow a limitation on his invention 
where the result would have been that an imitator could avoid the infringement of his 
patent by the expedient of making a slight variation which had no plausible reason 
and take all the benefit of the invention was an important reason for his conclusion 
that there was infringement in Catnic. The approach of inquiring into such a reason 
was part of the Lord Reid approach.
33
 In Van der Lely Lord Reid said: 
 
“The respondents have copied the appellant‟s method of conversion of the machine to 
a swath turner with one difference. The appellant‟s dismount the three hindmost 
wheels of the row of six and remount them separately in accordance with claim 11. 
The respondents‟ do exactly the same except that they dismount and remount the 
three foremost wheels. They cannot point to any mechanical reason for doing this or 
to any advantage resulting from it. It is simply done to try and evade the claim, and 
the respondents‟ method is the exact mechanical equivalent of the appellants‟ 
method.”34 
 
Lord Reid‟s reasoning or approach as revealed in this passage was “borrowed” by 
Lord Diplock in Catnic in the passage quoted a little earlier. 
 
[20] After a discussion of Lord Diplock‟s Catnic decision and Hoffman J‟s decision in 
Improver, Leger concludes: “we are BACK TO COMMON SENSE”.35 Leger also 
seems to suggest
36
 that Lord Diplock‟s Catnic decision does not depart from the 
“good sense” which he says was to be found in Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely. 
Leger even refers to Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely at page 75. This statement 
by Leger supports the proposition, made in this dissertation, that Lord Diplock took 
certain features of Lord Reid‟s reasoning in Van der Lely and Rodi and used them in 
his Catnic decision. Leger, after discussing Muldoon JA‟s judgment in Gorse v 
Upwardor Corporation,
37
 states that the decision like the O‟Hara decision 
demonstrated that the purposive construction doctrine did not necessarily permit a 
                                                 
33
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 377 lines 35-p.378 line 53; See also Lloyd-Jacob in Rodi at 458 lines 3-13 at 456 
lines 1-18. 
34
 Lord Reid‟s reasoning in Van der Lely at 75 lines 27-34 (author‟s emphasis). 
35
 Leger at 243. 
36
 See Leger at 243 read with what he says at 231 about the McPhar case and Lord Reid‟s speech in Van der 
Lely. 
37
 (1989) 25 CPR (3
rd
) 479 (Fed CA). 
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patentee to unfairly expand the protection afforded by his patent.
38
 After making this 
point, Leger states that in his opinion that was back to real common sense and, indeed, 
is not really a departure from the good sense cited above under which theory Lord 
Reid reiterated the doctrine of infringement in substance. 
 
                                                 
38





10 COMPARISON OF LORD DIPLOCK‟S JUDGMENTS IN BEECHAM AND 
CATNIC TO LORD REID‟S JUDGMENTS IN VAN DER LELY AND IN RODI AS 
WELL AS LORD PEARCE‟S JUDGMENT IN RODI 
 
[1] It is suggested that in Beecham the House of Lords was bound to use the Upjohn LJ 
approach to the determination of non-textual infringement and to the doctrine of pith 
and marrow. This was so because of its decisions in Van der Lely and Rodi. However, 
Lord Diplock turned his back on these two decisions of the House of Lords. It is 
suggested that a reading of his decision in Beecham reveals quite clearly that he did 
not apply the Upjohn LJ approach in that case. He applied the Lord Reid approach! 
This means that the House of Lords turned its back on its own decisions upholding the 
Upjohn LJ approach to the determination of infringement and the doctrine of pith and 
marrow. It applied the approach of the dissenters led by Lord Reid. What follows 
below provides clear proof of this. 
 
10.1 The Beecham Case 
 
(a) In the Beecham case, Lord Diplock considered whether the variant added 
any value to the product or device. He found in Beecham that the hetacillin 
would have no therapeutic value at all if it did not revert into acetone and 
ampicillin in the presence of water.
1
 The taking into account of this factor 
in the determination of non-textual infringement and in the approach to the 
doctrine of pith and marrow was part of the Lord Reid approach. In Van der 
Lely Lord Reid had concluded that the alleged infringer‟s decision to 
choose to dismount the foremost wheels as opposed to the hindmost wheels 
as dictated by the claim had no “practical significance”.2 In Rodi, Lord Reid 
said the same thing. He said that functionally the fact that in EXCALIBUR 
59 one limb of the U was extended and joined to the corresponding limb of 
                                                 
1
 See Lord Diplock in Rodi at 195 line 28 to 196 line 3. 
2
 See Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 21-24. 
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the corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, making a double link of 
the shape of an elongated letter C, did not make any material difference.
3
  
(b) When Lord Diplock responded in Beecham to the argument advanced on 
behalf of the alleged infringer that what was claimed in the patents as an 
essential feature of the class of products to which the ampicillin belonged 
was the presence of an amino group in the alpha position which feature, it 
was argued, was absent in the hetacillin, he said that, although this was 
“literally true at the time of importation and sale”, “it ceased to be true as 
soon as hetacillin is put to use for the only purpose for which it is 
intended”. He continued: “The substitution of hetacillin is evanescent and 
reversible and for all practical purposes of use can be regarded as the 
equivalent of the amino group in ampicillin. In the apt phrase used by the 
Court of Appeal, it is the reproduction of the substance ampicillin, albeit 
temporarily masked”.4 Lord Diplock‟s reasoning in this passage to the 
effect that, while it was true that the amino group was not present in the 
alpha position in the hetacillin was literally true at the time of importation 
and sale, but ceased to be true as soon as hetacillin was put to use for the 
only purpose for which it was intended, is similar to the reasoning that was 
used by Lord Reid in Rodi when, dealing with the main difference relied 
upon by the alleged infringer to say that there was no infringement of the 
plaintiff‟s patent, he said that functionally the fact that in EXCALIBUR 59 
one limb of the U was extended and joined to the corresponding limb of the 
corresponding U at the other end of the sleeve, thus making a double link of 
the shape of an elongated C, in his opinion made no material difference 
because “ it makes the bracelet slightly less flexible if one tries to bend it in 
a way which no one would normally try to do”.5 
 
(c) The Upjohn LJ approach which was applied by the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in the cases of Van der Lely and Rodi – which included the 
participation of Lord Diplock – looked exclusively on the wording of the 
claim in determining whether or not a particular feature was an essential 
                                                 
3
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 377 lines 36 to 378 line 5. 
4
 See Lord Diplock in Beecham at 202 lines 14-23. 
5
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 377 lines 36-45. 
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feature. It was a literalist approach of the worst order. However, a reading 
of Lord Diplock‟s judgment in Beecham reveals that he did not follow that 
approach. A reading of Lord Reid‟s judgments in Van der Lely and Rodi 
reveals that Lord Diplock substantially applied the Lord Reid approach in 
deciding whether or not there was infringement in Beecham. 
10.2 The Catnic Case 
 
(a) With regard to the Catnic case, it is important to point out that in the Court 
of Appeal, Buckley LJ had taken the view that, although it was not in fact 
essential to the working of the invention that the back plate should be 
precisely vertical, the patentee had, nevertheless, by the language used in 
his specification made such precision an essential feature of the monopoly 
he claimed. It is suggested that this attitude to the language used in a 
specification, or in claims was probably the most significant characteristic 
of the Upjohn LJ approach used in Van der Lely and Rodi by the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords of which Lord Diplock had approved. In 
fact in his judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rodi, Diplock LJ specifically 
said that the principles of construction of claims in specifications were 
those laid down in Upjohn LJ‟s judgment in Van der Lely at [1961] RPC 
296 at 312 which were approved by the House of Lords in Van der Lely. 
(b) In his speech in Catnic Lord Diplock placed the person skilled in the art to 
which the patented invention relates at the centre of the Catnic test or of the 
doctrine of purposive construction.
6
 He said that a patent specification is a 
unilateral statement by the patentee addressed to those likely to have a 
practical interest in the subject matter of his invention (ie skilled in the art). 
In Rodi, Lord Reid made it quite clear that “claims are addressed to 
practical men skilled in the prior art …”.7 It must be noted that in his speech 
in the House of Lords, Lord Pearce, one of the dissenters, said pertinently 
that it was important in construing a patent that one should seek to find 
                                                 
6
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 242 lines 44 to 243 line 1. 
7
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 378 lines 14-18. 
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what it means to the reasonable person who is reasonably versed in the 
matters of which it speaks – in that case mechanical.8 
(c) Lord Diplock said in Catnic that a patent specification should be given a 
purposive construction. The approach taken by Lord Reid in both Van der 
Lely and Rodi and the approach taken by Lord Pearce in Rodi was purpose-
driven. 
(d) Lord Diplock spoke against the use of a “purely literal” approach to the 
construction of a patent specification. He spoke against an approach to 
interpretation that was “derived from applying to it the kind of meticulous 
verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to 
indulge”.9 In Rodi, Lord Pearce spoke against the same kind of approach to 
the construction of patent specifications. Among other epithets, he called it 
an alphabetical approach, an approach which produced in Rodi a 
construction to which he referred as a “meticulous construction” that Lord 
Pearce found unattractive.
10
 He thought that such an approach had 
“meticulous niceties” of construction which, though could be wholly 
appropriate for a legal document, “may seem to the practical man to have a 
flavour of pedantry if they so whittle away a patent that they enable a 
copyist to avoid its ambit by means that seem to be concerned with words 
rather than essentials”.11 A little later after this Lord Pearce rejected one of 
the alleged infringer‟s arguments as seeming to him to be “too strained and 
meticulous a construction of the claim.”12 Before he completed his 
judgment, Lord Pearce once again said something against literal 
interpretations. He said: 
 
 “further, if one is going to be so literal and say that „inserted‟ (alone among 
the various directions) refers to a method of assembly, one should 
presumably limit the claim to bows „inserted in pairs‟, so that it would not 
cover operators who chose to insert them one at a time”.13 
 
                                                 
8
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 line 44 to 388 line 1. 
9
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 3-5. 
10
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 387 lines 18-37. 
11
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 388 lines 2-7. 
12
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 388 at lines 30-33. 
13
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 309 lines 20-24. 
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 In his speech in Rodi Lord Pearce repeatedly and emphatically spoke 
against an approach to the construction of patent specifications that was, as 
he put it, alphabetical, that was a meticulous construction and that was 
literal.
14
 In Rodi Lord Reid also spoke against the approach to construction 
that has “meticulousness which was once thought appropriate for 
conveyancing documents”.15  
(e) Lord Reid said in Rodi that a patent specification is not addressed to 
conveyancers.
16
 Conveyancers are lawyers. In Catnic Lord Diplock 
effectively disapproved of an approach to construction that is derived from 
applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers were 
too often tempted to indulge.
17
 
(c) Lord Diplock made it quite clear in Catnic that the question which he 
formulated as the test for determining the essentiality of an integer did not 
arise where the variant would have a material effect on the way the 
invention worked.
18
 That statement is derived from the rule of patent law 
that no one who borrows the substance of a patented invention may escape 
the consequences of infringement by making immaterial variations. What 
the rule meant was that, if a variation was material, there would be no 
infringement but, if the variation was immaterial, there would be 
infringement. This is the rule of patent law on immaterial variations which 
in Van der Lely‟s case was ignored from the court of first instance to the 
House of Lords, with the consequences which flowed from the adoption of 
the Upjohn LJ approach. That rule was applied by Lord Reid in Van der 
Lely even though he may not have referred to it in terms. Lord Pearce 
specifically referred to that rule in his dissent in Rodi.
19
 So, Lord Diplock 
effectively incorporated this rule into his judgment in Catnic. In his 
judgment in the Chancery Division in Rodi Lloyd-Jacob J referred to this 
rule of patent law and applied it to the case before him. In doing so he 
                                                 
14
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 388 and 389. 
15
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 378 lines 15-18. 
16
 See Lord Reid in Rodi at 378 line 15. 
17
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 3-6. 
18
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 12- 15. 
19
 See Lord Pearce in Rodi at 388 lines 10-12. 
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turned his back on the Upjohn LJ approach and in defiance of the Court of 
Appeal‟s decision in Van der Lely and Rodi as well as the decision of the 
House of Lords in Van der Lely. In this regard it is significant that in his 
judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rodi Diplock LJ did not refer to this 
rule.  
(h) In Catnic Lord Diplock laid much stress on what would be obvious or not 
obvious to the informed reader of the specification or to the notional 
addressee.
20
 In dealing with the question of how to determine the 
essentiality of a feature of an invention in Van der Lely, Lord Reid had 
drawn attention to the fact that there was no unanimity on how this should 
be done. He pointed out that some said it was a question of construction 
whereas others said one should have regard to all the facts of the case. He 
then said: 
 “I doubt if there is much difference between these two points of view. If the 
specification makes it clear that the patentee regards a particular integer as 
essential, then it must be treated as essential but otherwise even if the 
question is one of the construction of the specification, I cannot see why one 
should shut one‟s eyes to facts of which the patentee must have been aware 
when framing the specification.”21 
 
 It is suggested that when, in Catnic, Lord Diplock referred to what would 
be obvious to the notional addressee, the purpose was to determine what the 
patentee must have been aware of at the time of framing his specification or 
at the time of the publication of his patent. The reasoning was that, if a man 
skilled in the art would have been aware of certain facts at the time when 
the specification was published or framed, the patentee must also have been 
aware of those facts at the time. Furthermore, Lord Reid also said in Van 
der Lely that “you cannot avoid infringement by substituting an obvious 
equivalent for an unessential integer”. He added: “I cannot imagine any 
more obvious equivalent than substituting the foremost for the hindmost 
wheels in this machine”.22 It is conceded that in his judgment in Rodi in the 
House of Lords Upjohn LJ did say that whether a claim has been infringed 
                                                 
20
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 242 lines 12 to 244 line 18. 
21
 See Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 28-33. 
22
 See Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 76 lines 1-13. 
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or not was a question of construction and that a claim “must be read 
through the eyes of the notional addressee, the man who is going to carry 
out the invention described”.23 
(h) In Catnic one of the important bases for Lord Diplock‟s conclusion that 
there was infringement of the relevant claim despite the fact that the 
allegedly infringing device or machine did not fall within the literal terms 
of the relevant claim was that he inquired into whether there was any reason 
why the patentee would have limited his monopoly in the manner suggested 
by the alleged infringer. In Catnic Lord Diplock said: 
 “No plausible reason has been advanced why any rational patentee should 
want to place so narrow a limitation on his invention. On the contrary to do 
so would render his monopoly for practical purposes worthless, since any 
imitator could avoid it and take all the benefit of the invention by the simple 
expedient of positioning the back plate a degree or two from the vertical.”24 
 This was the kind of reasoning that had been adopted by Lord Reid in both 
Van der Lely and Rodi in determining whether or not there was 
infringement. Lord Reid said in Van der Lely: 
 “The respondents have copied the appellants‟ method of conversion of the 
machine to a swath turner with one difference. The appellants dismount the 
three hindmost wheels of the row of six and remount them separately in 
accordance with claim 11. The respondents do exactly the same except that 
they dismount and remount the three foremost wheels. They cannot point to 
any reason for doing this or to any advantage resulting from it. It is simply 
done to try to evade the claim and the respondents‟ method is the exact 
mechanical equivalent of the appellants‟ method.”25 
 
 In Van der Lely and Rodi the judges who dealt with those cases at the 
different levels and who adopted the Upjohn LJ approach and therefore, 
found that there was no infringement in each one of the cases did not extend 
the inquiry into the question as to why the alleged infringer had chosen to 
introduce the difference upon which he relied to contend that there was no 
infringement. However the Lord Reid approach in both Van der Lely and 
                                                 
23
 See Lord Upjohn in Rodi in the House of Lords at 391 lines 5-6. 
24
 See Lord Diplock in Catnic at 244 lines 13-18. 
25
 See Lord Reid in Van der Lely at 75 lines 27-34; see also Lord Reid in Rodi at 378 lines 6-11. 
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Rodi entailed asking this question before finally determining whether or not 
there was infringement. 
 
[2] As already stated above, the approach adopted by both the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in both the Van der Lely case and in the Rodi case was one which 
focussed exclusively on the language of the claims in the specification whereas Lord 
Reid‟s approach looked at not only the language of the claim and the objective 
materiality of the feature that had been omitted, varied or added but also in effect 
applied the rule of patent law on immaterial variations of patented inventions. In 
Beecham‟s case, which came after both the Van der Lely and the Rodi decisions of 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, Lord Diplock, who wrote for a 
unanimous House of Lords, took the materiality factor into account and effectively 
followed the same approach as that which had been followed by Lord Reid in his 
dissent in Van der Lely and Rodi. The question which arises is: why did Lord Diplock 
in the Beecham matter not follow the same approach that had been followed by the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in the Van der Lely case and in the Rodi 
case? Why did he choose to in effect follow the approach that had been adopted by 
Lord Reid in his dissents in the two matters? Furthermore, why did he not continue to 
use the same approach when he wrote his Catnic speech? 
 
[3] It is suggested that the reason is that Lord Diplock must have realised that the Upjohn 
LJ approach was wrong and produced unjust results. This must particularly be so 
when regard is had to the fact that in certain respects he relied upon some aspects of 
Lord Reid‟s reasoning in the latter‟s dissents in Van der Lely and in Rodi. In fact, 
when one reads Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic carefully and reads Lord Reid‟s 
dissents in the two cases and Lord Diplock‟s speech in Beecham, one is driven to 
conclude that Lord Diplock should have acknowledged the soundness of Lord Reid‟s 
approach as revealed in his dissents. Lord Reid‟s dissents reveal that the decisions of 
the majorities in Van der Lely and in Rodi were simply untenable and it was the 
untennability of the approach reflected in those decisions which had ignored the 
materiality of the variant and the well-known rule of patent law referred to above 
which drove Lord Diplock to introduce the Catnic test in Catnic. However, it is 
suggested that the untennability of the approach of the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords in Van der Lely and in Rodi should rather have driven Lord Diplock to 
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acknowledge and embrace Lord Reid‟s approach in its entirety and he should have 
proceeded to apply the doctrine of pith and marrow – the Lord Reid way – and should 
not have replaced it with the Catnic test. 
 
[4] Pendleton says that in both the Van der Lely and Rodi cases which split the House of 
Lords and, in the case of the Van der Lely matter, the Court of Appeal as well, the 
intention of the patentee to claim a feature as an essential integer of the invention was 
held by the majority to be the test for determining whether an infringement had 
occurred. He says that for infringement to exist there had to be copying of each and 
every such integer. He then says that this was the traditional formulation of the pith 
and marrow doctrine. He emphasised that such intention on the part of a patentee was 
to be imputed wherever a feature was included in a claim in clear language 
deliberately chosen. He says that the essentiality of the feature in relation to the 
working of invention as a whole was not considered as an aid in determining the 
patentee‟s intention.26 Pendleton‟s statement that the approach adopted by the 
majority in both Van der Lely and Rodi in the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal 
in both cases did not include the consideration of the essentiality of the feature in 
relation to the working of the invention as a whole was not considered as an aid in 





[5] Pendleton has submitted that the minority views in Van der Lely, Rodi and Catnic in 
the Court of Appeal were subsequently adopted and taken further by Lord Diplock in 
Catnic. However, Pendleton fails to advance any reasons for this proposition.
28
 It is 
suggested that Pendleton‟s submission in this regard supports the contention made in 
this dissertation that Lord Diplock, who had previously gone along with the Upjohn 
LJ approach, changed his mind after the decision of the House of Lords in Rodi and 
Lloyd Jacob J‟s judgment in Rodi and adopted the dissenters‟ approach, particularly 
Lord Reid‟s reasoning in Van der Lely and Rodi which is evident in Lord Diplock 
speeches in Beecham and Catnic. 
                                                 
26
 Pendleton Michael “Construe Widely and Face Invalidity/Construe Narrowly and Miss Infringement: The 
Dilemma of Interpreting Patent Specifications” (Sept 2004) 11/3 Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 
at par 11. 
27
 Pendleton at par 11. 
28
 Pendleton at par 13. 
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[6] Pendleton also refers to the passage in Lord Reid‟s judgment in Van der Lely 
commencing with the words “Upjohn LJ said that the appellants have deliberately 
chosen ...” and ending with the sentence: “I think that the principle is very necessary 
to prevent sharp practice”. Pendleton then submits that in that passage Lord Reid 
implied that, if a patentee did not appreciate that he was creating a functionally 
unnecessary limitation, provided always that the claims will not be construed to 
comprehend variants having a material effect upon the way the invention works, the 
court should not hold the patentee to the oversight. Pendleton submits that this test 




[7] Pendleton has also submitted that it is implicit in Lord Diplock‟s analysis of the 
decision in Van der Lely that the court should have had regard in its judgment to 
expert evidence on whether or not the defendants‟ machine‟s utilising dismountable 
foremost wheels could have a material effect upon the way the patented hay raking 
machine worked.
30
 It is suggested that this submission by Pendleton accords with the 
contention advanced in this dissertation that the majority in Van der Lely should have 
considered whether the dismounting of the foremost wheels instead of the hindmost 
wheels as stipulated in the claim had any material effect or added any value to the 
functioning of the machine which is what the minority did. Had the majority done the 
same in this regard, they would have reached the same conclusion as the one reached 
by the minority. Pendleton‟s submission in this regard also further supports the 
contention advanced in this dissertation that Lord Diplock borrowed Lord Reid‟s 
approach and reasoning.  
 
[8] Pendleton has also said, in the context of a discussion of “The true status of Catnic 
and purposive construction in Australia” that one of two difficulties which he 
identifies with regard to the “apparent acceptance” of Catnic in Australian law is that 
Lord Diplock appears to endorse the minority judgments of Lord Reid in Van der Lely 
NV v Bamfords Ltd and those of Lord Pearce in Rodi and Wienenberg, AG Henry v 
Showell Ltd ( Rodi) rather than the majority judgments (authored by Lord Upjohn in 
Van der Lely) “yet it is these majority judgments which have enjoyed predominant 
                                                 
29
 Pendleton at par 15-16. 
30
 Pendleton at par 23. 
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support in Australia and it should be said in England before Catnic”.31 Pendleton 
suggests that under a true purposive construction the essentiality of the feature is 
decided by reference to the importance or otherwise of the function of the feature in 
the invention as a whole.
32
 If this is true, it would lend further support to the 
proposition made in this dissertation that Lord Reid‟s approach in Van der Lely and in 
Rodi was purpose driven.  
 
[9] After a brief discussion of the cases of Van der Lely, Rodi and Beecham as decided by 
the House of Lords, Cornish and Llewellyn express the view
33
 that, if the attitude 
taken by the House of Lords in Beecham (after the attitude it had taken in Van der 
Lely and Rodi) suggested that some liberalisation over the attitude of the 1960s was 
beginning, this was confirmed by subsequent events. In support of this statement these 
authors then say that in the Catnic case the House of Lords, speaking through Lord 
Diplock, shifted emphasis in the construction of patent claims. The authors continue 
and say that, while it was true that Lord Diplock‟s speech first insisted that 
interpretation was the sole issue, and that there was no separate question of non-
textual infringement, he equally underscored the importance of “purposive” rather 
than a “purely” literal construction. These authors also draw attention to the fact that 
in his speech Lord Diplock also disapproved of the kind of meticulous verbal analysis 
in which lawyers are too often tempted by their training to indulge and preferred the 
understanding of persons with practical knowledge and experience of the kind of 
work in which the invention was intended to be used. Very interestingly, and, in line 
with what has been said in this dissertation, these authors draw attention to the fact 





[10] The statement by Cornish and Llewellyn that, if the House of Lords‟ decision in 
Beecham suggested a liberalisation over the attitude of the 1960s, which is in effect 
the House of Lords‟ attitude as reflected in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases, this was 
confirmed by the Catnic decision lends further credence to the proposition made 
elsewhere in this dissertation that, after the House of Lords‟ decision in Rodi, the 
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 Pendleton at par 39. 
32
 Pendleton at par 534. 
33
 Cornish and Llewellyn at 238. 
34
 Cornish and Llewelyn at 238. 
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House of Lords must have realised that the Upjohn LJ approach had been a mistake 
and Beecham became the first case in which the House of Lords turned its back on the 
Upjohn LJ approach and effectively adopted the Lord Reid approach. The fact that 
these authors draw attention to the fact that Lord Diplock was not alone in 
disapproving of undue meticulousness in the construction of patent claims in Catnic 
and that both Lord Reid and Lord Pearce had also disapproved of undue 
meticulousness in their respective judgments in the Rodi may be an indication that 
they, too, see a connection between, on the one hand, Lord Diplock‟s rejection of a 
meticulous and “pure literal” approach to the construction of patent claims and, on the 
other, Lord Reid‟s reasoning in the Van der Lely and Rodi cases just as it has been 
contended elsewhere in this dissertation that Lord Diplock‟s approach in Beecham 
was a rejection of the Upjohn LJ approach and the adoption of the Lord Reid 
approach. Lord Diplock was effectively borrowing the approach of the dissenters but, 
unfortunately, he did not give them the credit that they deserved, particularly Lord 
Reid whose reasoning he largely adopted in Beecham and in Catnic. 
 
10.3 Common Features Between the Lord Reid Approach and Lord Diplock’s 
Speeches in Beecham and Catnic 
 
[11] In Catnic Lord Diplock specifically addressed the question of the materiality or non-
materiality of an integer of an invention in the determination of whether or not non-
textual infringement had been shown.
35
 That he did so and did so specifically is 
remarkable because in the majority judgments in Van der Lely in the Court of Appeal 
and in the House of Lords as well as in the Rodi matter in the Court of Appeal and in 
the House of Lords the materiality of the integer omitted or varied or added was not 
taken into account and, it is suggested, with the resultant injustices that those 
judgments produced. It was Lord Evershed MR in Van der Lely as well as Lord Reid 
in the House of Lords in Van der Lely and Lord Reid and Lord Pearce in Rodi who 
took the issue of the materiality of the omitted integer or the variant into account in 
the determination of non-textual infringement. The Upjohn LJ approach simply 
focused on the language of the claim. It is suggested that the general approach that 
Lord Reid seems to have followed was that if the variant or omitted integer or added 
                                                 
35
 Lord Diplock in Catnic at 243 lines 12-24. 
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feature had no material effect on the functioning of the invention, one then invoked 
the rule of patent law on immaterial variations and, once that rule was invoked, a 
finding of infringement was almost inevitable. It is accepted that Lord Reid did not 
anywhere in his speech in Van der Lely and in Rodi refer in express terms to the rule 
on immaterial variations but it is suggested that in effect he applied the rule in his 






11 FIVE JUDGES WHO PLAYED SPECIAL ROLES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
ENGLISH PATENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE FROM VAN DER LELY TO CATNIC 
 
[1] The Upjohn LJ approach began with Lloyd-Jacob J’s judgment in the Chancery 
Division in Van der Lely and was taken further by Upjohn LJ and Pearson LJ in the 
Court of Appeal in the same matter. In due course it was approved by the House of 
Lords in the same matter. The Lord Reid approach began with Lord Evershed MR’s 
judgment in the Court of Appeal in Van der Lely and was taken further by Lord Reid 
in the House of Lords in the same case. When the Rodi case came before Lloyd-Jacob 
J in the Chancery Division after both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had 
approved the Upjohn LJ approach, Lloyd-Jacob J turned his back on the Upjohn LJ 
approach and applied the Lord Reid approach in deciding the issue of infringement. It 
is significant to observe in this regard that Lloyd-Jacob J would have read the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely as well as 
the dissenting judgments of Lord Evershed MR and Lord Reid in Van der Lely. When 
then the Rodi matter came before him and he applied the Lord Reid approach in 
determining infringement, Lloyd-Jacob J in effect went against both the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords which had decided that the correct approach to apply 
was the Upjohn LJ approach. 
 
[2] When the Rodi matter reached the Court of Appeal, that court still applied the Upjohn 
LJ approach in determining the issue of infringement. When the matter reached the 
House of Lords, although the majority applied the Upjohn LJ approach, not only did 
Lord Reid stick to the Lord Reid approach but also the number of the proponents of 
the Lord Reid approach increased because Lord Pearce joined Lord Reid in applying 
the Lord Reid approach. So, whereas during the journey of the Van der Lely matter 
from the Chancery Division to the House of Lords only two out of nine judges who 
dealt with the matter applied the Lord Reid approach with all the other seven applying 
the Upjohn LJ approach, by the end of the journey of the Rodi matter from the 
Chancery Division to the House of Lords, the number of judges who had applied the 
Lord Reid approach increased from two to four. This was after Lloyd-Jacob J had left 
the Upjohn LJ camp and joined the Lord Reid camp. The four were Lloyd-Jacob J, 
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Lord Evershed MR, Lord Reid and Lord Pearce. In Rodi the House of Lords was split 
3:2. The majority continued to apply the Upjohn LJ approach while Lord Reid and 
Lord Pearce dissented and applied the Lord Reid approach. The dissents which were 
produced by the dissenters were very powerful dissents. When, subsequently, the 
House of Lords dealt with the Beecham matter, it unanimously turned its back on the 
Upjohn LJ approach and adopted the dissenters’ approach, the Lord Reid approach. 
 
[3] The roles played by five judges in this entire episode must be highlighted. The five 
judges were Lloyd-Jacob J, Lord Evershed MR, Lord Reid and Lord Pearce, Lord 
Upjohn and Lord Diplock. Lloyd-Jacob J’s role in this episode was a very strange and 
yet interesting one. He was the one who began the Upjohn LJ approach when he gave 
the judgment that he gave in the Chancery Division in Van der Lely. The approach he 
adopted in determining non-textual infringement was later approved and adopted by 
the Court of Appeal on appeal in the form of a joint judgment of Upjohn and Pearson 
LLJ and later by the House of Lords in a further appeal. However, he was the first one 
to abandon the Upjohn LJ approach after he had read Lord Evershed MR’s dissent 
and Lord Reid’s dissent in Van der Lely. 
 
[4] Lord Evershed MR was the first judge among the judges who got involved in the four 
important cases discussed herein starting with Van der Lely and ending with Catnic 
who dissented from the Upjohn LJ approach and adopted the approach to the 
determination of non-textual infringement and the doctrine of pith and marrow 
referred to herein as the Lord Reid approach. Lord Reid was the first Law Lord in the 
House of Lords to dissent from the judgments propounding the Upjohn LJ approach. 
He took the same approach as had been taken by Lord Evershed MR in the Court of 
Appeal in the Van der Lely matter. When he got a second chance in Rodi to change 
his mind about opposing the Upjohn LJ approach, he not only did not change his mind 
but, instead, he persisted in the approach he believed was right and gained another 
Law Lord in the House of Lords to his side in this debate, namely, Lord Pearce. Lord 
Pearce was the second Law Lord in the House of Lords to go against the Upjohn LJ 
approach and to support in effect the Lord Reid approach. 
 
[5] Upjohn and Pearson LLJ were the judges who strengthened the Upjohn LJ approach 
in general. Upjohn LJ initially did so in the Court of Appeal but, later, he also did so 
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in the House of Lords when he was promoted to the House of Lords. Lastly, Lord 
Diplock played a very interesting role in this entire saga. First, he sat in the Rodi 
appeal in the Court of Appeal and specifically expressed agreement with the Upjohn 
LJ approach that had been taken by Upjohn and Pearson LLJ in their judgment in the 
Court of Appeal in Van der Lely but Lord Diplock later completely changed his mind 
and turned his back on the Upjohn LJ approach and, for all intents and purposes 
adopted the Lord Reid approach in Beecham.  
 
[6] In Catnic, Lord Diplock used in his judgment a very significant part of the reasoning 
previously employed by both Lord Reid and Lord Pearce. It is a pity that Lord 
Diplock does not seem to have seen the need to give Lords Reid and Pearce some 
credit in his judgments because an analysis of all the relevant judgments reveals that 
Lord Reid’s dissents influenced, in a very significant way, Lord Diplock’s decision to 
abandon the Upjohn LJ approach and adopt the approach he adopted in Beecham and 
Catnic. That Lord Reid’s reasoning in Van der Lely and Rodi and Lord Pearce’s 
reasoning in Rodi, influenced Lord Diplock’s approach very significantly in Beecham 
and Catnic is shown by a comparison of his judgments in Beecham and Catnic to the 
judgments of Lord Reid in Van der Lely and Rodi and Lord Pearce’s judgment in Rodi 






12 SPECIAL QUESTIONS ON CATNIC 
 




 has pointed out that it has been said that the decision of the Appellate Division 
in Multotec Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v Screenex Wire Weaving Manufacturer (Pty) Ltd
2
 
was not an indication that in SA the doctrine of pith and marrow had been replaced by 
the doctrine of purposive construction, but it revealed that the approach of the Appellate 
Division was in fact to “embellish” the doctrine of pith and marrow by using the 
doctrine of purposive construction as a means of determining which features are 
essential and which ones are not. In this regard Burrell is referring to JR Steyn‟s view.3 
It is suggested that within the context of the South African patent law, Steyn‟s view may 
well be supported by the fact that in South Africa the position is that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal continues – well after the Multotec case, to use the principles of patent 
construction which had been used prior to the Multotec decision. These principles are 
those set out in the Gentiruco
4
 judgment of the Appellate Division. This practice in 
South Africa must be contrasted with what happened in English law after the Catnic 
decision. In English law, soon after the Catnic decision, the Court of Appeal said in the 
Improver case that it would no longer be necessary to refer to pre-Catnic case law. 
 
[2] Burrell has expressed the view that, while the determination of essential and non-
essential features of an invention has always been part of the doctrine of pith and 
marrow, the rule of purposive construction dispenses with the need to distinguish 
between essential and non-essential integers of a claim as a step preparatory to the 
application or non-application of the doctrine of pith and marrow.
5
 In South Africa there 
was a whole debate between the Appellate Division and Burrell about this proposition. 
The Appellate Division took the view that purposive construction helped to determine 
the essentiality of features of an invention whereas Burrell took the view that purposive 
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construction dispensed with the need to distinguish between essential and non-essential 
features.
6
 It is suggested that the Appellate Division‟s view is the correct one of the two 
views in the debate. Support for this is to be found in Lord Diplock‟s speech in Catnic 
itself. In the oft-quoted passage in Catnic starting with “My Lords...” Lord Diplock 
articulated the question to be asked in each case. That question expressly inquires into 
whether a person with practical knowledge and experience in the relevant field “would 
understand that strict compliance with the particular descriptive word or phrase 
appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an essential requirement of the 
invention with the result that any variant would fall outside the monopoly claimed ...”.7 
It is suggested that Burrell was in error in this regard. 
 
12.2 Did Catnic Bring About Any Change in the Law? 
 
[3] Since the delivery of the decision of the House of Lords in Catnic in November 1980, 
there have been many debates in many parts of the world about whether or not Catnic 
brought about any changes in the law and, if it did, what changes it brought about and in 
particular whether it rejected the doctrine of pith and marrow. In this regard it is to be 
noted that the Supreme Court of South Africa has expressed the view that Catnic did not 
bring about any changes in the law.
8
 The Supreme Court of Canada also takes the same 
view. Mr Justice Binnie, writing for an unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, went to 
the extent of saying that Catnic was simply old wine in a new bottle.
9
 Unfortunately, 
neither the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa nor the Supreme Court of Canada 
gave any reasons for their view in this regard. Despite the high status of these two 
Courts, the view they have expressed in this regard does not appear to be the result of 
any serious analysis of the Catnic decision of the House of Lords and the English patent 
law jurisprudence relating to the law of infringement of patents immediately before the 
Catnic decision was delivered. 
 
[4] It is suggested that the Catnic decision did bring about changes in the law relating to the 
construction and infringement of patent claims. To conclude whether Catnic brought 
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about changes or not, it might not be enough to analyse the Catnic decision only. It is 
suggested that the Clark v Adie decision, the Marconi decision, the Birmingham 
decision, the judgments of all the Courts at different levels in Van der Lely, Rodi and 
Beecham which preceded Catnic and, of course, the Catnic decision itself should all be 
considered and analysed carefully first. This is what has been done in this dissertation 
and the conclusion is that the Catnic decision of the House of Lords did bring about 
changes in the law. Support for this is to be found below: 
 
4.1 First, it would appear that, prior to Catnic the question of whether 
infringement was a question of construction or of fact was the subject of 
conflicting opinions according to Lord Reid in Van der Lely. Adie had said 
that whether a device had taken the substance of a patented invention was a 
question of fact. Catnic decisively said that infringement was a question of 
construction. 
  
4.2 Secondly, under the doctrine of pith and marrow which definitely applied 
prior to Catnic, the question to be asked was different from the question 
which Catnic decreed should be asked. Under the doctrine of pith and marrow 
the question was whether or not the allegedly infringing device or apparatus 
had taken the substance of the patented invention.
10
 Under Catnic the question 
is whether or not persons with practical knowledge and experience in the art 
in which the product or process is to be used would understand that the 
patentee had intended that strict compliance with the descriptive word or 
phrase in a claim be an essential requirement so that any variant fell outside 
his monopoly even if such variant would have no material effect on the 
working of the invention.  
 
4.3 Thirdly, although both under the doctrine of pith and marrow and the Catnic 
test, there would be no infringement if the variant had a material effect on the 
functioning of the invention, under the doctrine of pith and marrow, once the 
variant was found not to have a material effect on the functioning of the 
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invention, the general rule was that there was infringement whereas under 
Catnic this does not appear to be the case. Under the doctrine of pith and 
marrow this was the case because of the patent law rule on immaterial 
variations. Under Catnic where the variant has no material effect upon the 
functioning of the invention, the rule of patent law on immaterial variations is 
not invoked. In fact it was not referred to in Catnic nor was it referred to in 
the important cases that came out soon after Catnic such as Codex,
11
 Improver 
and Kirin-Amgen. The rule seems to have effectively been abolished by 
Catnic. Under Catnic, once it is found that the variant has no material effect 
upon the functioning of the invention, the question is asked whether or not the 
patentee has not by the way he has framed his claims made the missing 
integer an essential integer of his invention (notwithstanding the fact that 
objectively it is an immaterial integer). If it is found that the patentee has done 
so by the language he has used in his claims, that is the end of the inquiry 
because, in such a case, the accused device or apparatus lacks an essential 
feature of the patentee‟s invention and, therefore, there is no infringement. 
This is said here despite the fact that in Catnic Lord Diplock did seem to lean 
towards finding no infringement where he could not see why the patentee 
would have limited his monopoly in an unnecessary manner.  
 
4.4 Under the doctrine of pith and marrow it was the Court or tribunal dealing 
with a complaint of patent infringement which made up its mind whether or 
not the alleged infringer had taken the substance of the patented invention. In 
Clark v Adie it was said that this was for the jury dealing with the facts of the 
case to decide. Under Catnic whether a particular integer is or is not an 
essential integer of the patentee‟s invention is not decided according to the 
value judgment of the Court but the Court defers to the judgment of the 
notional addressee who must give his understanding of whether the patentee 
intended that strict compliance with a descriptive word or phrase in a claim be 
an essential requirement. If the notional addressee says that his understanding 
is that that is what the patentee intended, then the integer is treated as an 
essential integer and there is no infringement. If, however, the notional 
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addressee says that that is not what the patentee intended, then such integer is 
not treated as an essential integer and there is infringement. 
 
 4.5  It is difficult to understand the proposition that Catnic did not change the law 
when even the House of Lords said in Kirin-Amgen subsequently that what 
the House of Lords did in Catnic was “abandon literalism”.12 There Lord 
Hoffmann said in part: “If literalism stands in the way of construing patent 
claims so as to give fair protection to the patentee, there are two things you 
can do. One is to adhere to literalism in construing the claims and evolve a 
doctrine which supplements the claims by extending protection to equivalents. 
That is what the Americans have done. The other is to abandon literalism. 
That is what the House of Lords did in the Catnic case ... .” Hitchman and 
MacOdrum
13
 seem to agree that Catnic did bring about some change in the 
law. They say that the Catnic decision appears to have been a watershed 
decision which moved the law from the two fold test of literal infringement 
and infringement in substance to an analysis of the claims given the purpose 
of the invention. Fox says that the English Courts have accepted that the strict 
literalism of the past and the limited application of the doctrine of pith and 
marrow have been superseded by a “purposive” approach to claim 
construction where the scope of protection extends beyond its literal meaning 




[5] It is suggested that the changes which Catnic brought about as pointed out above 
support the proposition that Catnic did sound the death knell to the doctrine of pith and 
marrow in English patent law. May LJ‟s remarks in the Court of Appeal in Codex to 
the effect that from thenceforth it would be unnecessary to refer to the pre-Catnic 
authorities seems to also support this. The fact that in the important cases on the 
infringement of patents that came after Catnic in English patent law no reference was 
made to the doctrine of pith and marrow also supports this proposition. The absence of 
any reference in subsequent English case law to the patent law rule on immaterial 
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variations which was an important part of the doctrine of pith and marrow, also 
supports this proposition. 
 
[6] The doctrine of pith and marrow had been used for over 100 years. Accordingly, if 
there was to be a departure from a principle that had been followed by the English 
courts for such a long time, this should have been said in clear and unambiguous terms 
and the reasons for the departure should have been given. This was not done in any 
express terms in Catnic. Some may take this as providing support for the proposition 
that Catnic did not reject or abandon or replace the doctrine of pith and marrow. It is 
suggested that, when all relevant factors are taken into account, there can be no doubt 
that it did. What has been said above shows that Catnic replaced the doctrine of pith 
and marrow. Leger views the Catnic test or the doctrine of purposive construction 
introduced into Canadian patent law by the O‟Hara decision as a new doctrine which is 
different from the doctrine of infringement by the taking of the substance of an 
invention and, he says that the doctrine of purposive construction relates to the 
meaning of claims and whether or not the infringing article is within the claims.
15
 This 
suggests that Leger also takes the view that, after Catnic, the law was no longer the 
same as before on the construction of patents and the determination of patent 
infringement. Leger
16
 says purposive construction may be said to be the prevailing 
mode of considering the issue of patent infringement in substance in Canada today. In 
response to this, attention should be drawn to the judgments of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Whirlwind and Free World which are to the effect that Lord Diplock‟s 
judgment in Catnic, which introduced purposive construction, was nothing new. 
 
[7] Brian C Reid has pointed out that in Catnic Lord Diplock did not “dissent” from the 
enunciation as to law contained in Van der Lely, Rodi and Beecham. Reid then says: 
 
  “The question may reasonably be asked – if Lord Upjohn‟s enunciation was already 
correct and comprehensive, then why was it necessary for Lord Diplock to restate it 
at all? Certainly, much time, effort and words on the part of patent practitioners 
generally could have been saved in the years since if Lord Diplock had refrained 
from making his restatement.”17 
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 The question raised by Brian C Reid in the above passage is very important within the 
context of a discussion of the effect of the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in Van der Lely, Rodi, Beecham and Catnic. It must be remembered that 
in both Van der Lely and Rodi both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
approved and applied the Upjohn LJ approach. In this dissertation it has been suggested 
that the dissents of Lord Evershed MR and Lord Reid in Van der Lely were very 
powerful and persuasive. Indeed, it has been suggested that they were so powerful and 
persuasive that Lloyd-Jacob J was persuaded by them to abandon the Upjohn LJ 
approach and apply the Lord Reid approach in Rodi in the Chancery Division despite the 
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Van der Lely. It has also 
been suggested in this dissertation that in Beecham both the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords followed suit and that, ultimately, Lord Diplock significantly borrowed 
from the Lord Reid approach in his Catnic decision. If all this is correct, it must follow 
that the answer to Brian C Reid‟s question is: but Lord Diplock had abandoned the 
Upjohn LJ approach already in Beecham – long before Catnic! Accordingly, by the time 
of the Catnic decision, Lord Diplock could not have still thought that Lord Upjohn‟s 
enunciation was correct. By that time he had long concluded that it was the Lord Reid 
approach that was correct. Pendleton has expressed the view that it is the purposive 
characterisation of essentiality that constitutes the major departure from existing law at 




12.3 Was the Introduction of the Catnic Test Necessary? 
 
[8] It is suggested that the Catnic test was unnecessary and unjustified. The reasons for this 
proposition are the following: 
 
8.1 in the Catnic judgment, Lord Diplock did not himself advance any reasons to 
justify the discontinuation of the doctrine of pith and marrow which had been 
followed by the Courts for over a century. All that Lord Diplock said was that 
people were dealing with the issue of liability for the infringement of patent 
claims as if textual and non-textual infringements were two separate causes of 
action. He did not in any way substantiate this statement. 
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8.2. to some extent the Catnic test seeks to do in a very complicated, confusing 
and roundabout way what the doctrine of pith and marrow had been doing 
simply, easily and in a clear manner for over a hundred years. 
 
8.3. The Catnic test is confusing and has caused much uncertainty.
19
 In support of 
this proposition, the following can be said: 
 
(a) soon after the Catnic decision, Hoffman J found it necessary in the 
Improver case to clarify it by giving guidance for its application. 
That is why Hoffmann J proposed what later became known as the 
Protocol questions. The need for this clarification arose because there 
was uncertainty about the Catnic decision. 
 
(b) in Canadian patent law there are cases which used both the doctrine 
of pith and marrow as well as the Catnic test to determine liability for 
non-textual infringement; from this it can be inferred that the Catnic 
test caused confusion with the result that judges did not know 
whether the Catnic test replaced the doctrine of pith and marrow or 
whether the Catnic test and the doctrine of pith and marrow were 
mutually exclusive; or whether they could be used at the same time. 
Indeed, there is even a case in Canada where the Court said that there 
is no real difference between the Catnic test and the doctrine of pith 
and marrow. 
 
(c)(i) In South Africa the Catnic test gave rise to a huge debate and 
confusion about, among other things, its relationship with the 




(ii) In South Africa the case that seems to be the best example of the 
confusion about the role and place of the Catnic test, particularly in 
                                                 
19
 Annand thinks that the Catnic test achieves a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties but not always fair 
protection for the patentee now required in the UK by the Protocol (Annand at 52). 
20
 See Visser Coenraad “The Interpretation of Patent Claims: A chronology of the Vicissitudes of the Pith and 
Marrow Doctrine and the Doctrine of Purposive Construction in the Appellate Division” in The Quest For 
Justice: Essays In Honour Of Michael Mcgregor Corbett (1995) 328 at 334-341; see also Burrell TD Burell’s 




relation to the principles of construction is Nampak Products.
21
 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court in the land in patent 
cases. In that case it held that the principles of patent construction set 
out in Gentiruco
22
 which were the principles that applied prior to the 
adoption of the Catnic test in South Africa – still applied after the 
adoption of the Catnic test. Furthermore, in the Nampak case the 
Court said that purposive construction applied as an interpretive aid 
when in fact purposive construction is applied to determine the 
essential integers of a patent claim. 
 
(iii) in Triomed23 the Supreme Court of Appeal, through Nugent JA, 
expressed the view that, to the extent that in Nampak Products it had 
been suggested that purposive construction might be invoked only to 
construe an ambiguous claim, this was wrong. In the Triomed case 
the Supreme Court of Appeal said that “(w)hile the claim must be 
construed to ascertain the intention of the inventor as conveyed by 
the language he has used (Gentiruco AG v Firestone (Pty) Ltd 1972 
(1) SA 589 (A) at 614 B-C) what is sought by a purposive 
construction is to establish what were intended to be the essential 
elements or the essence of the invention, which is not to be found by 
viewing each word in isolation but rather by viewing them in the 
context of the invention as a whole”. 
 
(iv) in Vari-Deals,24 the Supreme Court of Appeal said, through Hurt 
AJA, that “Catnic did not change the law relating to construction 
…”.25 In support of this proposition the Supreme Court of Appeal 
referred to the Kirin-Amgen decision of Lord Hoffmann
26
 and quoted 
a passage from that paragraph. That passage does not support the 
proposition for which reference to it was made.
27
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(v) although in Sunsmart Products,28 the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
through Streicher JA, pointed out in paragraph 13 that it was well 
settled that the claims in a specification should be given a purposive 
construction so as to extract from them the essence or the essential 
elements of the invention, the Court decided the infringement of 
claims with absolutely no reference to the patentee‟s intention as 
understood by a person skilled in the art and with no reference 
whatsoever to how a person skilled in the art would have understood 
the claims. What Streicher JA did was to decide the case on the basis 
of his own understanding of what the patentee used the wording of 
the claims to mean instead of deciding it on the basis of what a 
person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to have 
intended. In other words Streicher JA paid lip service to purposive 
construction and the Catnic test which that Court had adopted. 
Indeed, an examination of the Supreme Court of Appeal‟s judgment 
in Sunsmart Products reveals that in reality purposive construction as 
advocated in Catnic was not applied at all by the Court in that case. 
 
(d) In so far as the basis for the rejection and abandonment of the “pith 
and marrow” doctrine was that it undermined the statutory 
requirement that a patentee should clearly and distinctly set out his 
invention in the claims in that the doctrine extended the patentee‟s 
monopoly beyond the terms of his claims, it seems that those who 
take that view expect the impossible from patentees; they expect 
patentees to write for every conceivable eventuality when they 
formulate their claims – something that is an impossibility; it is 
recognised that Parliament cannot cover every eventuality when it 
drafts legislation. That is why courts interpret legislation to deal with 
different eventualities. The position is no different in respect of the 
doctrine of pith and marrow. At any rate the doctrine of purposive 
construction is also subject to the same criticism because in certain 
circumstances it also entails the adoption of an interpretation that 
                                                 
28




extends the scope of legislation or document beyond the literal terms 
thereof. A good example hereof is to be found in Lord Diplock‟s 
judgment in Kammins Ballrooms.
29
 The doctrine of pith and marrow 
was adequate to deal with the determination of non-textual 
infringement of patents. That is why even in Beecham in the House 
of Lords and Catnic in the Court of first instance, Lord Diplock and 
Whitford J, respectively, used the doctrine of pith and marrow to 
determine non-textual infringements. Accordingly, the introduction 




[9] Having highlighted the commonality of various features and statements between, on the 
one hand, Lord Reid‟s and Lord Pearce‟s speeches and, on the other, Lord Diplock‟s 
judgments in Beecham and Catnic – after the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords in both Van der Lely and Rodi which followed the Upjohn LJ approach 
– the conclusion is inescapable that, after the Rodi decision of the House of Lords, Lord 
Diplock turned his back on the Upjohn LJ approach. Having done so, the question arose 
as to what approach should be adopted. It is suggested that it would have been very 
difficult for him to boldly announce that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
had both been wrong in the approach they had adopted in Van der Lely and Rodi. He had 
been part of that approach. He could also not boldly announce that the Lord Reid 
approach as reflected in Lord Evershed MR‟s dissent, Lord Reid‟s dissents and Lord 
Pearce‟s dissent in both cases had been right. It seems that initially Lord Diplock 
decided to apply the Lord Reid approach in Beecham without saying much about this 
turn. However, when it came to Catnic, he must have thought that he should find a way 
for the House of Lords to get itself out of the legal quagmire in which it had placed 
itself. It had to rectify the position and abandon the Upjohn LJ approach without losing 
face. It so happened that these developments occurred at a time in English law when 





 Lord Diplock had called for the adoption of purposive 
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construction of statutes and other legal documents. It seems that he considered that the 
adoption of purposive construction in the construction of patents would enable the 
House of Lord to take much of Lord Reid‟s approach and turn its back on the Upjohn LJ 
approach without having to credit him for it as it would be seen as features of the 
purposive construction and, therefore, the Catnic test that the House of Lords would 
advocate in its decision. 
 
[10] This is how English patent law came to have the Catnic test replacing the doctrine of 
pith and marrow in the determination of non-textual infringement of patents. It is 
suggested that Lord Evershed‟s, Lord Reid‟s and Lord Pearce‟s dissents provided an 
important contribution even though they were not credited for it. Lord Diplock should 
have acknowledged the help he derived from those dissents, particularly Lord Reid‟s 
dissents. It is a pity that he did not do so. 
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